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Background: NHS 111 represents a fundamental change in the way that urgent care is delivered. It is
underpinned by a computer decision support system (CDSS) and involves signiﬁcant labour substitution,
in particular the greater use of non-clinical staff to deliver services.
Objective: To investigate four core features of health-care innovation and change in relation to the new
NHS 111 telephone-based service for 24/7 access to urgent care, namely the way in which work and
workforce are organised for this new service and how the technology and organisational context shape
the way in which services are delivered.
Design: Comparative mixed-methods case study of NHS 111 providers.
Settings: Five NHS 111 sites, characterised by differences in organisational size, form and ethos and in the
type of workforce employed and professional roles and skill mix.
Methods: The study combined ethnographic and survey methods. Non-participant observation was
conducted at NHS 111 call centres and their linked urgent care centre(s) (UCCs; a total of 356 hours).
Six focus groups were conducted with 47 call advisers, clinicians and organisational managers. An online
survey was administered to call centre and UCC staff (n = 745) to ask their views about NHS 111; trust in
NHS Pathways; and communication and information sharing (response rate: 41% for call centre staff,
35% for UCC staff).
Results: Clinical assessment by call advisers is characterised by high levels of communication (including
negotiation, communication and translation) and ‘emotion’ work, extending the work beyond simple
operation of a CDSS. At most sites clinical advisers supported call advisers in clinical assessment but also
played an important role in managing and sanctioning dispositions, notably emergency ambulance
dispositions. Clinicians at UCCs have experienced a loss of control over their everyday work, which is now
shaped by call centre workers. The Directory of Services, which provides information about locally available
services, is key to delivering an integrated urgent care system. Trust in the CDSS is higher amongst call
advisers than amongst clinical staff but there is widespread belief that the CDSS is risk averse. Staff often
develop workarounds to ‘make the technology work’. There is considerable variation in how NHS 111 is
organised and delivered, shaped by the organisational history and the professional culture of the
organisations involved. Some sites were driven more by rationing and systemising, pursuing the NHS 111
vision of ‘right care, right place, right time’, whereas others were driven more by an ethos of what they
perceived was a more patient-centred service.v
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ABSTRACT
viConclusions: NHS 111 is primarily founded on a network of different organisations providing different
aspects of the service. This network is primarily enabled through technological integration. Successful
integration also requires understanding and trusting relationships between different providers, which were
lacking in some sites. Underpinning NHS 111 with non-clinical workers offers signiﬁcant opportunities for
workforce reconﬁguration, but this is not a simple substitution of labour (i.e. non-clinical staff replacing
clinical staff). There is a signiﬁcant organisational structure that is necessary to support and ‘keep in place’
both the CDSS itself and non-clinical workers using the CDSS.
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NHS 111 is a new, telephone-based service, available through a three-digit number (111), that allow
callers to access urgent health care 24 hours a day. It offers clinical telephone assessment (triage), advice
and referral when necessary to an appropriate health-care provider. To date, all NHS 111 services are
underpinned by a single computer decision support system (CDSS) called NHS Pathways. Trained
non-clinical call advisers answer telephone calls to the service and use this technology to support
questioning to assess a patient’s symptoms, provide health-care advice or direct the patient to the
appropriate local service. The NHS 111 service represents a large-scale and fundamental change in the
way that urgent care is delivered. It is predicated on the use of new digital technologies and signiﬁcant
labour substitution, in particular the greater use of non-clinical staff to deliver health services. It seeks to
integrate a range of different health services in the context of an increasingly complex landscape of
health services and signiﬁcant increases in demand for health care.
Our previous National Institute for Health Research Service Delivery and Organisation programme project
‘Ethnography and survey analysis of a computer decision support system in urgent out-of-hours, single
point of access and emergency (999) care’ (reference no. 08/1819/217), published in 2011, highlighted the
importance of effective workforce planning, management and training in the successful implementation
and continued use of the CDSS that underpins NHS 111. It shed light on the ‘work’ and effort required to
bring a CDSS into successful use in a similar service setting. The current follow-on project extends what we
have learnt in the context of the roll-out of the NHS 111 service. The study was designed to complement
the Policy Research Programme-funded University of Shefﬁeld evaluation of NHS 111 and to focus on how
the NHS 111 service changes the organisations that deliver it and the wider organisation of health care,
notably the implications for work, workforce conﬁguration and training.Objectives
NHS 111 has provided a timely opportunity to empirically investigate four core features of health-care
innovation and change, namely the way in which work and workforce is organised for this new service
and how both the technology and the organisational context shape the way in which services are
delivered. The aim of our project was to understand the implications of these inter-related aspects for the
organisation and delivery of modern health services and inform workforce planning and organisation.
1. What is the work of NHS 111? This examined the everyday work tasks and activities involved in
delivering the services and integrating care provision.
2. Who is the NHS 111 workforce? This examined the experience and skill sets of this new workforce and
identiﬁed education and training needs of workers and how this workforce might be developed and
maintained; and examined role differentiation and division of labour (e.g. how tasks are divided
formally and informally between staff).
3. What is the technology for NHS 111? This explored the technologies underpinning the service and the
complex sociotechnical interactions required to bring them into use, including conﬁguration and use of
these technologies.
4. What is the organisational context of NHS 111? In order to situate questions 1–3, this examined the
organisational effort and environment, to compare and describe structures, practices and service
integration within the wider political, sectoral and organisational settings (within NHS 111 sites and thexv
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SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY
xviwider network of providers); explored the extent to which integration has been achieved; identiﬁed
how information and knowledge are shared across the full range of services integrated
by NHS 111; and examined how trust and knowledge transfer varies across the NHS 111
health economy.Methods
We addressed these research questions by undertaking a comparative mixed-methods case study in ﬁve
NHS 111 sites. The different NHS 111 providers were characterised by differences in organisational size,
form and ethos and in the type of workforce employed and professional roles and skill mix within it.
Our case study sites were:
l An established emergency call-handling service provided by an ambulance trust (site 1) for two primary
care trust areas. Urgent care centres (UCCs) were provided by a separate organisation.
l An established out-of-hours call-handling service run by a general practitioner (GP) out-of-hours
service. Local partners operate an integrated UCC (site 2).
l An established emergency call-handling service provided by an ambulance trust (site 3). A local trust
operated an integrated emergency department, walk-in centre and out-of-hours centre.
l An established out-of-hours organisation providing both call-handling services and UCCs (site 4).
l A commercial organisation providing call-handling services. Two UCCs were operated by two separate
organisations (site 5).
The study combined ethnographic and survey methods. The ethnography used non-participant observation
conducted at both NHS 111 call centres and their linked UCC(s). These data comprise 356 hours of
observation undertaken between 2011 and 2012. We also conducted six focus groups with 47 call
advisers, clinicians and organisational managers.
An online survey, administered to call centre and UCC staff, asked staff about their views of NHS 111 and
information transfer and communication and assessed staff trust in NHS Pathways. Three e-mail reminders
were sent 2 weeks apart. A total of 216 call centre staff responded to the survey (529 surveys were
distributed), giving a response rate of 41%. Site 1 was unable to tell us how many staff the survey was
administered to at the UCCs and site 5 did not administer the survey to UCC staff. Excluding these two
sites our response rate for UCC staff, based on the other three sites, is 35%.
Ethnographic data were coded independently, analysed jointly in data clinics and imported into Atlas.Ti 6.2
(Scientiﬁc Software Development GmbH, Berlin, Germany). We examined data within each setting and
then across settings structured around our research questions. We used a mixture of analytical approaches
including thematic analysis and matrix/charting techniques to facilitate comparison.
Survey data were exported to IBM SPSS Statistics version 19 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). Descriptive
statistics were calculated and univariate analysis of variance was applied to the data.Results
The NHS 111 service receives calls about a broad range of physical and mental health problems as well as
social issues, from life-threatening illnesses to requests for health information. The types of calls received
by NHS 111 shape the everyday work for call advisers, clinical advisers and UCC clinicians working within
NHS 111 care provision. The everyday work of these groups of staff is distinctive in each site.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Work
Building on our previous study, NHS 111 call-handling work involves high levels of communication
(including negotiation, communication and translation) and ‘emotion’ work (for the management of
potentially life-threatening events and diseases and to establish rapport with the caller, as well as
managing their anxiety and distress). In summary, call advisers engage in a range of everyday work
activities that extend beyond being simple users of a CDSS to assess calls.
The everyday work of clinical advisers varied from site to site. At all sites (except site 2 where clinical advisers
were based at a separate organisation) these staff support call advisers in clinical assessment and they also
play an important role in managing and sanctioning dispositions, notably emergency ambulance
dispositions. Call supervisors at some sites also played a key role in supporting the call advisers and
providing expert NHS Pathways advice. Levels of trust at an organisational level appeared to inﬂuence
patterns of working so that some call-handling organisations engendered a more autonomous call-handling
workforce. Clinicians at UCCs provide further assessment and a consultation, either on the telephone or
face to face (at an UCC or at home), and their work is shaped by call advisers, clinical advisers and call
supervisors working at the call centre, who determine how many patients are seen, who is seen and how
quickly patients are seen by clinicians.Workforce
All sites were required to expand their workforce to provide the NHS 111 service, employing new staff
and/or reorganising staff to undertake new roles. Commitment to their work was high amongst call
advisers and many took particular pride in the health-care nature of their work. At some sites, NHS
Pathways and NHS 111 offered the opportunity for career development roles or activities (such as a
supervisory, training or auditing role) for non-clinical and clinical workers. Although formal roles exist in
each organisation, the boundaries between roles are often blurred. Although call advisers lack clinical
training, there is consistent evidence of them performing complex health-care work, albeit supported by
the technology. We observed that clinical knowledge gathered from the system and from clinical staff
becomes internalised in call advisers who then draw on this knowledge when handling calls. Despite this
there are clear beliefs amongst the workforce that input from clinical staff is essential not only for
supporting call advisers but also to allow them to take clinical responsibility for more complex calls.
Participation in training can be challenging for call advisers and requires considerable commitment in
relation to the amount that they have to learn and also the times that training sessions are run. Ongoing
formal and informal coaching was provided at all of our sites through buddying systems, support from call
supervisors and clinical staff and feedback from the audit process. However, there is considerable variation
across sites in how these activities are performed and by whom, which raises questions about the
standardisation of service delivery.Technology
We examined the core technologies implicated in the delivery of the NHS 111 service. These included the
CDSS used to assess and manage calls and the Directory of Services (DoS) used to locate appropriate
services for onward referral when indicated. The DoS is key to the delivery of NHS 111 as it provides call
advisers with information about services including location, opening hours and remit. However, the
delivery of the services requires additional technologies (such as case record and case management
systems and booking systems) and a range of what might be considered peripheral information and
communication technologies (ICTs) (including the internet).
Trust in the CDSS amongst call advisers is relatively high, particularly compared with UCC staff. There is
some appreciation that the system is risk averse and awareness of some areas in which the pathways are
less effective or useful (e.g. multiple symptoms). It appears that GPs and other external stakeholders are
less positive about the CDSS than those who use it every day. Turning to the theme of technology failures
we noted that the providers have established contingency plans for dealing with major faults, but we also
noted that the staff in the call centres work hard to make the technology work, often developingxvii
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xviiiworkarounds that enable this. The survey suggests that staff felt that the systems were largely reliable,
although some problems with the DoS were particularly noted.Organisational context
There is considerable variation in the organisation and delivery of NHS 111, which is shaped by the
organisational history, dominant service ethic and professional culture of the varied contracted
organisations. Call-handling organisations were motivated by different reasons when bidding for the NHS
111 contract. These reasons included entrepreneurial drivers (such as expanding the size of the business or
to grow new business) as well as protective drivers (to defend against threats to existing business and the
desire to keep call handling ‘in-house’).
There is an inherent tension within the NHS 111 service. On the one hand there is a push towards
rationalisation and standardisation, but local service providers are strongly pulled towards designing services
that are aligned with their service ethic and with their views about what is needed locally. Broadly, the
commercial organisation (site 5) and ambulance service providers (sites 1 and 3) were more driven by
rationing and systemising – by pursuing the NHS 111 vision of ‘right care, right place, right time’ – whereas
out-of-hours services (sites 2 and 4) were heavily driven by an ethos of providing a service that is more in
line with what they provided as out-of-hours organisations. The competitive nature of NHS 111 contracts
has presented challenges for organisations delivering NHS 111, with the need to protect themselves against
the potential loss of their business. Opportunities for sharing early best practice have been hampered as
sites have been less willing to ‘open their doors’ to potential competitors for fear of giving away their
competitive edge.Conclusions
Each group of workers has a different but integrated role that enables NHS 111 to operate. This
integration is not ‘seamless’ and there are clear frustrations in some areas about the use of non-clinical
staff to perform clinical assessments. On the face of it, call centre work is characterised by operating in
isolation – working one-to-one with the caller; however, the relationships between call advisers, call
supervisors and clinical advisers are a crucial part of managing calls and the overall workload. The ability to
engage in effective teamwork is also important both to support colleagues during calls and to provide
advice and emotional support following difﬁcult calls. There is some variation in training across sites and in
who provides such training. This may have implications for the skills acquired by call advisers and for the
degree of conﬁdence that they have to complete calls effectively.
Underpinning NHS 111 with non-clinical workers offers signiﬁcant opportunities for workforce
reconﬁguration. However, our ﬁndings suggest that there is not a simple substitution of labour
(i.e. non-clinical staff replacing clinical staff). A signiﬁcant organisational structure is in place to support and
‘keep in place’ the CDSS and the non-clinical workers that use it. The apparent advantage of a non-clinical
workforce has to be set against the resources and structures needed to support these types of staff.
NHS 111 is primarily founded on a network of different organisations that provide different aspects of
the service (call centre, UCC and so on) and this network is primarily enabled through technological
integration (e.g. communication, information sharing). Technological integration is key to delivering NHS
111, most notably NHS Pathways being able to assess the ‘right time and right place’ for the patient
and the DoS containing accurate information about the most appropriate service available locally.
Technological integration has been achieved in NHS 111, albeit with staff effort in developing
workarounds to ‘make the technology work’. However, successful integration requires trust and
communication between different providers. Our study revealed that at some sites relationships between
different providers in the NHS 111 network were poor and mistrust (of technology and of partner
organisations) was high. Much of the communication between different NHS 111 providers was electronic,NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3with little personal contact between providers. We suggest that technological integration alone is not
enough to sustain an integrated service.
Relationships were more harmonious in sites that were co-located and/or that had a history of working
together. Time and effort is crucial in promoting shared communication and a more harmonious
relationship between partner organisations. NHS 111 imposes an abstracted standardised system on the
urgent and emergency health-care system, but our ﬁndings suggest that ‘place’ affects the way in which
this standardised system becomes embedded in practice. The way in which NHS 111 has developed in
different areas and the diversity of providers, which bring with them different values and history, suggests
that NHS 111 is unlikely to be an entirely standardised service across England.Funding
The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.xix
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DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Chapter 1 IntroductionRationaleThe NHS 111 service represents a large-scale and fundamental change in the way that urgent care is
delivered. It is predicated on the use of new digital technologies (notably, but not only, a computer
decision support system – a CDSS – and telephony) and signiﬁcant labour substitution, in particular the
greater use of non-clinical staff to deliver health services. It seeks to integrate a range of different health
services in the context of an increasingly complex landscape of health services and signiﬁcant increases in
demand for health care. In addition, it is a complex service innovation that has been introduced at a time
of signiﬁcant system reform. All of these factors make the new NHS 111 service a compelling case study.
For us, NHS 111 provided a timely opportunity to empirically investigate four core features of health-care
innovation and change, namely the way in which work and workforce is organised for this new service
and how both the technology and the organisational context shape the way in which services are
delivered. The aim of our project was to understand the implications of these inter-related aspects for the
organisation and delivery of modern health services and inform workforce planning and organisation.
This report presents a comparative case analysis of NHS 111, focusing on these four aspects of work,
workforce, technology and organisation. The remainder of Chapter 1 explores the background literature
and outlines our objectives and approach.Urgent care contextUrgent care is typically deﬁned as ‘the range of responses that health and care services provide to people
who require – or who perceive the need for – urgent advice, care, treatment or diagnosis’ (p. 12).1
It may draw on a wide range of services including general practitioner (GP)- and nurse-led care as well as
dentistry and social and mental health acute crisis teams. In England there is a range of speciﬁc urgent and
unscheduled care services including out-of-hours GP services, minor injuries units, NHS walk-in centres and
the telephone service NHS Direct (the national nurse-led telephone service) that come under the umbrella
of urgent care. At times urgent care may also overlap or interface with emergency care provided by
ambulance services and hospital emergency departments (EDs).
The pressures on both emergency and urgent care health services in the UK have been increasing. Calls to
the national 999 ambulance service increased by 3.36 million (42%) between 2002 and 2011.2 The
increasingly fragmented nature of urgent care provision has made it difﬁcult to assess demand but
Richards et al.3 reported a 26% increase in out-of-hours calls following the introduction of the new
general medical services contract in 2004 [an agreement between general practices and primary care trusts
(PCTs)].4 Calls to NHS Direct have increased by 20% every year since its introduction in 1997.5 There
continue to be debates about the appropriateness of service use. For example, in 2011–12, 4.17 million
999 calls (37.9%) were classiﬁed as category C (presenting conditions that are not immediately serious or
life-threatening), which may be considered ‘urgent’ or non-emergency rather than emergency cases.2
Government policy has sought to tackle rising demand whilst simultaneously aiming to improve services
and reduce costs.6,7 Workforce reconﬁguration and digital information and communication technologies
(ICTs) are seen as key tools in achieving these ends.
The need to better integrate urgent and emergency care services has long been recognised. The Carson
review of out-of-hours care8 argued for geographical integration of out-of-hours services to manage
urgent care more effectively, improve access and thereby increase patient satisfaction. The report was1
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INTRODUCTION
2followed by a pilot that used the NHS Direct telephone triage and advice service to integrate out-of-hours
urgent and emergency care,9 although this model failed to be widely adopted.
Six years on from the Carson review, a National Audit Ofﬁce report10 concluded that urgent care
continued to be characterised by a widely divergent market with multiple providers, leading to
understandable confusion on the part of the public. More recent government reports and consultation
conﬁrmed this view.6,11 The NHS 111 service has been proposed as a solution to this problem by providing
a centralised, efﬁcient, recognisable entry point to the NHS which can co-ordinate and integrate services to
connecting patients to ‘the right place, ﬁrst time’.The NHS 111 serviceNHS 111 is a new telephone-based service that allows callers to access urgent health care 24 hours a day.
It has been publicised as a service for patients to call ‘when it’s less urgent than 999’12 and it is targeted at
callers who:
l need ‘medical help fast’ but the problem is not life-threatening
l are unsure about what service they need
l need to access care out of hours
l ‘don’t have a GP to call’
l need health information or reassurance about what to do next.
NHS 111 offers clinical telephone assessment (triage), advice and referral when necessary to an
appropriate health-care provider. To date, all NHS 111 services are underpinned by a single CDSS
technology, NHS Pathways (see http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/pathways). Trained non-clinical call advisers
answer telephone calls to the service and use this CDSS to support questioning to assess a patient’s
symptoms, provide health-care advice or direct the patient to the appropriate local service. The NHS
Pathways assessment concludes with a ‘disposition’, which sets out the level of clinical care required and
the time frame in which is must be accessed. Possible referrals (dispositions) include to accident and
emergency (A&E), an urgent care centre (UCC), an out-of-hours GP, a NHS walk-in centre and an
emergency dentist or pharmacist, and NHS 111 call-handling staff can directly book appointments with
some of these. If necessary, calls resulting in an ambulance disposition are directly routed to 999 services.
NHS Pathways was piloted in an emergency (999) ambulance service and a primary care out-of-hours
telephone service. It is currently licensed for use by NHS ambulance services for the management of
999 calls and the safety and accuracy of the CDSS has been evaluated in this setting.13
The landscape of urgent and emergency health-care provision is changing as a result of health-care
reorganisation, which has altered both service commissioning and the range of providers in the sector.
From April 2013 clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) directly commission these health services. CCGs can
commission services that they consider ‘appropriate to meet reasonable local needs’ and from providers
who are best placed to deliver the needs of their patients and populations. Services can be provided by
‘any qualiﬁed provider’ from the public, private or third sector (p. 4).14The roll-out of the NHS 111 service
Four NHS 111 pilots were commissioned by the Department of Health and implemented in 2010, overseen
by a national programme board and strategic health authorities. These pilots were delivered by an
ambulance-led service in County Durham and Darlington PCT and three NHS Direct-led services in
Nottingham City PCT, NHS Lincolnshire and NHS Luton. The Department of Health commissioned a Policy
Research Programme (PRP)-funded evaluation of service activity and costs and patients’ perspectives of the
four NHS 111 pilots (University of Shefﬁeld, project number 049/0016, completed November 2011),15
which is described in more detail in Chapter 7. A ‘second wave’ of pilot sites was launched during 2010
and 2011 with the goal that NHS 111 would be in place across England by April 2013. In June 2012 itNIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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their locality16 and that the new service would replace the NHS Direct 0845 4647 telephone number.17 The
key difference between NHS Direct and NHS 111 is that NHS Direct was conceived as a nurse-led health
information and advice line (although it did also direct calls to other services when appropriate) whereas
NHS 111 is conceived as a service that provides a single point of access to non-emergency care, staffed by
call advisers and supported by nurses. Unlike NHS Direct, the ‘111’ number is free to call.How this research builds on our previous researchOur previous National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Service Delivery and Organisation programme
project ‘Ethnography and survey analysis of a computer decision support system in urgent out-of-hours,
single point of access and emergency (999) care’ (reference no. 08/1819/217),18 published in 2011,
highlighted the importance of effective workforce planning, management and training in the successful
implementation and continued use of the CDSS that underpins NHS 111. It shed light on the ‘work’ and
effort required to bring a CDSS into successful use in a similar service setting. We showed the potential for
the CDSS to intensify the work of call-handling, and demonstrated the complex relationship between
expertise and experience required for using CDSS on a day-to-day basis.
The current follow-on project extends what we have learnt in the context of the roll-out of the new
national single point of access NHS 111 service. The study was designed to complement the PRP-funded
University of Shefﬁeld evaluation of NHS 11115 (see Chapter 7) and to focus on how the NHS 111 service
changes the organisations that deliver it and the wider organisation of health care, notably the
implications for work, workforce conﬁguration and training.AimsOur aim was to examine the work, workforce, technology and organisation required to deliver the national
integrated three-digit number (‘111’) single point of access to urgent (non-emergency) care services.
We addressed the following research questions by undertaking a comparative mixed-methods case study
approach to understand the implications of these inter-related aspects of the new service in order to
inform the organisation and delivery of modern health services.Research questions1. What is the work of NHS 111? This examined the everyday work tasks and activities involved in
delivering the services and integrating care provision.
2. Who is the NHS 111 workforce? This examined the experience and skill sets of this new workforce and
identiﬁed education and training needs of workers and how this workforce might be developed and
maintained; and examined role differentiation and division of labour (e.g. how tasks are divided
formally and informally between staff).
3. What is the technology for NHS 111? This explored the technologies underpinning the service and the
complex sociotechnical interactions required to bring them into use, including conﬁguration and use of
these technologies.
4. What is the organisational context of NHS 111? In order to situate questions 1–3, this examined the
organisational effort and environment, to compare and describe structures, practices and service
integration within the wider political, sectoral and organisational settings (within NHS 111 sites and the
wider network of providers); explored the extent to which integration has been achieved; identiﬁed
how information and knowledge are shared across the full range of services integrated by NHS 111;
and examined how trust and knowledge transfer varies across the NHS 111 health economy.3
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4Theoretical approachesOur previous study used normalisation process theory.19 For the current study, although the theoretical
constructs of normalisation process theory were helpful in addressing the four research questions, we
found that it was more helpful to draw on other expertise across the research team in analysing the data.
This included, but was not conﬁned to, insights from science and technology studies about networks and
in particular the relationship between technology and human actors,20,21 and insights from social
psychology around trust and team work, which informed the survey design and analysis.22,23 These
theoretical ideas have informed our analyses and will be drawn on in further outputs from this study.
We agreed that it was less appropriate to structure this report around particular theoretical constructs and
instead we have used the four research questions to organise this report.Outline of the reportThe remainder of this report is structured around our four research questions. Chapter 2 details our
methodological approach and describes the research study sites. Chapters 3–6 present our ﬁndings based
around our research questions (on work, workforce, technology and organisation). Chapter 7 reports the
workshop that we held to discuss and integrate the ﬁndings of this project with the ﬁndings of the
Shefﬁeld PRP-funded evaluation15 and Chapter 8 concludes the report and explores the implications of this
work for future research.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Chapter 2 MethodologyIntroductionIn this study we used a detailed, comparative mixed-methods case study to understand the inter-related
aspects of work, workforce, technology and organisation associated with NHS 111 with the aim of
informing the provision of 24-hour urgent care. At the time of our research funding application, we had
intended to explore our research questions in the three pilot sites delivering NHS 111 services. These three
sites covered three distinct geographical areas. However, for reasons detailed in the following section we
increased the number of sites from three to ﬁve (see Appendix 1). We used survey and qualitative methods
to collect our data. Speciﬁcally, we used ethnography (comprising observation, informal interviewing and
focus groups) to explore everyday work, workforce conﬁguration and organisational contexts and an
online survey to examine staff views about NHS 111, the technology and information sharing between
NHS 111 service providers.Selecting case study settingsFollowing the launch of four NHS 111 pilot sites in 2010, at the start of our study in August 2011 we
were aware that four ‘second-wave’ sites had been commissioned to provide a NHS 111 service and
planned to launch during 2011. This offered us a wider choice of settings and organisational models from
which to sample. The different NHS 111 providers were characterised by differences in organisational size,
form and ethos and in the type of workforce employed and professional roles and skill mix within it. With
regard to location they varied in terms of spatial and population characteristics and in the extent to which
emergency and urgent care services were co-located. We discussed the choice of sites in the research team
and with our advisory group (see Appendix 2). This larger number of possible sites offered the opportunity
to explore the implications, beneﬁts and challenges across very different organisational models that include
both private and social enterprise providers as well as different NHS organisations. Guided by our
discussions with the advisory group we agreed that our main criteria for the selection of case studies
should be to maximise variation in type of NHS 111 providers (public/private/social enterprise and different
types of NHS trusts) and to reﬂect geographical variation by including a mix of north and south and urban
and rural locations.
In light of the above, ﬁve sites providing NHS 111 services in 2011–12 were chosen as case studies rather
than three, as suggested in the proposal. We felt that this both was practically manageable and offered
the combination of familiarity and detailed understanding of local context and the opportunity to provide
systematic analytical and theoretical generalisation.24 We focused our attention on two core activities of
NHS 111 services, namely call handling and UCC provision. This was in part a pragmatic decision as we did
not have the resources to examine all of the possible providers of urgent and emergency care services
(e.g. late-night pharmacies or emergency dental services). We were also mindful that UCCs received the
highest proportion of referrals from NHS 111 (in the form of either transfers for telephone consultation or
face-to-face consultation at the centre or requests for a GP home visit). Each case study site described in
this report therefore includes both the NHS 111 call-handling centre and its linked UCC(s).
The study combined ethnographic and survey methods and is described in more detail in the
following sections.5
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6EthnographyThe ethnographic component of the study included direct observation of staff at call centres and at
UCCs, informal interviewing of staff at these locations and a series of focus groups with staff and key
stakeholders. This part of the project aimed to provide a detailed, nuanced understanding of the everyday
work, workforce conﬁguration and roles, technology and wider contextual factors in each setting.
Our previous research18 looking at the same telephone call-handling decision support system in the context
of emergency and urgent care using the same methods informed this aspect of the study.Non-participant observation
The ethnographic component of the project addressed all four research questions (see Chapter 1, Research
questions). Given the time scale of the project (15 months) we employed a rapid ethnographic approach
characterised by a range of data collection methods to provide an understanding of actors and activities in
a given (short) time frame. This meant sticking closely to the focus of the research (driven by the research
questions), making effective use of key informants and capturing rich ﬁeld data by using multiple observers
and interactive observation techniques, and undertaking collaborative qualitative data analysis.25 It should
be noted, however, that the work in this project builds strongly on our earlier work,18 which included
some 500 hours of observation of call advisers and clinical advisers engaged in similar work in call centres.
Observation in each setting was designed to capture activity at different times of the day/days of the
week, including day shifts, evenings, nights and weekends. The total number of observation hours at each
site varied depending on the complexity of local organisation and work practices, and at two sites we
undertook slightly less observation. These were sites that took part in our previous project (sites 1 and 2).
An orientation visit by research team members was undertaken at each site that we had not previously
worked with, to outline the project and negotiate access with key staff. In undertaking observational work
one researcher visited the site at any one time. Much of the observation was undertaken by AR, but JT, JP,
SH and CP also undertook some observation. Researchers closely observed staff engaging in their everyday
work and how they interacted with each other and the technology. The data collection built on our
previous work in which the focus was limited to staff use of the CDSS (primarily non-clinical call advisers).
This project included detailed observation of a wider range of staff and a wider range of clinical activity
involved in the provision of NHS 111 services compared with the previous project. We focused on UCC
activity as well as call-handling activity and on clinicians as well as call advisers.
With permission the researcher usually focused on one member of staff (see Appendix 3 for the participant
information sheet). At call-handling sites the researcher typically sat alongside three to four different
members of staff on a given shift (a period of 2 hours per staff member) to observe what they do. The
focus was both on call advisers using the CDSS and how a call disposition was made and on clinical
advisers/supervisors within the call-handling site. We were also interested in the interaction and division of
labour between these staff roles. Observation was also undertaken at UCCs as a large proportion of
dispositions go to the UCC. Activity was more varied in UCC settings because UCCs differed in their size,
organisation and range of activities. Observation was undertaken of clinical staff undertaking telephone
consultations and patterns of activity in communal areas (receptions, nurses’ stations, waiting rooms) and
also involved travelling in cars with drivers and GPs. Observation did not include any face-to-face
consultations with patients. In both call centres and UCCs we looked at interactions between staff,
technologies in use and the settings, including networks and relationships, integrated working, routines,
everyday processes, and workload and content.
During quieter periods the researcher sometimes discussed the work of staff members informally or joined
in conversations. These informal conservations were used to augment and to help to understand what was
being observed. Speciﬁcally, the purpose of these conversations was to (1) enable the researcher to check
with staff that what was observed has been accurately understood/interpreted and (2) understand the
nature of everyday NHS 111 work. At busy periods there was not always the opportunity to engage staffNIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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during the observation period and transcribed soon afterwards. Field notes described the everyday work of
the staff involved in delivering the NHS 111 service, as well as their opinions about NHS 111 and any other
relevant background information. Notes – including verbatim or near-verbatim statements – were, for the
most part, taken overtly in the setting, forming an outline from which more detailed notes were written up
afterwards. Details about the staff, the nature of the calls and the triage process were anonymised.
The observation was structured to capture activity at different times of the day and days of the week but
primarily focused on busier times of the day, the ‘out-of-hours’ period of evenings and weekends.
Observation covered all or part of a shift depending on the setting (typically 6 hours at a time).
Ethnographic data consisted of a total of 356 hours of observation conducted over 10–14 days at
each site (Table 1).
Focus groups
In total, six focus groups were undertaken with staff and key stakeholders from across the NHS 111 service
network, one each at sites 1–3 and 5 and two at site 4. Focus groups addressed different aspects of all of
the research questions and focused on how NHS 111 had changed the nature of the work, the impact
that it had had on the organisations and the barriers to and facilitators of NHS 111 for work, workforce
and organisation. Focus groups consisted of six to nine individuals. The precise focus of the focus groups
was informed by the observational work and by the roles of the participants. A topic guide was prepared
for facilitating focus groups but this allowed ﬂexibility to explore issues that arose from the participants
(see Appendix 4). Potential participants (staff and key stakeholders) were identiﬁed following periods of
observation in each site. Participants included a range of staff in different job roles (call advisers, clinicians
and managers) but were primarily from call centre organisations (Table 2). Before each focus groupTABLE 1 Observational data collection: hours, days and time period of data collection by setting
Site No. of hours No. of days Time period
1 60 10 October 2011–May 2012
2 60 10 December 2011–January 2012
3 72 12 February–June 2012
4 82 14 April–May 2012
5 82 14 July–October 2012
Total 356 60 October 2011–October 2012
ABLE 2 Focus groups: number of groups and participants
Site No. of focus groups No. of participants Professional roles of participants
1 1 7 Call advisers, call supervisors, trainers, clinical adviser
2 1 9 Call advisers, trainer, auditor, manager
3 1 8 Call advisers, call supervisor, UCC administrator, manager,
clinical adviser, district nurse, patient/lay adviser
4 2 14 (7 per group) Call advisers, call supervisors/managers (group 1); clinical
advisers, nurse practitioners, GP, senior managers (group 2)
5 1 9 Call advisers, trainee call advisers, trainer, clinical advisers
Total 6 47T7
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8commenced the researcher explained the study and consent form, seeking written consent to conduct the
focus group (see Appendices 3 and 5) and digitally record and subsequently transcribe the focus group
interview. Assurances were given about conﬁdentiality of the recording and anonymity of the transcript.
All of the focus groups were recorded and typically they lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. Two members
of the research team conducted each focus group (one as a moderator/facilitator and one as an
observer/assistant).
Analysis of ethnographic data
Observational data and interview data were analysed together. A sample of ﬁeld notes and focus group
transcripts was read and open coded independently by SH, CP, JP, AR, SB and JT. The codes were discussed
in data clinics and reﬁned. Transcripts and ﬁeld notes were imported to Atlas.Ti 6.2 (Scientiﬁc Software
Development GmbH, Berlin) and coded to facilitate data management and retrieval. We held six data clinics
to discuss emerging codes, explore themes of interest and develop our interpretations. As the study
progressed the analysis was structured to examine all of the data within each setting and then across the
settings using the research questions and four key aspects of the study (work, workforce, technology,
organisational context). Data clinics were organised around sets of observational or interview data read in
advance. We also used matrix/charting techniques to facilitate comparison and had ongoing discussions
with the wider team and the advisors to check our interpretations.Survey
Design of the survey and sample
The survey ﬁrst collects some basic information about job role and length of time working at the
organisation and with NHS Pathways and is then divided into three key sections (see Appendices 6 and 7).
The ﬁrst part of the survey includes nine questions that ask staff about their views of NHS 111 as well as
their views on how it affects demand for urgent and emergency care. These questions were primarily
developed based on policy material about the aims of NHS 111 (e.g. to promote easier access). The second
part of the survey includes nine questions about information transfer and communication, including
questions about technological information sharing and communication between NHS 111 providers. These
questions were derived primarily from our ethnography work. The third part of the survey consists of
10 questions to assess staff trust in NHS Pathways. The ﬁrst seven of these questions relate to the
technology itself and the remaining three to the interactions between the technology and staff. These
questions about the technology were based on an earlier survey conducted in our previous work.18 Finally,
we asked respondents an open question about their views of NHS 111, which allowed them to provide
any additional comments or elaborate on aspects related to the survey. All items in the three main sections
of the survey were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 5 = ‘strongly agree’).
The survey was piloted with ﬁve NHS 111 call advisers in one site who discussed the face and content
validity of the survey. The call advisers were asked to comment on the length, readability and content of
the survey. Following piloting some changes were made, notably the inclusion of additional questions and
rewording of some of the items.
We aimed to include a range of staff at call centres (including call advisers, call supervisors and clinical
advisers) and at UCCs [GPs, nurse practitioners (NPs), emergency care practitioners (ECPs), managers and
administrative staff when applicable]. To some extent we were reliant on managers at sites to identify who
they felt it would be most appropriate to send the survey out to as the survey might not be directly
relevant to everyone who works within that organisation. The survey was administered online. An e-mail
that included a web link to the survey was sent to staff by a manager at each site; this was accompanied
by a participant information sheet (see Appendix 6). Managers at each site sent three follow-up reminder
e-mails to staff, 2 weeks apart. To maximise response rates we also offered sites paper copies of the surveyNIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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copies to us in a Freepost return envelope.Response rate
The survey was administered to 529 staff at call centres and 216 replies were received, giving a response
rate of 41% (Table 3). There was considerable variation in response rate between sites, with the lowest
response rate at site 1 (28%) and the highest at site 3 (70%). With regard to UCCs, site 1 was unable to tell
us how many UCC staff the survey was administered to and site 5 did not administer the survey to UCC
staff. Therefore, our response rate for UCCs is calculated based on sites 2, 3 and 4. At these sites the survey
was administered to 194 staff and yielded a response rate of 35%. The nature of online surveys and limits
of research ethics approval were such that we were not able to collect information about non-responders.
Analysis of survey data
Data from the online survey were directly exported as CSV ﬁles (which included all completed surveys).
Any paper versions of completed survey were double entered in Microsoft Excel (2010; Microsoft Corp.,
Redmond, WA, USA), checked and corrected. Data were then exported into IBM SPSS Statistics version 19
(IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA) and descriptive summary statistics were calculated.
Questions relating to information transfer and communication (Q13–21) and questions about the
monitoring of non-clinical call advisers (Q29), need for clinical support for of non-clinical call advisers (30)
and the ability of non-clinical call advisers to perform their role safely (Q31) were analysed individually. The
nine questions that asked staff about their views of NHS 111 were grouped into two composite variables:
whether staff felt that NHS 111 was ‘good for patients’ (average of Q4–6 and 11) and whether staff felt
that NHS 111 was effective in dealing with the demands on health providers (average of Q7–10 and 12).
Reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha was performed on each composite variable and revealed high
internal consistency (α = 0.86 and 0.92 for ‘good for patients’ and ‘manages demand’ respectively). In
relation to Q22–28 about trust in the technology, responses were averaged to generate an overall score.
Reliability analysis revealed high internal consistency (α = 0.95).
The survey data were then analysed across sites for each individual variable or composite variable as
detailed above using univariate analysis of variance. In addition, each variable was further analysed
dependent on whether the respondent was a clinical or a non-clinical member of staff and also dependent
on whether the staff member was located in the call centre or in an UCC. Signiﬁcant effects, when they
occurred, are detailed throughout the report.TABLE 3 Survey response rate
Site Call centre staff UCC staff
1 32/115 (28%) 21/not knowna
2 25/48 (52%) 17/43 (40%)
3 32/46 (70%) 28/80 (35%)
4 85/237 (36%) 23/71 (32%)
5 42/83 (51%) NAb
Total 216/529 (41%) 68/194 (35%)c
NA, not applicable.
a Data on who the survey was administered to at site 1 UCCs are not available.
b Site 5 did not administer the survey to UCC staff.
c Total based on the sites with available data (i.e. excludes sites 1 and 5).
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METHODOLOGY
10The case study sitesThe case study sites included different models of NHS 111 service provision (Table 4). There were some key
organisational differences including:
l The type of organisation that provided call handling. Two sites (sites 1 and 3) were ambulance
services, two (sites 2 and 4) were out-of-hours organisations and one (site 5) was a commercial
provider. Our study did not include a NHS Direct-led service.
l Length of experience using NHS Pathways and providing NHS 111. Sites 1 and 2 had considerable
experience of NHS Pathways prior to the launch of NHS 111 and were two of the earlier sites to pilot
NHS 111. In comparison, site 5 was relatively new to NHS Pathways and NHS 111 during the course of
our study.
l The size of population covered, ranging from approximately 140,000 to 760,000.
l The existence of UCCs. UCCs existed in all sites. The number (and location) of UCCs reﬂected the size
of the population and urban/rural geography. UCCs at sites 1, 3 and 4 were open to walk-in patients
as well as NHS 111 referrals. In site 4 the call-handling organisation also operated the UCCs.
There was some variation in workforce roles at each site (Table 5). All of the sites except for site 2 had call
advisers, call adviser supervisors and clinical advisers; in site 2 the clinical advisers were employed by a
different organisation in a different location. Site 2 based its GP telephone consultation role at the call
centre rather than at the UCC. All services had links with district nursing teams remotely, but site 3
additionally based a district nurse at the call centre during the out-of-hours period. Call advisers are
referred to by different titles at different sites, such as health advisers, call assessors and call advisers. For
consistency we will refer to this role as call adviser (in line with the Department of Health description).12
At some sites clinical advisers are also referred to as clinical support desk (CSD) practitioners and nurse
advisers. For consistency we will refer to these staff as clinical advisers.TABLE 4 Organisational characteristics of the study sites
Characteristic Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5
Start datea August 2011 November 2011 May 2011 November 2011 March 2012
Location North-east North-west South Midlands South
Geography Urban
city/town
Urban town Urban town
and rural
Urban city/town and
rural
Urban city
Population 600,000 140,000 140,000 760,000 250,000
Call-handling
provider
organisation
Ambulance
foundation
trust
GP-led out-of-hours
organisation (part of
larger consortium)
Ambulance
trust
GP-led
out-of-hours
organisation
Commercial
provider
No. of call
centres
2 1 1 2 1
No. of UCCs 6 (3 are
also WICs)
2 1 (integrated
with ED
and WIC)
8 (4 open to
walk-in patients)
2
Co-location of
services
Call centre
and 999 service
co-located;
UCCs are
separate
Call centre and
GP telephone advice
service co-located;
UCC and nurse
advice service
separate
Call centre,
999 service
and district
nursing service
co-located;
separate from
UCC
One call centre
separate and one
co-located with an
UCC
Call centre is
co-located
with one
UCC
WIC, walk-in centre.
a Start date of the NHS 111 service ‘going live’.
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
TABLE 5 Workforce roles at call centres and UCCs
Workforce role Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5
Call centre roles
Call adviser ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Call supervisor ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Clinical adviser ✓ Not on site ✓ ✓ ✓
District nurse ✓
UCC clinical roles
GP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ECP ✓ ✓
NP ✓
Pharmacist ✓
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3At UCCs all sites employed GPs to provide telephone consultations as well as face-to-face consultations at
the centre and home visits. At sites 1 and 4 ECPs worked alongside GPs in this role and undertook similar
duties to GPs. Site 4 also employed NPs in a similar role.
In Chapters 3–6 the results of the ethnographic data collection (observation and focus groups) and the
survey ﬁndings have been combined. The following abbreviations are used in the presentation of the
qualitative data to indicate sources:
l CallA – call adviser
l ClinA – clinical adviser
l CallS – call supervisor
l CMgr – call manager
l DN – district nurse
l ECP – emergency care practitioner
l GP – general practitioner
l NP – nurse practitioner
l SMgr – senior manager.11
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In this chapter we explore the nature of everyday work tasks and activities involved in delivering NHS 111services. We ﬁrst describe the nature and type of calls received by the NHS 111 service before examining
the everyday tasks and activities of different groups of NHS 111 workers including call advisers, clinical
advisers and UCC clinicians.Types of calls received by the NHS 111 serviceMany calls made to the NHS 111 service were about symptoms that included coughs, colds, sore throats,
rashes, fever, sprains, headaches, abdominal pain, vomiting and diarrhoea. Typically, staff reported higher
volumes of calls from certain populations, such as parents of young children and more elderly patients,
consistent with the literature on out-of-hours and unscheduled care.26 Calls were received about a broad
range of issues including requests for health information (e.g. contraception advice or medication advice)
or a repeat prescription. Staff at some sites, particularly those who had previously provided a single point
of access or out-of-hours service (sites 1 and 4), believed that the introduction of NHS 111 had generated
calls about a broader range of issues. Staff perceived that this was also the result of changes in patients’
expectations of health services more generally:© Que
Health
provid
addres
Park, S[It’s] changed quite a lot, now we’ve took 111 on . . . We get a lot of calls now for patients just
wanting a bit of information and advice . . . how to take some medications . . . Before, we just
basically helped people who were unwell. Now, it’s help and advice . . . it’s a lot different to how it
used to be.
CallA4, focus group, site 4People want more immediate . . . help now. People are going to come up to [UCC] to get a bottle of
Calpol on prescription free of charge [rather] than pay £2.50 or whatever . . . at [the pharmacy],
aren’t they?
CallS1, focus group, site 3Health-care professionals and other services also called NHS 111 to obtain appointments for patients in
their care or to seek advice, including calls from nursing or residential care, usually by a nurse or a care
assistant/manager. When calls are made by a qualiﬁed health professional the patient is not triaged;
instead, a decision is made about the type of care and speed of response needed. Other calls are received
from the probation service, the police service, social services and paramedics or other health professionals.
Site 4 had an alternative, dedicated number for patients who had identiﬁed chronic or palliative care
needs, with calls answered by NHS 111 staff but referred directly to a clinician for assessment.
Call advisers and clinicians alike spoke of the prevalence of calls concerning ‘social problems’ or mental
health problems, with callers seeking reassurance or a friendly ear to talk to. Once a medical need is ruled
out, call advisers may provide unscripted reassurance or support (i.e. not prompted by NHS Pathways),
relying on their communication skills and experiential knowledge. These types of call were sometimes from
‘repeat’ callers to the service:So you are getting a bit angry are you? Have you done anything? So you are having a few problems
with your ex-girlfriend. Let’s just take a few details and we can get you some care [. . .] Have you got
people you work with on this feeling angry? Have you spoken to them?
CallA20, observation, call centre, site 113
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NIHR[There is a call] from a female repeat caller. She has already made three 111 and 999 calls today and
was attended earlier by an ambulance. The clinical adviser says ‘put it through as a doctor
[disposition] . . . we can’t keep sending crews’.
Observation, call centre, site 3Staff suggested that the general public are sometimes confused about when to telephone NHS 111, for
example using 111 rather than 999 or vice versa or not being clear what NHS 111 is for. A range of factors
is likely to inﬂuence a patient’s decision to call NHS 111, but staff believe that the way in which NHS 111 is
advertised could create additional demand, exacerbated by ‘111’ being a free telephone number:One of the biggest hang ups with 111 is the poster; it is kind of like creating a need; ‘if you need
medical help fast call 111’; what does that mean?
CallA3, observation, call centre, site 4At all sites the NHS 111 service received calls from people who reported that they were unwilling or
unable to obtain an appointment at their GP surgery or, in some cases, with their dentist. Patients were
sometimes confused by the fact that NHS 111 is a 24/7 urgent care number but they were often advised
only to try telephoning their GP again, or to attend the local walk-in centre when one was available. This
may also be exacerbated by GP surgeries encouraging patients to call 111 when same-day appointments
were not available, as well as transferring calls to NHS 111.When CallA1 finishes the call she says [with sarcasm], ‘they’re good these doctors surgeries! This
guy phoned up for a visit and was told by the surgery, “we can’t get someone out now, so phone
out-of-hours” ’.
Observation, call centre, site 2The clinical adviser says that there are a number of patients who are ‘working the system’ – i.e. bypassing
routine general practice and presenting to 111 instead.
Observation, call centre, site 4All sites suggested that some GP surgeries are advising patients to use NHS 111 during the daytime as an
alternative, causing tension between those working within NHS 111 (call advisers, clinical advisers and GPs)
and those working at GP surgeries. At least two sites (sites 1 and 4) now routinely record all reports that
patients have been advised to phone 111 by their GP practice as well as those surgeries that transfer their
telephones over to the 111 number early. Some sites were keen to see greater integration with GP
surgeries, including being able to book routine GP appointments, but recognised that many surgeries
would be reluctant to do this.The GP tells CallA19 about a GP surgery ‘that were refusing patient appointments from 5 pm and
saying they were going in an hour and to phone 111’. The GP appeared quite angry: ‘it’s wrong’.
Observation, call centre, site 2CMgr2: The surgeries are . . . not joined for us to be able to follow the call all the way through. I’ve
just had a call now, where a patient couldn’t see their doctor for two weeks [. . .] A lot of the patients
are using the 111 service purely because they can’t get what they need from their doctor’s surgeries.
So they don’t even attempt the doctors’ surgeries . . . they go via 111 to start with, thinking that
they’re going to get more out of 111 than they are . . . then it’s not the case, because we can’t offer
them anything at the end of the disposition.CallA3: I’ve had this said to me, particularly at weekends or on a Friday, ‘well, if I ring you, I know that
I’m going to be seen . . . because I know that if I wait ’til Monday morning, I’m never going to be seen’.CallA4: That’s misuse of the service, though, isn’t it?Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.CMgr2: It is . . . misuse but . . . we’re always going to generate that.CallA4: But some patients wait, don’t they? They’re at work . . . they wait till they get in, and
then . . . So . . . that’s all changed.CallA1: They’ve got a good service from us in the past, they’ll use us all the time, because you’re not
going to get good service from your doctor, are you? You know that. You can ring us, we assess
them, takes six minutes, they’ve got an appointment within the half an hour, and they’re happy,
aren’t they, really, because they think ‘this is great; I’m going to come here again’.
Focus group, site 4In summary, the NHS 111 service receives calls about a range of issues that are broader than urgent care
and some staff are concerned that the NHS 111 service may have increased the number of ‘non-urgent
calls’ (compared with out-of-hours services). There is some confusion for some patients about the purpose
of NHS 111 and what it can be expected to offer. The types of calls received by NHS 111 shape the
everyday work for call advisers, clinical advisers and UCC clinicians working within NHS 111 care provision.What is the work of call advisers?Call advisers are mainly employed to provide clinical assessment using NHS Pathways and to direct patients
to the most appropriate care, as indicated by the CDSS disposition. Call advisers are responsible for directly
arranging care for patients, when appropriate. This commonly includes transferring a call to a clinical
adviser for further assessment or home advice, directly booking a patient a telephone or face-to-face
consultation with a clinician at the UCC, arranging for a district nurse to visit a patient or arranging an
emergency ambulance. In this section we outline key aspects of the role, including communication,
emotion and quasi-clinical work.Communication work
Clinical assessment using NHS Pathways
Our previous study examined the everyday work and skills of call advisers in detail.18,27 This current project
conﬁrmed much of our previous analysis but it has extended our understanding of the everyday work of
call advisers. It is not our intention to replicate earlier ﬁndings in full but instead provide an overview of the
key aspects of call-handling work within the NHS 111 service.
NHS Pathways synthesises current clinical research into a series of algorithms that, when followed
accurately, should produce consistent outcomes so that there is an objectively ‘correct’ disposition for
every condition. By extension, the role of the call adviser is to identify the most important symptom for
triage and allow the CDSS to drive the assessment, so that call advisers are, in essence, trained users of
technology. However, our previous work contended that call advisers do more than simply use the CDSS.
Some call advisers ‘follow the system’ as closely as they can, as they are trained to do. This is particularly
observable with less experienced call advisers. However, NHS Pathways is designed to include a degree of
ﬂexibility so that call advisers can ask questions in different ways using ‘supporting information’ provided
in the system, whilst still ‘capturing the clinical essence’ of the question (‘probing’). Probing is required to
elicit the most accurate or precise information possible, which can change the disposition, for example
asking the patient to describe the nature of their chest pain (e.g. ‘crushing’, ‘shooting’, ‘aching’, ‘ripping’):You can probe more, and you can word it in a way that you think [the caller is] going to understand . . .
put it in your own words, but you’ve got to make sure that you still stick to the same track of
what . . . you’re trying to ask, the information that you’re trying to get from them. Which . . . is quite
difficult, because you’ve . . . only got a few seconds to think, how you’re going to ask this person.
CMgr2, focus group, site 415
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the teNIHRNHS Pathways] also teaches you, because every time you use it, you learn. When you read the
formation, the next time you come to do that call again you know what to say. You [learn] to say
hings in different ways . . . like . . . the dreaded, ‘have you got a ripping or tearing pain question?’
veryone says, ‘yes’, to that, so you learn how to say it in different ways . . . Pathways helps you do
hat with the supporting information.
CallA3, focus group, site 5rvation at all sites conﬁrmed our earlier ﬁndings that the call adviser acted as a ‘translator’ between
Pathways and the caller; this is a critical component of call assessment. Call advisers explain clinical
in a way that is comprehensible to the caller, provide explanations and, conversely, interpret the
’s description of symptoms. The way in which call advisers employ their communication skills is
ularly evident when callers experience difﬁculty in answering questions, especially questions that
re the caller to ‘quantify’ symptoms (e.g. the amount of blood loss, severity of pain, how unwell
feel):a parent phoned with a child that’s a little bit lifeless, and we say . . . ‘is the child floppy and
feless’? If we just went on what the parent said, ‘yes, they are . . .’ we’d have to get an ambulance
or that child . . . But if you . . . chat a bit more . . . ‘well, are they floppy and lifeless, or are they just a
ttle bit lethargic, and a bit sleepy?’ Now, if mum’s saying they are floppy and lifeless . . . we need
hat ambulance, but sometimes, an interpretation of floppy and lifeless, it might just be a listless,
thargic baby who doesn’t need an ambulance. How do you decide which one is life-threatening and
ot? You chat to the mum as much as you can . . . you know, is it like a ragdoll?
CallA4, focus group, site 4dvisers constantly test out their understanding from the caller, by reﬂecting their description back to
r her. This ensures that they have a clear picture of the symptoms described by the caller. This also
o defer responsibility back to the patient, who is then primarily responsible for describing what he or
inks the main or most serious symptom is.
call advisers often have high emergency ambulance disposition rates, partly because they have yet to
enough experience to develop the probing and translation skills that are necessary to make NHS
ays work. More experienced call advisers internalise the knowledge/clinical expertise within the
, observable in the way that they sometimes work ahead of the system. It is a ﬁne line between
ing using the supporting information’ and ‘using your own words’; call advisers are aware of this:allA1 speaks very fast when triaging calls. After the call he says that he ‘probably goes a little bit fast
ecause I know the pathway so well . . . it’s probably not a good habit to be in . . . sometimes I might
iss something but I’m so used to the pathway now’.
Observation, call centre, site 2allA10 says, ‘I rarely follow a pathway to the end. You can’t. You’d never get to a disposition. You
ave to go off of the exact questions and ask them slightly differently. Depending on how you ask the
uestions . . . you can ask them in such a way as to change the response and convince someone’.
Observation, call centre, site 3le use of the CDSS is strongly linked to widespread beliefs (amongst call advisers and clinicians)
s sites that NHS Pathways is ‘risk averse’ and that it is necessary to be cautious to ensure that the
ology is safe for use by non-clinical staff. However, this is problematic for health services that have to
ss rising demand by rationing front-line services. Overall, call advisers trust that the system is ‘safe’
re less conﬁdent in its ability to discriminate (potentially) life-threatening cases from less urgent cases.
in NHS Pathways from the NHS 111 workforce is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (see Trust in
chnologies for NHS 111).Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3CallA4 stated that ‘Pathways works on the basis that I don’t have any medical knowledge . . . on the basis
of ruling out. It’s going to send an eight minute response on the basis of, we can’t rule out’ (focus group,
site 1). To compensate for this perceived lack of speciﬁcity, call advisers and clinicians mediate the
assessment process to ensure that it does not result in ‘unnecessary’ dispositions that require a higher level
of care (e.g. an emergency ambulance). When calling NHS 111, many callers do not expect – or want – an
ambulance. This can be used to avoid sending an ambulance, depending on the call adviser’s ‘instinct’ or
‘judgement’. When the call adviser ‘feels’ that an ambulance is probably necessary, he or she is more
forceful in suggesting to the caller that an ambulance is advisable:© Que
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Park, SThere’s a slight drop on the right hand side of the face? Has that started within the last 3 hours . . .
you don’t know . . .? [. . .] From the information you have given me, we would advise an ambulance
because your friend said your face and body are dropping on one side [. . .] That’s up to the
paramedics to decide . . . [an ambulance is] the quickest way to get you assessed.
CallA20, observation, call centre, site 2In other situations, when the caller adviser’s instinct is that an ambulance is probably not needed, the call
adviser offers the caller a choice of what he or she would like to do. Call advisers cannot ‘downgrade’ the
urgency of a call, but they can transfer the call to the clinical adviser for further discussion about the
disposition. Less commonly, call advisers may also restart triage when the call is heading towards a
999 disposition and their instinct is that an ambulance is not required or, conversely, to ensure that a
999 disposition is reached:CallA12 says that ‘with some ambulance despatch calls, you get a sense an ambulance is not needed’,
reiterating that sometimes he ‘goes back’ to re-ask a question and ‘sometimes you get a different
response then, or sometimes a caller will recognise themselves they don’t need an ambulance and
will say’.
Observation, call centre, site 2Additionally, call advisers also call on the clinical expertise of the centre clinical advisers to mediate the
system during assessment (explored in What is the work of clinical advisers?).Making a disposition
Call advisers engage in negotiation so that the disposition is acceptable to the caller. This involves
managing the caller’s expectations (e.g. around the need to answer the questions, around home visits and
around the time that they may need to wait for an ambulance to arrive). For example, CallA1 reiterates,
‘I am going to ask a series of questions, some of these won’t seem relevant but they will enable us to get
[name of patient] the care she needs’ (observation, call centre, site 2).
Call advisers also offer the caller a degree of choice. There were differences between sites in how call
advisers approached negotiation. At sites 1 and 5, call advisers were typically less likely to offer a range of
options to patients and it appeared that training played an important role in this. Call advisers were trained
to trust the system – and the system disposition – so that they tended to present that disposition to the
patient as the appropriate (and only) option whenever possible. Experienced call advisers learned to avoid
hesitancy and limited the choice offered to patients. It appeared that these staff had been trained to ‘take
the call as far as they can’, to trust the disposition, and as a result appeared more ‘empowered’ in
negotiating more ﬁrmly with patients:I’ve heard some people say, ‘right, from the information you’ve given us you need to contact your GP
within the next 24 hours. So do you want to wait and contact your own GP surgery or should we
book you an appointment?’ What’s that about? Don’t ask them ‘should we book an appointment?’
[. . .] In training, it’s not part of the call flow to say, ‘can you get there okay?’ It’s part of the call flow
to say, ‘this is your disposition, or here’s your appointment, this is it finished’.
Trainer1, focus group, site 117
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NIHRInterviewer: Do you have any issues here with . . . getting calls from people that probably ought to try
to see their own doctor, or is that not really an issue?CallS1: They get referred back to their own doctor after the assessment.
Focus group, site 5The other sites were more likely to check that callers were happy with the outcome, sometimes offering a
range of options or over-riding the disposition. Sites 2 and 4 had both previously handled GP out-of-hours
services prior to NHS 111 and this history appeared to play a part. Previously, call advisers took basic
demographic information and passed the call to a clinician so that patients almost always saw or spoke to
a doctor. Some call advisers believed that a quality, patient-centred service is one in which the patient has
contact with a GP (or NP) – and this was particularly noticeable at site 4.We recommend you contact your GP in the next 12 hours. You have a couple of options; go to your
GP, or the drop-in centre [walk-in centre]. Or you could go to the urgent care centre at the hospital.
Those are your options at the moment. What do you think you will be doing?
CallA13, observation, call centre, site 2CallA3 talks in some depth about NHS 111, explaining that before 111 they used a ‘call handler
protocol’ that included only a couple of questions and was very different to Pathways. He explains
that he feels ‘111 is effective in some ways, but in others it is detrimental . . . you have to understand
the clinical essence of calls. There are so many different call takers and some won’t understand the
clinical essence’.
Observation, call centre, site 4Although call centre staff at these sites highlight that there are many calls coming into NHS 111 that may
be more appropriate for management in routine general practice, once call advisers have triaged a call
they are often reluctant to follow the ‘see own GP within 3 days’ disposition. This disposition is frequently
over-ridden or upgraded so that patients are either booked in at an UCC or referred to a clinical adviser.
This practice partly stems from a reluctance to ‘take responsibility’ for the 3-day disposition and partly
occurs because call advisers feel that this disposition offers a poorer service than was offered previously
(in the out-of-hours organisation).CallA2: I don’t like that one [disposition], see your doctor in three days.CallA5: Ah, well, you see, I don’t do that. I then put it through for nurse.CallA4: I do, as well [laughter, overtalking].CMgr1: Right, I see! You know if it comes out as that, you can tell them that. It’s only if they refuse
it, and say they’re not happy, with the advice that you’ve been given? And if they’re happy, that’s
fine. If they’re not happy, then you put in for a nurse . . . How many more people are doing things
like that?CallA2: If it’s Saturday morning, and they’re waiting three days, I think, they’ve rung this morning,
because they don’t want to wait till Monday [. . .]CMgr1: But do you know what it is, everybody’s sat there thinking, well, actually, I’m not risking my
calls, well, actually you go round and, everybody’s doing the same.CallA1: Yes, but if somebody’s got a baby, and . . . or a child, and they’ve got symptoms, why would
they want to go into the doctors next week? [overtalking] [. . .]Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SCMgr1: I think it’s the mindset, as well, because we’re urgent out-of-hours like, people, like CallA1
said, they’ve rung you at the weekend because they want something doing that weekend. If not,
they’d have waited till Monday. And I think it’s our mindset, well, actually, we’re not offering a good
service, if we don’t then offer them a service, at the weekend, because we used to.
Focus group, site 4Emotion work
Call advisers are engaged in front-line work that involves considerable emotional labour and there are
several factors that contribute to this: (1) the intensity and pressure of the work, (2) the emotional nature
of the calls and (3) feelings of personal responsibility for patients’ care.Intense and pressurised work
Call advisers experienced intense and pressurised periods of work sometimes, with few breaks between
calls (particularly when sites were ‘understaffed’), and described their work as sometimes stressful, intense,
demanding and/or tiring. Meeting call targets added additional pressure. Periods of high demand occurred
particularly during Saturday mornings and early evenings after the GP surgeries close (1800–2000).
However, we also observed periods when there were considerable gaps between calls (typically on early in
the afternoon and overnight).CallA11 is concerned about current shift patterns covering busy periods: ‘I don’t think we should
work both Saturday and Sunday [staff at site 3 usually work 12-hour shifts]. It’s constant from the
moment you sit down until the moment you leave. It’s too much. Your brain can’t think straight by
the end of the day [others sitting nearby agree] . . . call advisers should do split shifts . . . either a
Friday/Saturday, or Sunday/Monday; not a Saturday/Sunday’.
Observation, call centre, site 3CMgr2: As soon as you put that phone down, it’s ringing again. It’s got to be answered within
15 seconds. It’s just mind boggling.CMgr1: Six hours and you’re exhausted; doing constant call after call after call . . . it’s hard to switch
off from one patient to the next.
Focus group, site 4Our observation at all ﬁve sites showed that call advisers experience pressure to undertake a range of
tasks, many of which are carried out in parallel. The call adviser must listen to the caller, talk to him or her
and ask questions, read the screens, type in information and navigate the system with a mouse, all within
a tight time frame. This adds to the complexity of the work.The system’s grown so big and . . . there’s so much more to remember . . . it’s the booking systems,
the call flows . . . the calls are becoming harder for everybody, including . . . the call takers who are
brand new, who have got a hell of a lot to remember.
Trainer1, focus group, site 1Emotional nature of the calls
Call advisers routinely manage patients undergoing potentially life-threatening events and with potentially
life-threatening diseases who may be anxious and distressed. While directing to urgent care services or
providing health advice, callers often require reassurance and emotional support and sometimes call
advisers bear the brunt of callers’ anger, frustration, hostility or abusive language. Some caller frustration
was triggered by having to answer the questions required for the assessment process and this occasionally
led to anger towards call advisers and accusations about call advisers’ ‘status’ and/or experience:19
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NIHRPeople ring up wanting advice and they are not happy. For example a patient phoned who didn’t
want to answer questions. He always used to call [out-of-hours service] before and get a doctor’s
appointment straight away. We had to do an assessment and he didn’t want to wait for an
out-of-hours appointment. He agreed to see the doctor in the end.
ClinA3, observation, call centre, site 5Call advisers also sometimes needed to ask sensitive, embarrassing or difﬁcult questions. Some
demonstrated reluctance, apologising for asking a particular question, and occasionally omitted to ask
questions that they felt were inappropriate for particular patients (e.g. not asking an elderly man about
drug or solvent abuse). Call advisers at all sites routinely warned callers at the beginning of each call that
they would ask a series of questions, ‘some of which might not seem relevant’. This served to defuse
callers’ frustration from the beginning of the call.
There were clearly individual differences between call advisers’ emotional responses to callers, but there
also appeared to be differences in approaches and attitudes at organisational level. The role of
organisational context is explored further in Chapter 6. For example, typically call advisers at site 1, and to
a lesser extent at site 3, spoke less often about the emotional component of their role. This may be the
effect of ‘ambulance’ culture – in which workers typically appeared to express a more matter-of-fact
approach to work. Site 2 shared some of the attitudes of sites 1 and 3 but many call advisers expressed
a high level of concern about what some referred to as ‘our patients’. Sites 2 and site 4 in particular
emphasised a patient-centred service ethos (discussed further in Chapter 6). Typically, calls about young
children and elderly callers elicited greater empathy from call advisers. Call advisers and clinical supervisors
alike were concerned about callers and had an interest in patients’ well-being beyond their contact with
the NHS 111:The new staff . . . we can only teach them so much. We teach them pathways, and we put them in
the call centre, and they’ll do the calls, and we’ll show them everything that should be done . . .
within four weeks they can do a lot more than we could ever teach them, because the existing
staff also teach them as they’re going along . . . the staff that we’ve got . . . really do care about
patients [. . .] We’re very lucky like that.
CMgr1, focus group, site 4CallA20 says that she had to tell the caller to call back their own GP. She expresses concern for the
patient and wonders if their own GP would offer them an appointment today: ‘I hope he doesn’t
wait until tomorrow. I wish there was a way for me to check’.
Observation, call centre, site 2Several call centres reinforced to call centre staff the message about the patient-centred nature of the
service, using printed information or computer technology:Posters about 111 are displayed on the walls in the call centre, encouraging call takers to think about
how they respond to calls: ‘go that extra mile to make sure our patients are safe and cared for. That
lady might be your mum’.
Observation, call centre, site 2Empathy is associated with call advisers’ categorisation of the ‘appropriateness’ of the caller. At all call
centres moral judgements about patients’ behaviour are made and call advisers construct a shared
understanding about the ‘inappropriate use of services’ and that some callers’ concerns are ‘not genuine’:There’s loads of things that we can fix . . . like stopping people . . . with a sniffle, for example. For me
personally the thought of ringing an out-of-hours service would literally be because I am that ill that I
can’t physically . . . I remember one time I came into work and I could hardly speak, I was that ill.
Trainer1, focus group, site 1Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SCallA1 explains sometimes callers will make it sound so bad that ‘by the end of the Pathway we have
to say “based on what you’ve told me I’m going to have to send a blue light ambulance” and then
the caller is like “no, no, I’m not that bad” ’. Sometimes ‘they try and play the system’.
Observation, call centre, site 1Personal responsibility
Even with a technology widely acknowledged as ‘risk averse’, the ﬂexibility in the system can create
uncertainty for call advisers with regard to their assessment of calls. Call advisers are under pressure to
avoid any risk to patients, but at the same time are on the ‘front line’ in rationing and allocating health
resources. At all sites call advisers were highly aware of the risks inherent in their role – the potential for
causing unintended harm by ‘getting the disposition wrong’. This anxiety was particularly observable at
sites less experienced in providing NHS 111 services (sites 4 and 5). Some call advisers felt a huge sense of
personal responsibility for making the right disposition, and at site 4 in particular high levels of anxiety
about ‘getting it wrong’ were evident. Part of the call advisers’ anxiety could be attributed to being a
newer NHS 111 provider, but they were also inﬂuenced by the fact that NHS 111 did not offer the ‘level
of service they had offered before’ (i.e. as an out-of-hours organisation) and they were uneasy about
ending a call without the input of a clinician:CMgr1: It’s a massive, massive responsibility, because one mistake, it can cost somebody . . . their life.CallA4: Which is a lot for somebody who is only call handling and . . . not medically trained.CMgr2: . . . it’s always at the back of your mind how serious and how important it is that.
Focus group, site 4[The trainer] says [staff] ‘didn’t realise what they were taking on’. Under the previous system all calls
were passed to a GP/nurse for triage/consultation . . . now the job requires them to probe for
information . . . call advisers feel much more responsibility for the patient, decision and disposition
(particularly when care can end with the advice they give, e.g. go to pharmacy). Call advisers have
commented on their pay in relation to a clinician who is paid to take the responsibility, but they
recognise their pay is better than other call-handling work.
Observation, call centre, site 4What is the work of clinical advisers?Clinical advisers support and collaborate closely with call advisers. Indeed, NHS 111 is promoted as a
service that is ‘staffed by a team of fully trained advisers supported by experienced nurses’.12 Largely, the
everyday work of clinical advisers is dependent on call advisers, who deﬁne and prioritise their work. NHS
111 is designed so that calls are transferred to a clinical adviser at the time of the call whenever possible
(known as ‘warm transfers’), so that patients experience ‘seamless care’. If no adviser is available the caller
is offered a call back, but the call back should be made within 10 minutes. Clinical advisers at call centres
are involved in three main activities: (1) supporting call advisers by providing them with clinical advice and
taking calls that require further assessment, (2) managing or moderating NHS Pathways dispositions and
(3) providing home management advice for patients. Clinical advisers also performed audit and/or training
roles (see Chapter 4, Clinical advisers). It is important to note that we did not directly observe clinical
advisers in site 2 as they were employed by a different organisation and were located elsewhere.21
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22Supporting call advisers and providing further clinical assessment
Call advisers frequently seek assistance from clinical advisers, requesting information or advice about calls
that do not ‘ﬁt’ easily into NHS Pathways and about which pathway to take or explanations for the
meaning of medical terms. There were, however, noticeable differences between sites in the practice of
providing ‘in-call’ advice. At site 3, clinical advisers routinely supported call handling in this way, which was
not unique to this site but did occur more frequently here. At this site clinical advisers also often listened in
to calls ‘live’ and would intervene to offer advice. The NHS 111 Minimum Data Set (MDS)28 suggests that
site 3 transfers fewer calls to the clinical adviser than other sites, but our ﬁndings suggest that this is likely
to be because clinical advice is utilised more informally during the call:NIHRThe clinical adviser comes over to CallA6 (she has been listening in to the call) and advises that the
occupational therapist should visit the patient at home to undertake further triage. Call advisers
perhaps draw on each other’s knowledge less often here (than other sites) but ask clinicians
for advice.
Observation, call centre, site 3At other sites (particularly sites 1 and 2) call advisers tended to seek support from non-clinical supervisors
or other call advisers. At site 4, rather than seeking ‘in-call’ advice, call advisers more readily ‘early exited’
the call (i.e. when triage is not completed within the call) and transferred it (warm transfer) to a clinical
adviser. A number of factors might account for these observed differences. Call advisers at sites 1 and 5
were trained to ‘take the call as far as they could’ before seeking additional support from the clinical
adviser. At site 2 the fact that call advisers tended to seek support from non-clinical supervisors or other
call advisers was almost certainly because there were no clinical advisers at the call centre, which required
call advisers to make a telephone call to access clinical adviser support. At site 3 the spatial conﬁguration
of the call centre (it was small with fewer staff and was therefore easy to attract the attention of the
clinical supervisor), and the fact that call advisers were actively encouraged to ask a clinical adviser for
help as and when necessary, appeared to encourage greater involvement of clinical advisers during call
adviser assessment.
When a call is warm transferred the role of the clinical adviser is to verify the call adviser assessment,
checking that the call adviser used the correct pathway and elicited the correct answers (‘validation’),
rather than commence triage from the beginning. However, many clinical advisers expressed concern
about validation, instead of their normal clinical role of beginning assessment ‘at the beginning’. Some
clinical advisers expressed a lack of trust in non-clinical call advisers and NHS Pathways, as well as concerns
that their professional registration could be at risk:NP1: As a nurse, I still prefer to take [assessment] from the beginning . . . when you’re just validating,
it’s like starting a book halfway through [. . .] Some people do tend to over validate . . . or think, well,
they’ve already been asked that, and under validate; it’s finding that fine balance [. . .] I do like
starting from the beginning.Interviewer: So is the ideal then . . . it should be about validation, and not re-triage?SMgr1: Yes, they should not re-triage. They should validate and then continue the clinical assessment.NP1: [. . .] When we first went to look at [NHS Pathways] . . . I think quite a few of us thought,
‘I like this, but I like this for nurses to use. Do we like this for call handlers to use?’NP2: When it comes down to it though . . . when you say nurses are over validating, a nurse has got
a registration to protect . . .SMgr1: And they are accountable for their own actions, and to mark somebody down for being
over cautious . . .Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SNP1: . . . I can lose two points [in auditing]. I’d rather over validate than . . . than miss points.NP2: Lose two points, rather than lose a life [. . .] The nurse has to be confident, because she’s then
taking responsibility and accountability. We do work very well as a team . . . we know we’ve got
some great call handlers but we don’t know everybody . . . some of them are new, you’re . . . just
trusting someone else, has she asked that . . . question correctly . . .? So the nurse is actually
accountable for her actions.
Focus group, site 4This lack of trust by clinical staff was reﬂected in the survey ﬁndings (Table 6). At all sites (except site 5)
clinicians were signiﬁcantly more likely than non-clinical staff to disagree with the statement ‘Non-clinical
call handlers are safe to assess calls supported by NHS Pathways’. It is important to note that the UCC
staff in site 5 did not take part in the survey, which may affect the results for this site as their views are
not represented.
Staff across all sites felt that clinical advisers are necessary to support call advisers in delivering the NHS
111 service. The survey revealed few differences between sites, although, perhaps unsurprisingly, at site 2,
where clinical advisers are part of a separate provider, non-clinical staff were less likely to agree that
clinical advisers are necessary (with a mean score of 3.83 compared with mean scores of 4.72 at site 1,
4.43 at site 3, 4.62 at site 4 and 4.57 at site 5). Clinical and non-clinical staff were similar in their views
about whether clinical advisers are needed, except in site 1, where clinicians were less likely to agree that
clinical advisers were a necessary part of delivering NHS 111 (Table 7).
Sanctioning and moderating dispositions
Clinical advisers also deal with calls that require further clinical assessment, including those in which the caller
has refused or is unhappy with the disposition, for example when a lack of mobility or transport prevents a
patient from travelling to a health-care facility. Unlike call advisers, clinicians can ‘downgrade’ dispositions.
They also take calls that are ‘early exited’ by call advisers, such as calls that appear to have a complex history
or that involve complex multiple symptoms, calls in which the patient answers ‘not sure’ to three or more
questions during call adviser triage or calls in which the caller is not the patient/not with the patient.CallA1 explains to ClinA1 across the room that the disposition is ‘[for the patient to] see an optician . . .
mum is questioning whether it’s hay fever . . . I’ve gone down the eye pathway, but it’s saying “optician
3 days” . . . this is the second time I’ve had an optician disposition and it didn’t feel appropriate’.
ClinA1 agrees to take the call. After the call CallA1 explains, ‘the disposition didn’t quite feel right, so I
sent it to the paramedic’ [clinical adviser].
Observation, call centre, site 3Clinical advisers serve an important role in sanctioning early exits and ‘over-rides’ (in which the call adviser
chooses not to follow a pathway/disposition). Sites 1 and 2 appeared to ‘early exit’ less often. The NHS
111 MDS conﬁrmed that lower proportions of calls at these sites were passed to clinical advisers. It is most
likely that we are seeing the effects of a longer-established, more experienced workforce. Our observations
suggested that site 4 call advisers routinely ‘early exited’ calls and transferred them to a clinical adviser.
In the main, clinical advisers were very supportive, but occasionally they were reluctant to take a call,
suggesting that call advisers were sometimes ‘too keen’ to transfer a call, adding to their clinical workload,
with the call adviser effectively deferring responsibility for the disposition. It is likely that the lack of
conﬁdence on the part of the call advisers is primarily because this is a relatively new site. However, it could
also be the case that this site had less of a culture of autonomy in call handling than other sites, where call
advisers were encouraged to complete as many calls as possible without assistance from clinical advisers:If they [the caller] say no I will then pass it to the clinical supervisor to decide. They can take
responsibility with their clinical skills.
CallA18, observation, call centre, site 123
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NIHR[The clinical adviser] was clear that she shouldn’t get all the calls she does – far too many calls are
being early exited, usually using the ‘complex medical history’ explanation.
Observation, call centre, site 4Some types of disposition were more likely to be passed to clinical advisers, typically 999 dispositions and
routine GP dispositions. Across all sites there are strong normative messages (from within the organisation
and externally) to avoid sending ambulances to patients who have dialled NHS 111 ‘unnecessarily’ and to
ensure that the number of calls resulting in a 999 disposition is within ‘acceptable limits’. This is
particularly observable at sites where call handling is provided by ambulance services. In all settings, both
formal and informal processes shape the way that clinical advisers moderate or ‘sanction’ dispositions. At
site 3 a local policy exists so that all NHS 111 calls resulting in a 999 disposition are routinely checked by a
clinician (who quickly assesses it to ensure that it does ‘really need’ an ambulance), giving responsibility to
the clinician to ‘control’ the dispatch of ambulances. Staff support this intervention believing that clinical
experience is necessary to take account of a risk-averse system (as well as patients who ‘over-report’
symptoms). At other sites there was no ‘policy’ as such, but 999 dispositions were frequently checked by
clinical staff in the same way (sites 1, 4 and 5).You need clinicians as [NHS Pathways is] so risk averse; otherwise you’d end up with an ambulance
for everything.
ClinA6, observation, call centre, site 3CallA2 says, ‘there are protocols to not send the ambulance out where we [organisation] feel it’s not
needed’. Staff are actively managing the system to ensure that their 999 call rates are not ‘too high’.
We see this elsewhere . . . Staff see it as part of ‘making NHS Pathways work’.
Observation, call centre, site 4Home management: clinical experience and the use of NHS Pathways
Clinical advisers also manage calls that require patient self-care. These calls are transferred to the clinical
adviser who can offer advice, sometimes using CDSS module 2, but also drawing on clinical expertise and
training. At all sites there is an expectation to manage callers at home whenever it is appropriate to do so,
and avoid referring calls ‘upwards unnecessarily’ (e.g. to GPs/NPs at UCCs). Some staff perceived that there
were individual differences between clinical advisers in how they managed self-care advice for callers – and
our observations reﬂected this. Differences between individual clinical advisers related to their levels of
conﬁdence and the degree of risk they were prepared to take: ‘It depends on the nurse, so some nurses
might be more conﬁdent to say, you can manage those symptoms at home. Depends how . . . how
demanding the patient is, on what the nurse has done’ (CallA4, focus group, site 4).
Potentially, NHS Pathways ensures a standard approach to managing calls, to ensure consistency and
safety, to lessen risk. Clinical advisers used NHS Pathways in quite different ways – some followed the
system very closely, others used it much more ﬂexibly, but differences appeared to be more at individual
clinician level rather than at ‘organisational’ level. Clinical advisers are professional/autonomous clinicians
who usually merge their own knowledge, experience and clinical expertise with the CDSS:ClinA4 is not particularly following module 2. She asks several questions about symptoms and recent
medical history. She clicks through the questions and reaches at a home management disposition.
ClinA4 works out what pain relief she could suggest [asking the patient what she has already taken].
Observation, call centre, site 4The clinical adviser doesn’t find using NHS Pathways restrictive despite his clinical knowledge. ‘In the
end you’ve got to be safe’, which he describes as safety netting [. . .] He thinks NHS Pathways is
cautious [. . .] He says he now understands that when call advisers say that NHS Pathways results in an
emergency it is because of the system and feels that as long as you’ve asked the question then its right.
Observation, call centre, site 5Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3What is the work of call supervisors?All sites employed staff to perform a ‘call and/or shift supervisor’ role, referred to by a range of titles
(call supervisor, duty supervisor, shift manager); these staff varied in the exact nature of their role and
responsibilities. Call supervisors play a key role in the operational management of call-handling and urgent
care settings, routinely monitoring workload and workforce and ensuring that NHS 111 or local service
standards are met. The role essentially is the operational hub for maintaining the smooth running and
integration of the service, with the everyday work being to ensure the management of resources and the
adequacy of cover for the whole region. This entails overseeing activities, managing levels of stafﬁng and
dealing with emerging problems. In some sites call supervisors also monitor call advisers and provide advice
on using NHS Pathways (sites 1 and 2).Monitoring and managing workload and staffing
Call supervisors have a ‘real-time’ overview of demand across urgent care services and are responsible for
monitoring and managing workﬂow at the call centres and UCCs, including:
l monitoring the number of calls received by the call centre and if they are answered and/or transferred
within standard time frames
l checking that calls are passed correctly to relevant service or health-care professionals (that calls are in
the right ‘queue’)
l checking that, on completion, calls are closed correctly and removed from the queue
l monitoring activity at call centres and UCCs, such as the warm transfers and the call-back queue
for clinical advisers and GPs, as well as managing demand at UCCs (e.g. GP/ECP call-back queues,
face-to-face appointments and, in some sites, home visits).
Supervisors also make amendments and changes to the computer system as well as communicating with
other services by telephone or e-mail to update and pass on information about a particular patient, for
example if a call disposition changes (perhaps because the patient has undertaken a different course of
action or has refused the disposition). The supervisors also deal with queries, complaints and any calls
that are outside the usual pattern of work. In some sites the supervisor has a role in arranging transport
(e.g. dispatching cars for home visits in site 4).© Que
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Park, SCallA1 checks on an earlier prison call: ‘It’s gone on the system’ as a routine case . . . but ‘should be
an urgent’ and no call back has been made yet. She approaches the supervisor to explain . . . CallA1
returns: ‘The supervisor is going to get the prison call back done as there are five cases in the queue
now and it has gone to the bottom of the list’.
Observation, call centre, site 5CallA12 finishes the call and informs CallS3: ‘[the patient has] got an ambulance now. His breathing
got worse since they spoke to us’. CallS3 says that, ‘you’ll still have to retrieve [the call] and cancel it’.
CallS3 telephones the UCC to cancel the home visit.
Observation, call centre, site 2Typically, call supervisors also manage stafﬁng levels at the call centre and, in some locations, at the UCCs
(sites 2 and 4). Such work includes ensuring that shifts are covered, organising breaks, sometimes
organising rotas and arranging cover if staff are sick. This can also include ensuring that there is sufﬁcient
clinical cover at UCCs. Call supervisors at some sites also have a line management role. Overall, the work
requirements of these workers are complex and demanding:The call supervisor is talking to a UCC doctor: ‘Yes it’s a bit busy up there [UCC]; we’re just trying to
clear a backlog . . . What time can you get there for? . . . It’s just that there are a lot of walk-ins . . .
It’s [unclear] rate, so double time’.
Observation, call centre, site 227
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NIHRThe call supervisor speaks to CallA16 about his timekeeping: ‘you know the rules, you still need to be
logged in and ready to go’.
Observation, call centre, site 1The duty supervisor shows me the notebooks that she keeps, covering all the important events on
each shift so that she can remember later if she needs to go back to something. She says it’s very
hard to switch off after the shift is over. She keeps remembering things when she gets home and has
to call up the duty supervisor on shift to make sure they’ve been dealt with.
Observation, call centre, site 4Sanctioning and moderating dispositions
In some sites (sites 1, 2 and 5) the call supervisor also provides advice and support for using NHS
Pathways. At site 2 the ‘liaison’ performs call-handling duties but also has a role in supporting call advisers
with NHS Pathways. Similar to clinical advisers, call supervisors in some sites also played a role in making
decisions about the course of action during an assessment, and sanction dispositions, such as authorising
an upgrade:The patient reports pain in her chest and back. CallA9 asks if she has ever been diagnosed with a
heart attack. Patient: ‘I don’t think it’s anything like that’, reporting pain, but not severe pain [. . .]
CallA9 tries to establish if the chest pain is due to breathing. He is unsure whether to follow the
‘breathlessness’ or ‘chest pain’ pathway. He puts the patient on hold and approaches CallS3
explaining the situation – that the pathway is not answering the question, because the chest pain is
from the breathing. CallS3 advises CallA9 to follow the chest pain pathway; the disposition is ‘contact
doctor in the next 6 hours’.
Observation, call centre, site 1Sometimes you get a . . . hunch it’s worse than [the patient] says; you can then get the call supervisor
to upgrade it.
CallA1, observation, call centre, site 2In summary, the work of call supervisors shares many of the characteristics of call-handling work. It
similarly involves considerable communication and emotion work and is quasi-clinical in nature. The work
is also busy and demanding, requiring call supervisors to manage multiple simultaneous events and
activities. It also carries considerable responsibility in ensuring that demand for urgent care services is
managed optimally, that problems are rectiﬁed and that calls ‘don’t get missed’. There is additional
responsibility for moderating dispositions.What is the work of urgent care centre clinicians?Clinical assessments and dispositions made by NHS 111 call advisers using NHS Pathways shape the work
of the clinicians who provide telephone or face-to-face consultations (at the UCC or during home visits).
In sites where premises are shared with walk-in centres they also see ‘walk-in’ patients and have to
balance the demands of walk-in patients with the demands of those who have been booked an
appointment through NHS 111. UCC clinicians also take calls from other health-care professionals,
providing clinical advice.Managing risk and upward referral of patients
The main aspect of the UCC clinician’s role in relation to NHS 111 is to provide further assessment and a
consultation, either on the telephone or face to face (at an UCC or at home). When patients are referred
to the UCC by the call-handling service, an appointment time is booked and the UCC receives a summary
of the NHS Pathways clinical assessment so that the clinician has some details about the patient
beforehand. However, the clinicians use little of this earlier assessment information because they regard itJournals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SVery few doctors will read [the call summary] thoroughly in practice. It can be very confusing. You
may have a quick look, but will probably start from scratch again [. . .] it’s not difficult to navigate
through the information, but it’s irrelevant.
GP1, observation, UCC, site 5ECP2 describes the call summary as ‘no use nor ornament . . . all the useful information is down the
bottom, so you to keep scrolling down until you find it’. The useful information are the positive
statements; what the clinician sees first is usually a lot of negative statements (e.g. breathlessness
was not described; heavy blood loss was not described). He describes the [free] text typed in by the
call handlers as ‘useless’. It provides ‘no history’ for the ECP to work with, so they do a lot of triage
from scratch.
Observation, UCC, site 1Implicit in many of the clinicians’ thoughts about the information provided by the NHS Pathways
assessment are concerns about clinical decision-making and who should be making the decisions in the
ﬁrst place. We revisit the tensions between clinicians and non-clinicians in Chapter 4 (see Professional
boundaries: clinical and quasi-clinical roles) where we consider professional boundaries between different
groups of workers.
Although most appointments handled by clinicians are the result of the NHS 111 call adviser making a
disposition requiring the caller to speak to a doctor, in the same way that call advisers sometimes defer
responsibility to clinical advisers for the call disposition, calls are also deferred to the GP for decision-making
(either by the call adviser or, less frequently, by the clinical adviser). Most commonly, these are calls in which
the caller is unable or unwilling to comply with the disposition (e.g. callers who are unable to travel to the
UCC; callers who request a home visit). As we saw in Communication work, GPs also receive patients when
the call advisers have upgraded a call to a ‘see’ or ‘speak’ to GP disposition. It was not uncommon for
clinicians to be frustrated by such referrals:GP1 reads the disposition from a case that has appeared onscreen: ‘if pharmacy is not available
contact GP in normal working hours . . . and guess what, it’s been passed to us for telephone
advice!’. GP2: ‘you get lots like that don’t you?’
Observation, UCC, site 3All you’ll get is skewed cases . . . more prescriptions and more passing the buck. Patients who refuse
to come to the clinic will just get passed to us.
GP1, observation, UCC, site 5Despite these frustrations, for call-handling organisations, upward referrals to a clinician are used as a way
of minimising risk. Unlike the risk-averse technology and the non-clinical operators, clinicians can assess
and manage risk in ways that non-clinicians cannot and so can downgrade dispositions safely. Although it
is not always possible to diagnose in full because of the absence of sufﬁcient medical information, they
have the expertise needed to make clinical recommendations:The GP is engaged in conversation with the patient experiencing hallucinations: ‘it’s beyond my
remit to be altering your Parkinson’s drugs without all of your entire history in front of us and as an
out-of-hours service, we don’t have this’. The GP reassures that their symptoms are due to the
medications: ‘it almost certainly is that, persevere and stay on the dose and we’ll get the doctor to
call you tomorrow’.
Observation, call centre, site 229
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30Clinicians also frequently upgraded dispositions for a variety of reasons, including judgements about clinical
need, when they felt that it would reassure the patient, if they had capacity at the UCC to offer the patient
an appointment or when they were unable to negotiate with the patient over the original disposition:NIHRAt about 6.30 I sit with the GP doing telephone consultations. The call is from a man who has some
sort of infection in his finger. The [NHS Pathways] disposition is ‘see GP within 3 days’, but the GP
says, ‘I’m more than happy to look at it tonight [at the UCC] if you want me to’. She books an
appointment for 9.00 pm.
Observation, UCC, site 1Loss of control over decision-making and workload
Many clinicians working at UCCs have experienced a loss of control over their workload since the
introduction of NHS 111, with call advisers now determining their work. Call advisers determine which
patients are seen by the clinicians, how quickly they need to be seen and how many are seen. Before NHS
111, particularly in sites that previously provided out-of-hours care, the decision to offer an out-of-hours
telephone or face-to-face consultation would have primarily been made by clinicians:Looking at the case list on screen, ECP1 states, ‘we have to do the yellow one next as it’s a V2’
[‘urgent’ – see within 2 hours].
Observation, UCC, site 4I ask the ECP if he finds it difficult that his workload/decision making is effectively controlled by
someone else. He says, ‘no, it’s about the workload being managed effectively. We’ll [UCC staff] see
whoever comes through the door . . . we’ll see whoever we need to see’.
Observation, UCC, site 1On the one hand clinicians report that they will simply deal with ‘whatever comes through the door’, but
the way in which calls have been assessed and prioritised has led to frustration levied at call centre staff
and at NHS Pathways. There is some acknowledgement that triage is a difﬁcult task for a clinician let alone
a non-clinician:GP2 says that ‘there are some conditions you can pigeon hole . . . chest pain which are quite clear
cut, and need to err or the side of caution, but there are other symptoms that are much more
difficult for a non-clinician to assess’. She acknowledges that telephone triage is difficult; the lack of
visual cues mean that ‘it’s a very difficult media to work in’.
Observation, UCC, site 1However, UCC clinicians frequently disagree with the ‘appropriateness’ of the referral, perceiving that the
main problem is over-referral, but they also have some concerns about ‘under-referral’ of cases. Clinicians
perceive that some of this is the result of a risk-averse system and call advisers ‘passing the buck’. Our
observation suggests that loss of control over the assessment and categorisation of work has meant that
there is a lack of understanding about how dispositions are arrived at. Some clinicians know little about
NHS Pathways and do not always trust it. They are frustrated about some aspects of the way that the
system is regulated and are not clear about what the call advisers are allowed and not allowed to do:ECP3 describes a case of a very young child with breathing difficulties: ‘they need to be seen urgently,
not in 3 hours’ time. They come in and you think, “my god, we could have done something for you
hours ago” ‘.
Observation, UCC, site 1Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SThis case is a headache [adult male] . . . it’s not urgent . . . I don’t know where some of their
categorising comes from; whether it’s Pathways that decides what’s urgent or the call advisers . . . I’m
not sure what they see, presumably they are just answering questions on the screen, but sometimes
these [points to the disposition] come out completely wrong . . . I’m not blaming them, but Pathways
doesn’t get it right.
GP2, observation, UCC, site 3At every site, UCC clinicians reported that their workload has increased in the out-of-hours period
following the introduction of the NHS 111 service, often making comparisons between their current
workload and that in the previous out-of-hours service. Although an increase in numbers overall is
inevitable given the change from an out-of-hours service to a 24/7 service, clinicians believed that they
were seeing an increased number of referrals at all times of the day. It is not clear whether the increase is
simply a result of more calls to the service and a knock-on effect or whether the call centres are referring
more calls (than the previous out-of-hours service). It appears that clinicians are experiencing an increase in
face-to-face referrals, a point made across all sites:GP1 explains that since 111 started he thinks there has been an increase [workload] for GPs. ‘There
used to be three to four calls on the previous out-of-hours and now on 111 there’s an average of
nine . . . on bank holiday Monday . . . they’d gone right down the screen and off the screen’.
Observation, UCC, site 3GP1 says ‘too many urgents, too many home visits, too risk averse’. GP2 tells me ‘there are far too
many home visits from 111’.
Observation, UCC, site 5NP1: It’s had a big impact on the clinical staff because it’s increased their workload . . .
face-to-face . . .SMgr3: I think by about 44%.NP1: And yet . . . we’ve not increased the . . . staff. The . . . work’s increased, but . . .SMgr1: The clinician advice has gone down, but the face-to-face work has gone up . . . [. . .]
So the face-to-face staff have felt an impact because they are busier [. . .]SMgr3: I think 111 is probably a very good initiative but I’m not sure why it’s being introduced at a
time of financial austerity. Ideally, yes, we would bring more clinicians in to be able to accommodate
extra work; more people are being seen, which is probably quite a good thing, out-of-hours, but of
course, we haven’t got the resources to be able to pay for more doctors and nurses to see them.
So . . . it feels a bit of a double whammy, doesn’t it.SMgr1: . . . the amount of goodwill by everybody, but the clinicians, if you look at the . . . shift report,
people are working an hour, an hour and a half over, and this must be impacting on the finances . . .
of [the organisation] because it’s right from the senior, from the doctors, down to the call handlers,
people are working overtime.
Focus group, site 4Survey ﬁndings reﬂect some of the concerns and perceptions amongst UCC staff identiﬁed in the
qualitative work about NHS 111 generating demand (Tables 8 and 9). At sites 1, 3, and 4, UCC staff were
less likely than call centre staff to agree that NHS 111 is an effective way of managing demand (Table 8)
and that NHS 111 is a good service for patients (Table 9).31
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TABLE 8 Staff agreement with the composite measure ‘NHS 111 is effective in dealing with the demands on health
service providers’a
Siteb Staff group n Mean (SD) Range (min.–max.) 95% CI F-value; p-value
1 Call centre 32 3.84 (0.72) 2.40–5.00 3.57 to 4.10 F = 59.90; p <0.001
UCC 21 2.01 (1.00) 1.00–4.20 1.55 to 2.47
2 Call centre 25 3.47 (0.80) 2.00–5.00 3.15 to 3.80 F = 1.15; p = 0.29
UCC 17 3.17 (1.02) 1.60–4.80 2.65 to 3.70
3 Call centre 32 3.70 (0.61) 2.60–5.00 3.48 to 3.92 F = 14.05; p < 0.001
UCC 28 2.95 (0.92) 1.00–5.00 2.59 to 3.31
4 Call centre 85 3.55 (0.93) 1.00–5.00 3.35 to 3.75 F = 17.84; p > 0.001
UCC 23 2.59 (1.08) 1.00–5.00 2.13 to 3.06
Total Call centre 174 3.73 (0.82) 1.00–5.00 3.62 to 3.85 F = 84.28; p < 0.001
UCC 89 2.69 (1.07) 1.00–5.00 2.47 to 2.92
CI, conﬁdence interval; max., maximum; min., minimum; SD, standard deviation.
a 1 = ‘strongly disagree’; 5 = ‘strongly agree’.
b The survey was not administered at the UCC in site 5.
TABLE 9 Staff agreement with the composite measure ‘NHS 111 is good for patients’a
Siteb Staff group n Mean (SD) Range (min.–max.) 95% CI F-value; p-value
1 Call centre 32 4.13 (0.72) 2.25–5.00 3.87 to 4.39 F = 58.98; p < 0.001
UCC 21 2.42 (0.90) 1.00–5.00 2.00 to 2.82
2 Call centre 25 3.81 (0.74) 2.50–5.00 3.50 to 4.12 F = 1.66; p = 0.21
UCC 17 3.48 (0.89) 1.75–5.00 3.03 to 3.94
3 Call centre 32 3.91 (0.58) 2.50–5.00 3.71 to 4.12 F = 9.65; p < 0.003
UCC 28 3.39 (0.72) 2.00–5.00 3.11 to 3.67
4 Call centre 85 3.75 (0.80) 1.75–5.00 3.58 to 3.93 F = 10.08; p = 0.002
UCC 23 3.13 (0.97) 1.25–5.00 2.71 to 3.55
Total Call centre 174 3.96 (0.75) 1.75–5.00 3.86 to 4.06 F = 66.43; p < 0.001
UCC 89 3.13 (0.94) 1.00–5.00 2.93 to 3.32
CI, conﬁdence interval; max., maximum; min., minimum; SD, standard deviation.
a 1 = ‘strongly disagree’; 5 = ‘strongly agree’.
b The survey was not administered at the UCC in site 5.
RESULTS: WHAT IS THE WORK?
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NHS 111 receives a wide range of calls, from life-threatening cases to those requesting health advice,
dealing with physical and mental health as well as social issues. Building on our previous study, our
observation shows that NHS 111 call-handling work is complex, involving high levels of communication
and ‘emotion’ work. Call advisers engage in a range of everyday work activities that extend beyond being
simple users of a CDSS to assess calls. The ways in which the work ‘gets done’ play out differently at each
site, but all call advisers demonstrate a considerable level of skill in negotiation, communication and
translation to mediate the assessment process, which enables the CDSS to work most effectively. Clinical
advisers provide support and reassurance for call advisers but they are more ‘hands on’ in some sites than
in others. They also play an important role in managing the use of ambulances. Variations between sites in
how clinical advisers provide support seem to depend in part on the organisational culture of trust in call
advisers and NHS Pathways to triage correctly and on idiosyncratic differences between particular clinical
advisers related to their professional competence and attitude towards risk. Call supervisors typically are
involved with managing and monitoring workload and stafﬁng across NHS 111. In some sites they also
play a role in supporting call advisers with their use of NHS Pathways.
Clinicians at UCCs provide further assessment and consultation, either on the telephone or face to face
(at an UCC or at home), and their work is shaped by call advisers, clinical advisers and call supervisors
working at the call centre, who determine how many patients are seen, who is seen and how quickly
patients are seen by clinicians. Overall, staff at UCCs were less positive about NHS 111 than call
centre staff.33
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In this chapter we explore the workforce of NHS 111, including call-handling and urgent care staff roles.We start by describing the workforce brieﬂy, considering their skills and experience. Next, we discuss the
emergence of a new ‘NHS 111’ workforce, considering aspects such as role differentiation, division of
labour and team relationships. Finally, we consider the training and education needs of the workforce.Work roles
Call advisers and supervisors
At the two sites where call handling is provided by ambulance service providers (sites 1 and 3), call-handling
staff included existing 999 and single point of access/out-of-hours call handlers. At site 1, call advisers had
used NHS Pathways for several years prior to the introduction of NHS 111. Many existing call advisers were
‘dual trained’, taking both 111 and 999 calls, although newly recruited staff were trained only to take NHS
111 calls. At site 3, all call advisers were trained to take both types of call using NHS Pathways a few
months before the launch of NHS 111. This allows the ﬂexible use of staff as call advisers can answer NHS
111 or emergency ambulance calls and is one way of managing peaks in demand or unexpected demand.
At sites 2 and 4 a number of existing call advisers were joined by new call advisers when NHS 111 was
launched. The existing staff at site 2 also had previous experience of using NHS Pathways. Site 4 trained its
existing staff to use NHS Pathways and recruited new staff for the NHS 111 service. Site 5 was a new
provider with a new workforce of call advisers (Table 10).
The length of shifts varied at the different sites. At ambulance-led sites (1 and 3) shifts were typically
12 hours long and, although a full-time workforce was favoured in these sites, NHS 111 brought about
more variation with the addition of more part-time staff to cover peak demand. For example, in site 3, a
weekend workforce was introduced. At other sites there was greater variation in shift length (but more
typically 6–8 hours).
There was variation across sites in the number of call advisers on shifts. The smaller sites (sites 2 and 3)
typically had between two and four call advisers in-hours (i.e. 0830–1800) and between four and 10 at
busier, peak demand times (evenings and weekends), reducing to one to three call advisers overnight. The
larger sites typically had between four and eight call advisers on shift in-hours and six to 12 at peak times.
In some cases staggered shifts were introduced to cover peak demand, so one or two call advisers might
start the shift and be joined by others as the evening progressed and routine GP surgeries closed and
demand increased.
Call advisers typically worked a range of day-time, evening, night-time, weekday and weekend shifts.
Our observations of call advisers’ backgrounds conﬁrm the results of our previous study18,27 that health-care
call advisers are a diverse workforce in terms of age, experience and qualiﬁcations. Broadly speaking, in sites
1 and 5 the call advisers were typically younger and more transitional and included students, graduates and
people with high career aspirations (trainee or intended doctors, paramedics); in site 1 call advisers also
included those who had chosen a career in the ambulance service as 999 call handlers. In sites 2, 3 and 4
call advisers were typically older and many viewed their role as a long-term career. This is slightly surprising
as many call advisers in sites 2 and 4 were employed on a part-time basis. Others were students and ﬁtted
the roles around their studies. A further group reported using the job to gain experience for another job in
the health-care sector, including those who had aspirations to be GPs or paramedics.
The importance placed on educational qualiﬁcations, attainment and an ‘educated workforce’ varied
dramatically between sites. We observed organisations in which there was a lack of value ascribed to
formal qualiﬁcations and more value given to how personable or likely a person was to get on with the35
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Turnbull et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
TABLE 10 Summary of call adviser workforce characteristics
Characteristic Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5
No. of call advisers 70 30 31 113 54
FT or PT FT and PT FT and PT FT and PT FT and PT FT and PT
Shift length (hours) 12 FT; shorter
shifts for PT staff
6–8 12 6–8 6–8
Previous use of NHS Pathways Yes Yes No No No
Existing call adviser workforce
prior to NHS 111
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
FT, full-time; PT, part-time.
RESULTS: WHO IS THE WORKFORCE?
36existing workforce (site 2). In other sites formal qualiﬁcations were highly valued (site 5). Interestingly, the
call advisers in the private provider (site 5) were made up of two groups: a mix of geographically local
people, (mothers with young children, etc.) and a more qualiﬁed and possibly transient workforce,
including trainee doctors from overseas and students.
Regardless of short- or long-term intentions, observation suggested a call-handling workforce that
consistently showed commitment to the role and work in providing NHS 111 services to the public and
predominantly viewed the work as important and in some cases ‘life saving’. There were some differences
between sites, for example among the more transitional workforce in some sites (sites 1 and 5), loyalty to
the service was less evident (although loyalty to the task at hand was evident). There was also a particular
pride and sense of identity that seemed to come from working for the ambulance service. Loyalty was
particularly evident in sites 2 and 4, where staff identiﬁed themselves as being part of a ‘big family’, with
management fostering and holding on to this ethos. Not surprisingly, there was very low staff turnover
reported in these organisations and job satisfaction was high:NIHRCMgr1 emphasises ‘the family’ feel to the organisation . . . Another senior manager says, ‘yes, my
best story of the 111 launch is the person who first took the first out-of-hours call 17 years ago, also
took the first 111 call and she was so proud . . . Now we need to extend the service, so we don’t get
wiped off the map. We need to tender for the larger areas; but not get so large that we lose that
personal feel’.
Observation, call centre, site 2CMgr1 tells me that their staff turnover is very low; many staff have been here a number of years.
She says how good the staff are and that [the organisation] places a strong emphasis on providing
good care. She says that ‘[the caller] may not remember your name, but they remember if they get
good care’. This comes across in how call advisers speak to patients (e.g. attempting to personalise
the service by telling the callers their name). She says that call advisers ‘take at least 15 seconds
between calls to “recover” from calls . . . they are patients not call centre customers’.
Observation, call centre, site 4CallA4: That’s the nice side of the job, where . . . at the end of your shift say, ‘I helped that person
today, that person that might have . . . come to some serious harm, I was able . . . to help, you know,
prevent that’. So there’s some side of it that’s not all hard work and stress.CallA3: And some depressed people, they can start off by saying, I’m going to kill myself, and at the
end of the call, if they say, ‘oh, I feel a bit better now’ . . .CallA4: [You] made that difference.
Focus group, site 4Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3The skills required to perform the call-handling role were described in detail in our previous
publications18,27 and therefore we do not expand on this aspect in much detail in the present study.
However, as indicated in the previous chapter when describing the work performed, call advisers
possessed a broad range of skills such as negotiation, probing and listening skills, as well as empathy, to
enable them to carry out their role effectively.
Across sites call-handling role responsibilities were varied. Although in some cases call advisers only
answered calls in other cases they had a broader, more ﬂexible, set of responsibilities. For example, in site 2,
in addition to handling calls, some call advisers sat on the reception at A&E and used NHS Pathways to assess
walk-in arrivals, sending them either to A&E or to the out-of-hours service, which was located in the same
building. At sites 3 and 4 call advisers also took on some administration roles such as liaising with other
services. In contrast, at sites 1 and 5 the call adviser role was more delineated with a narrower set
of responsibilities.
In all sites a number of the call advisers have been promoted into supervisory roles. As identiﬁed in
Chapter 3, these staff had different titles in different settings, such as call supervisors and liaisons. The role
was used ﬂexibly across sites with call supervisors performing slightly different roles in each setting, from
helping staff to deal with difﬁcult calls to handling enquiries between the call centre and NHS 111 service
providers and managing shifts and/or auditing calls. For example, at sites 2 and 3, call supervisors were
involved in auditing call advisers’ calls. At site 2 call supervisors were also involved in delivering training. In
contrast, at site 1 such responsibilities were performed by a dedicated audit and training team. In addition,
many supervisors continued to answer calls. In many cases call supervisors were people who had been
identiﬁed as competent call advisers. However, the nature of the role, which was pivotal in terms of
making sure that the NHS 111 service was delivered effectively, meant that these workers required a much
broader set of skills including the ability to manage call advisers and manage relationships with front-line
NHS 111 providers.
Although call advisers generally appeared to be happy taking on supervisory roles, we saw some resistance
from call advisers to the concept of being trained as auditors. This related to both concerns about working
relationships with other call advisers and also concerns that, although there might be opportunities to
acquire new skills or responsibilities, there was not necessarily a corresponding recognition in terms of pay:© Que
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Park, SCallA6 says that call advisers have been asked if they would be willing to train in audit and are being
offered training for this. She thinks that it would be uncomfortable for her to audit her peers (‘how
can I judge them when the next day I’m standing up and asking “what shall I do with this call?” ’).
She says that taking on this additional responsibility wouldn’t result in any higher pay ‘so I’m not sure
it’s worth the hassle . . . I will do the training and then see from there’.
Observation, call centre, site 3The emergence of these ﬂexible supervisory roles had also been observed in our previous work in sites 1
and 2, suggesting that they were not solely a feature of the introduction of NHS 111. Instead, the role
seems to have emerged in response to the rising call volumes combined with the demands of using NHS
Pathways, the complexity of the work and the use of non-clinical workers for triaging calls. At each of our
sites call centres described an expanding workforce employing more call advisers, clinical advisers and staff
supporting call-handling activity, such as auditors and trainers. Some of this growth was the result of
organisations expanding to cover new or larger geographical areas, but the introduction of NHS 111 and
NHS Pathways itself increased the need for staff even where the size of the area covered did not change
(e.g. sites 1 and 3). To accommodate the growing workforce four sites moved premises or extended their
existing premises (one site was a new service but was still expanding in terms of the number of staff).37
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38Clinical advisers
The clinical advisers were from a wide variety of backgrounds and included nurses, paramedics, mental
health nurses and midwives. Sites 1 and 3 particularly used a mix of nurses and paramedics in the role; it is
likely that providing both 999 and NHS 111 services impacted on the number of paramedics in this role. At
sites 4 and 5 many clinical advisers were recruited from NHS Direct and at site 5 they came from a variety
of backgrounds – nurses, midwives, paramedics and mental health specialists, with staff speaking of the
beneﬁts of a diverse clinical workforce. In site 2 clinical advisers were employed by a separate organisation
in a different location.
The primary responsibility of these workers in each setting was to speak to callers when the disposition had
been ‘speak to nurse’. Clinical advisers would use their clinical expertise to assess callers’ needs. However, in
addition, these workers took on a much broader set of responsibilities such as managing call advisers and
providing support for difﬁcult calls. In several sites (notably sites 4 and 5) we saw them adopt the role of
‘ﬂoor walkers’ – resulting in the presence of experienced clinicians who could answer any queries and
support and keep a watchful eye on the activity of call advisers, especially newly trained call advisers:NIHRCMgr2: Yes, floor walkers . . . have got to happen, really.Interviewer: And what would their role be?CMgr2: . . . if any of the call handlers are struggling where to go with the call, or they don’t quite
think the disposition that they’ve reached is . . . they’ve got access to somebody straight away, when
they need them. At the minute . . . when you’re needing help, people are on the phones . . . you’re
just sat there waiting for someone to come free. You haven’t got . . . that time to sit there. You’re
conscious calls are waiting to get through. You’ve only got a few seconds to be able to make these
decisions, whether it’s the right one, wrong one.
Focus group, site 4Clinical advisers also undertook a range of auditing and training responsibilities, which demanded skills
beyond their clinical experience and training. Some clinical advisers seemed to value this expansion of their
role and the opportunities it presented for them, although the start-up of NHS 111 and the challenges it
presented as the system bedded in was perceived by some to have temporarily limited such development:ClinA1: There’s a lot of development in the company, there’s a lot of opportunities from a nurses’
point of view [although] at the moment . . . everything’s gone on the back burner. I just hope that . . .
once it settles down, once we get 111, and get established and . . . we’re up and running, then we can
start to continue to develop. We’ve got nurses who are going through a nurse practitioner course . . . I
hope that opportunity is going to arise again [. . .] So I hope everything settles down, and the company
continues how it was, with lots of development and lots of opportunities.NP1: . . . that’s one of the benefits of being integrated with the out-of-hours, because there are
different varying career progressions, isn’t there?ClinA1: There’s lots . . . of opportunities within the company.
Focus group, site 4Professional boundaries: clinical and quasi-clinical rolesWithin NHS 111, call advisers are non-clinical staff who perform clinical work (triage/clinical assessment)
previously performed only by professionals. Call advisers at most sites position themselves as non-clinical
workers by identifying themselves as call advisers when answering calls and often explaining to patients
that it is not part of their role to diagnose or prescribe.Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3
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Park, SCallA20 says [to the caller], ‘we are not clinicians so we can’t really diagnose, but we just need to
know what the main problem is. Is the rash under the arm the main concern?’
Observation, call centre, site 2The patient asks CallA9 ‘I’m due for insulin shall I give it to myself?’ CallA9 is quick to inform the
patient, ‘I’m not a prescriber’, and asks ‘is the leg the main problem?’
Observation, call centre, site 1However, at the same time, the nature of the role involves clinical assessment, albeit supported by a
computer. The everyday performance of asking clinical questions allowed these call advisers to identify
themselves not as unskilled, generic call centre workers but as doing complex health-care work. Offering
clinical information and advice, supported by NHS Pathways, adds a greater clinical component to the role.
Call advisers often enjoyed being able to give this advice and felt that it was valued. Call advisers
internalised knowledge of the system and the clinical information that it contained and consequently were
able to anticipate questions before being prompted by the software. This was especially noticeable at sites
where NHS Pathways had been deployed for several years. Additionally, those who had worked with the
system for some time (999 and out-of-hours) drew on personal and experiential knowledge about medical
conditions or health care:[The manager] says that due to the nature of the work, they have renamed their call handlers as
‘call assessors’ to better reflect the job that they do.
Observation, call centre, site 3Call advisers from the ambulance trusts tended to assert their ‘clinical knowledge’ to a greater degree and
some call advisers spoke of clinical knowledge or knowledge outside of the system and crucially identiﬁed
themselves as skilled workers, although they clearly recognised the distinction between themselves,
clinicians and managers. Call advisers clearly distinguished their call-handling role from other non-health
call-handling roles, and felt that their identity was more akin to health-care workers than call centre
workers. There were some requests for a recognised qualiﬁcation for NHS 111 call advisers as a means of
formalising and recognising the training undertaken and legitimising call adviser identity.CMgr1: [I would] like a recognised qualification, and a title as a health care . . . something to do with
health in it so that they realise that they’re not just . . . you can be a call handler for a catalogue firm, or
anything like that. I’m not belittling that . . . but just to recognise the work that they’re actually doing.CallA4: We’re almost health-care providers now, giving health-care advice, aren’t we?
[general agreement]CMgr2: It’s got a lot of responsibility attached to it, and I don’t think people realise [. . .]CMgr1: . . . the other day, somebody collapsed in [shopping centre] in front of me. I went up to this
lady, and says, ‘I’ve got no medical knowledge’, and I waited for this first aid person to come. But I
turned to [colleague], and she says, ‘well, really, you shouldn’t say you’ve got no medical knowledge,
because you do Pathways. You have got medical knowledge’.CallA4: And we do life . . . life support.CMgr1: . . . basic life support, so . . . but really, we’ve not got a title [. . .] a recognition, that this is a
clinical environment.CallA4: We’re giving health advice, aren’t we?CMgr1: Recognised to the outside world that you’ve achieved this qualification . . .39
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NIHRCallA1: It’s like, when we answer the phone, we say . . .‘111 call handler’ . . . I think some people
instantly . . . don’t want to talk to you, because they think, well, you’re not medically trained [. . .]
Because we say call handler it sounds more office-y and not health care.
Focus group, site 4However, balanced against this identity as a ‘health-care worker’ was the belief across all sites that clinical
input (from trained clinicians) is necessary to support call adviser assessment and mediate the system. The
sense that clinical assessment and decision-making – and the responsibility that it carries – should be a
clinical role was particularly strong in site 4. Call advisers at this site often commented that clinical advisers
have the clinical skills to be able to manage more risk and the responsibility of home care and are ‘paid’
accordingly. They did not believe that taking such a responsibility was part of their job:CallA4: It depends on the nurse, so some nurses might be more confident to say, you can manage
those symptoms at home. Depends how . . . how demanding the patient is, on what the nurse has
done, why they’ve given them an appointment.CMgr1: I’ve noticed, if you’re sat with a nurse . . . I was probing, and then she was taking what I
thought . . . like, well, more . . . what I would have considered a risk, really, than I would have done as
a call handler, reading it black and white.CallA4: Yes, because they know more.CMgr1: Because they know more, and they’ve got more information, and I felt quite uncomfortable
that they were trying to push me to go further, with . . . than I would have wanted to go.CallA1: That’s how I felt when I started, because I sat with a nurse all the time . . . I found it really
helpful in one way, but in another way, not, because they were asking me to think out the box,
which I couldn’t. I kept trying to say, I’m a call handler, and I can’t go off from what’s in front of me.
I can’t think clinical like you.
Focus group, site 4CA6 was critical of the call handlers who just exited, rather than triaging further to discover whether
this history was relevant to the particular call in hand. She mentioned several times that some call
handlers felt that they shouldn’t have to deal with the difficult cases because they weren’t nurses, not
trained or paid to do that kind of thing.
Observation, call centre, site 4CallA16 says that ‘we are not clinically qualified to make clinical decisions’ but ‘probing introduces an
element of clinical decision making/can require a degree of this’. He says a number of times about
not having clinical knowledge.
Observation, call centre, site 3‘Inappropriate’ dispositions have a knock-on effect of increased workload, but there were also concerns
about patient safety despite slightly contradictory concerns about the risk-averse nature of NHS Pathways.
Frustration and blame were levied at call advisers and the technology:ECP5 comes over and says ‘come into the consulting room so I can show you these calls’ . . .
describing 111 as ‘flawed and inappropriate’. He says that [the information about the call says that
this] patient is ‘under investigation for cancer and has a productive cough, as reported by his wife . . .
but he doesn’t have a productive cough, he doesn’t have cancer and he doesn’t have a wife – she
died 20 years ago’. It’s unclear how this error has occurred but the call handler is held responsible for
inputting incorrect information.
Observation, UCC, site 1Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SECP2 also has concerns about whether the service is safe for patients, which mostly relate to sending
patients that need emergency department care to the UCC instead. He says that ‘someone will die’.
Observation, UCC, site 1As a reaction to this, some call advisers were compelled to demonstrate their clinical knowledge, despite their
lack of clinical training, and were forceful in characterising their role as a skilled – albeit non-clinical – job:CallA27 tells me that someone from [an IT company] has been observing call handlers and is
reportedly going to be a Pathways trainer but has not used Pathways before. ‘I think she was shocked
by the number of calls and felt she had a lack of qualifications to do the job. I told her the job needs
all sorts, qualified clinicians, GPs. You know, we’re not trained; you need all of us. We’re not qualified
clinicians, but it’s a qualified job, it takes experience’.
Observation, call centre, site 2CallA2 perceives that [some] doctors ‘talk badly’ to call handlers and don’t acknowledge their
experience or skills . . . She tells me that she often makes it known to doctors calling 111 that she
knows something about biology, or understands what is wrong with the person, reiterating ‘I’ll make
the doctor know I’m aware; I’ll say “so it looks like it’s a stroke doctor, is that right?” ’
Observation, call centre, site 1However, these attitudes towards call advisers were by no means universal, with some UCC clinicians
acknowledging the skill required by call advisers and the complexity of the work. ‘Blame’ for perceived
incorrect dispositions is sometimes directed at the technology rather than at the call advisers themselves:GP2 says that he thinks the call advisers do a really good job and are ‘undervalued’. He says that they
do ‘a very hard and serious job . . . one that sometimes involves quite complex decisions . . . but
they are not always given the credit for this’.
Observation, UCC, site 3ECP2 clarifies: ‘the call handler had not done anything wrong, but the triage didn’t come out right’.
She appears a little reluctant to talk further but says ‘call-handling is increasingly becoming a skilled
job’. She adds that she used to work for NHS Direct: ‘I had enough of using algorithms as a nurse,
I found it hard, let alone as a call handler with no clinical knowledge’.
Observation, UCC, site 4Some clinicians felt that call advisers could perform clinical assessment but needed additional training to
extend their skills. Others commented that call advisers were not the problem and that the ‘system’ might be:GP1 says that she thinks 111 ‘is better than NHS Direct used to be’. She says that the problem with
NHS Direct was that you had ‘clinically qualified nurses who just used to follow the system and send
every patient anyway’. She says that you might as well use non-clinical call handlers as they are less
costly, but the end result is the same [i.e. most of the patients end up with a 999, emergency
department or UCC disposition anyway].
Observation, UCC, site 1In addition to the blurring of role boundaries between call advisers and clinicians, there was also some
blurring of boundaries across different clinical professions. Clinical advisers triage, make decisions and
assess clinical risk within NHS 111, so stepping into the domain of the GPs who have traditionally delivered
out-of-hours triage. Although there is long history of nurse telephone triage and therefore this is not new,
we note its presence within NHS 111. NPs and GPs were performing very similar roles in some sites.
Professionals working within NHS 111 are delegating tasks to other disciplinary groups, such as the
prescribing of medication by NPs and ECPs. In sites where ECPs or NPs worked alongside GPs in UCCs,41
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42typically these staff undertook similar roles across sites in dealing with face-to-face appointments and
home visits.NIHRECP2 says that GPs do ‘99.99% of the home visits’ . . . but they share the UCC attendances. The UCC
also sees walk-in patients as well. He says the ECP staff are a mix of nurses and paramedics [he
himself was a paramedic].
Observation, UCC, site 1There were also some differences in the roles they assumed across sites. For example, there was a local
protocol in one of our organisations under which only GPs (and not ECPs or NPs) assumed responsibility
for call backs to patients with mental health problems and ECPs rather than GPs tended to go on more
home visits (site 4).
As with the relationship between clinicians and call advisers, tensions about role boundaries also existed
between professionals. There was criticism of clinical advisers at call centres for lacking expertise, being
reluctant to make clinical decisions and referring cases ‘upwards’ to the UCC. It is important to note that,
although these perceptions were present in all sites, they were more extreme in site 1 than in other sites.ECP2 questions the experience of the clinical advisers – ‘[they are not] sufficiently knowledgeable to
make the necessary clinical decisions’ – and says when the service first started they took on a lot of
nurses that had little or no experience of telephone triage, resulting in a lot of cases being ‘referred
up the chain’. The call handlers refer the call to the nurse advisers/supervisors [within the call centre]
who then in turn, refer the calls to the ECPs and GPs here at the UCC.
Observation, UCC, site 1GP2: I had a child down as an urgent and when I got there they were just asleep and doesn’t need to
be seen . . . 111 creates inappropriate prioritisation.GP1: There are also only a handful of nurses who can deal with things fast and effectively, GP triage
is better, it’s more efficient than nurse or 111.
Observation, UCC, site 5Communication and relationships across NHS 111We have seen in Chapter 3 how call advisers collaborate with clinical advisers and call supervisors. In
addition to this, call advisers often worked together with other call advisers on more complex calls, actively
helping colleagues (i.e. by looking up information). We have used the term ‘team’ to refer to groups of
staff who work together within call centres (call advisers, clinical advisers, managers, trainers and auditors)
and also teams of people who work together within UCCs (GPs, NPs, ECPs, reception and administrative
staff). Team support was strong at all call centres, both in teams that had worked together for some time
and in teams that were relatively new. Support also included praising and reassuring one another:Call handlers seek advice or reassurance from other call handlers sitting with them fairly often. This
kind of group support seems an important part of the role.
Observation, call centre, site 2After a call where the call adviser found it difficult to obtain an answer from a caller who was
‘difficult’, the clinical adviser suggests that these types of cases really help people learn. She suggests
that she herself also learns from this. There is a sense of mutual solidarity against the difficult nature
of the work, and displays emotion work to make the call handler feel better [. . .] There is a sense that
this type of call can happen to anyone.
Observation, call centre, site 5Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SThe clinician says to one of the call handlers, ‘good investigation . . . well done’. It seems that the call
handler’s probing identified a piece of important information that crucially affected the disposition the
patient received.
Observation, call centre, site 3Friendly humour illustrated the close working relationships important in a pressurised and sometimes
stressful environment. Among call centre staff, humour contributed to a sense of being a team,
community or ‘family’ and was a means of mutual support. Humour and laughing together was a means
of bringing people closer together, building trust, cementing relationships, strengthening the team and
equipping them to withstand stressful situations:CallA7’s phone rings again and he exclaims, ‘why is it only me taking calls?’ There’s lots of laughter;
CallA7 jokes ‘shh . . . this could be someone dying on the end’, laughing some more, before taking
the call and the laughing stops.
Observation, call centre, site 2There were also typically strong working relationships between call advisers and clinical advisers and call
supervisors or managers. There was an inherent respect for the clinical skills of their clinical colleagues
from call advisers and call supervisors, and for the most part this respect was mutual in that the clinical
advisers acknowledged the skills of their non-clinical colleagues. Relationships were weaker when call
advisers and clinical advisers worked for different organisations in different locations.CMgr1: We’ve always had . . . and we really do have clinical respect, and I think it’s important . . .
if I take my children to casualty, I want somebody clinical to see them [laughter].CallA2: Yes, but I think what’s changed now is that they’ve got respect for us because they realise . . .CMgr1: . . . We’ve . . . we’ve got clinical respect for them, and we know, obviously, the importance of
their clinical training . . . They’ve also got respect for us, because they know how hard our job is . . .
they’re brilliant. They’re trying to help us all the time.
Focus group, site 4CallA27 says, ‘I don’t know what to do, she has no worsening symptoms, but she’s been told to call
back. I need to keep it in-house’. The call advisers opposite advise, ‘you could put it through to the
doctor’, which he does. After the call CallA27 says ‘it’s all about keeping it in-house, keeping it with
111 and not sending it to [clinical advisers outside the organisation]. That one was sent internally as
GP triage, as a red (urgent) flag, but was probably not red; we just want to keep it in-house’.
Observation, call centre, site 2There were some differences in communication and team working between staff at different sites.
This appeared to be primarily inﬂuenced by the spatial conﬁguration of the call centre and by the
organisational culture of the call centre. Co-location and close proximity of clinical advisers to call advisers
and call supervisors appeared to foster an environment of respect, approachability and mutual support,
and supported successful implementation. At sites 1 and 2 there appeared to be a more visible hierarchy
between clinical advisers and call-handling staff, with a separation in communication between these.
At site 1 this seemed to be partly because the call centre is large (and based over two sites). Although
communication levels were high between call advisers and call supervisors, they less frequently called on
the clinical advisers for assistance (and this was usually by telephone). At site 2 relationships were weaker
with the clinical advisers, who were based elsewhere. Here, there was little communication and no sense
of being part of the ‘same service’. The relationship was limited to ‘warm transfers’ of calls, which involved
minimal communication between call advisers and nurses. When the out-of-hours GP was on site,
relationships with the GP appeared functional, often characterised by a lack of communication in general,
although we did observe some informal communication. Supervisors tended to mediate between the GP,43
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44call advisers and/or patients if needed. ‘So far this evening, I haven’t really seen the GP interacting
with the call advisers or supervisor, other than to say he is staying for an extra hour’ (observation,
call centre, site 2).
At site 3 the routine deferral of decisions to clinical advisers (see Chapter 3) suggested a clear hierarchy
but there were high levels of communication between all staff in the call centre (including call advisers,
supervisors, clinical advisers and the ambulance dispatcher), where there was extensive face-to-face
communication, discussion and ‘joint decision-making’ about a particular call. Site 4 appeared to be
characterised by a much ﬂatter hierarchy than most other sites and there was not the same sense of
division or rank. Call advisers and clinical advisers sat alongside each other in one of the call centres and
there was a sense of ‘mucking in’, that is, collaboration, to ‘get the job done’. The supervisor role was
undertaken by a non-clinical supervisor or a NP on any given shift. The site had worked hard to reduce
tension between workers and there was a strong organisational culture of valuing all workers:NIHRThe clinical lead says that ‘it’s important you make yourself approachable and to reassure the [call
advisers] I’m here, even if it seems like a silly question’. She says that fostering an environment of
approachability is key [. . .] ‘Sometimes they have a clinical question . . . it’s a clinical doubt “niggling”
in their minds; I’ve told them it’s best to come and talk to me or a nurse adviser if they are in
any doubt’.
Observation, call centre, site 4At site 5, located in a large call centre, we observed high communication levels, generally via telephony,
with call advisers typically phoning through to clinical advisers for assistance, although there were some
face-to-face queries. Call advisers and clinical advisers were co-located in one room, with clinical advisers
generally stationed at the end of blocks of call adviser stations for easy communication and to offer advice
when needed.
There are inevitably individual differences and individual incidents that give rise to tensions between staff,
typically because of pressures on the service and/or clinician perceptions of inappropriate dispositions:After the call the clinical adviser comes over to the call adviser. The atmosphere seems a bit tense. She
says, ‘I probably wouldn’t have reached a different disposition, but might have been able to stall them
for a bit’ [the ambulance service is under pressure so the clinical adviser would conduct a telephone
consultation to ‘buy some time’]. I sense there is a bit of a ‘power struggle’ here.
Observation, call centre, site 3The clinical knowledge and expertise in using NHS Pathways is shared across call centre teams and has
implications for the skills required for call-handling that extend beyond manipulating the computer system.
Mutual support is offered as a learning experience. The integration of different workers in a wider
organisational hierarchy supports and maintains the NHS 111 service. In all sites the spatial location of the
work facilitated – or hindered – communication and sharing of knowledge. The operationalisation of the
CDSS and call-handling work played out in different ways determined by the conﬁguration of the call
centre, but it seems unlikely that call centre activity would be so successful in environments in which staff
did not have this connectivity. The ability to work in and manage teams is therefore an essential set of
skills needed for successful implementation of NHS 111 and testing of teamworking skills is actually part of
the recruitment process for call advisers at some sites (e.g. site 1).Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SECP2 compares this [UCC] to [another]. He says [the other] is more private [there are individual
consulting rooms rather than cubicles] but the downside is that staff are ‘locked away . . . all day . . .
you don’t see anyone . . . [Here] is much more social, we can ask each other for things . . . [it is a]
much nicer environment for working in’. They do seem a very sociable team; there is a lot of informal
conversation between seeing patients.
Observation, UCC, site 1However, relationships between UCCs and call centres were sometimes poor. Some of these tensions have
been discussed earlier, for example frustration over perceived ‘inappropriate’ dispositions (see Chapter 3,
What is the work of urgent care centre clinicians?) and tensions around professional boundaries (see
Professional boundaries: clinical and quasi-clinical roles).ECP2 says that there is some tension with [call centre provider] about triaging and [what the UCC
perceive as] incorrect dispositions. He says that ‘they never admit they are wrong’.
Observation, UCC, site 1Proximity (co-location) and history appear to have inﬂuenced the working relationship between call centres
and UCCs (see Chapter 6). For the most part call centres and UCCs are separate services (the exceptions
are that site 2 has the out-of-hours telephone consultation GP located with it; site 4 has one call centre
co-located with the UCC; and at site 5 the UCC is downstairs from the call centre but there does not
appear to be a close working relationship between them). Communication between UCCs and call
centres is often limited to NHS Pathways information transmitted electronically and some telephone
communication to follow up a patient or request additional information; therefore, the relationship is a
‘faceless’ one. In one site it appeared that efforts were made to foster closer relationships and
understanding, viewed positively by UCC clinicians.ECP3 explains that a number of call advisers came to shadow the ECPs: ‘now they understand our
role better and send to us rather than A&E, or realise when they don’t need us at all’.
Observation, UCC, site 4The ﬁndings from the survey suggested that sites overall were neither positive nor negative about
communication with other NHS 111 services (Table 11). Overall, site 5 was more positive about experiences
of communicating with other NHS 111 providers, agreeing that they were easy to contact, that it was not
time-consuming and that communication was supportive. However, it should be noted that these data are
based on call centre staff only and not UCC staff. It is possible that this could explain the difference.45
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TABLE 11 Staff agreement with statements about communication with other NHS 111 providers
Site n
Strongly
disagree,
n (%)
Disagree,
n (%)
Neither agree
nor disagree,
n (%)
Agree,
n (%)
Strongly
agree,
n (%)
Mean
(SD)
F-value;
p-value
Easy to contact other services
1 53 5 (9.4) 11 (20.8) 15 (28.3) 19 (35.8) 3 (5.7) 3.08 (1.09)
2 41 2 (4.9) 3 (7.3) 20 (48.8) 15 (36.6) 1 (2.4) 3.24 (0.83)
3 60 1 (1.7) 8 (13.3) 27 (45.0) 19 (31.7) 5 (8.3) 3.32 (0.87)
4 106 6 (5.7) 19 (17.9) 48 (45.3) 28 (26.4) 5 (4.7) 3.07 (0.93)
5 43 0 (0.0) 9 (20.9) 4 (9.3) 21 (48.8) 9 (20.9) 3.70 (1.04) F = 3.86;
p = 0.004
Communication with other services is often necessary
1 53 0 (0.0) 3 (5.7) 10 (18.9) 29 (54.7) 11 (20.8) 3.91 (0.79)
2 40 1 (2.5) 2 (5.0) 12 (30.0) 19 (47.5) 6 (15.0) 3.68 (0.89)
3 60 0 (0.0) 8 (13.3) 28 (46.7) 21 (35.0) 3 (5.0) 3.32 (0.77)
4 105 0 (0.0) 7 (6.7) 31 (29.5) 52 (49.5) 15 (14.3) 3.71 (0.79)
5 43 0 (0.0) 3 (7.0) 10 (23.3) 19 (44.2) 11 (25.6) 3.88 (0.88) F = 4.72;
p = 0.001
Communication is time-consuming
1 53 0 (0.0) 6 (11.3) 15 (28.3) 16 (30.2) 16 (30.2) 3.79 (1.00)
2 40 0 (0.0) 8 (20.0) 16 (40.0) 14 (35.0) 2 (5.0) 3.25 (0.84)
3 60 1 (1.7) 7 (11.7) 34 (56.7) 17 (28.3) 1 (1.7) 3.13 (0.72)
4 107 1 (0.9) 8 (7.5) 43 (40.2) 41 (38.3) 14 (13.1) 3.55 (0.85)
5 43 0 (0.0) 11 (25.6) 17 (39.5) 11 (25.6) 4 (9.3) 3.19 (0.93) F = 5.52;
p < 0.001
Communication is supportive
1 53 5 (9.4) 8 (15.1) 22 (41.5) 17 (32.1) 1 (1.9) 3.02 (0.97)
2 41 1 (2.4) 6 (14.6) 21 (51.2) 8 (19.5) 5 (12.2) 3.24 (0.94)
3 60 1 (1.7) 2 (3.3) 34 (56.7) 17 (28.3) 6 (10.0) 3.41 (0.79)
4 107 1 (0.9) 11 (10.3) 52 (48.6) 35 (32.7) 8 (7.5) 3.36 (0.80)
5 43 0 (0.0) 4 (9.3) 13 (30.2) 15 (34.9) 11 (25.6) 3.77 (0.95) F = 4.62;
p = 0.001
SD, standard deviation.
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The nature of call-handling training was documented in our earlier work.18 We do not seek to repeat this
work; rather, we offer a summary and draw out key differences across sites and present observations
about training practice and training needs not identiﬁed in our previous research.Initial training
Initial NHS Pathways training for call advisers and clinical advisers is structured around a core training
package produced by the CDSS developers and was standard across the sites. Call advisers undertake a
2-week programme that they must complete – and pass – to demonstrate initial competency before taking
calls in the call centre. Sites provide up to 2 weeks’ further mandatory training that varies from site to site
but typically includes health and safety training, data protection, safeguarding children and vulnerable
adults, organisational procedures, and training in other ICTs [e.g. Adastra (Advanced Health & Care,
London, UK), appointment booking software]. Training typically took place in small groups in classrooms
located on site in contact centres.
Training was challenging for call advisers and required considerable personal commitment in terms of time
and the amount of information that they are required to learn. There are additional pressures in that call
advisers are guaranteed a job only if they pass the training. Call advisers perceived training to be intense
and to require huge commitment as the quote below typiﬁes, but typically they felt that the training
programme largely prepared them as much as is possible for their role as a NHS 111 call adviser:© Que
Health
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addres
Park, SCMgr2: I think [the training] was too in depth. Too much information in a short space of time.Interviewer: So how long is that training?CMgr2: Two weeks . . . But it just doesn’t stop there, after the two weeks’ classroom,
full-time training . . .CMgr1: Plus, we had to travel to [name of a city] to do our training, which is all right, but . . . for
those of us with children . . . So you were going out first thing in the morning, you were coming back
late at night, you were so tired, you were trying to learn a new system; I’ll be honest with you; I were
nearly in tears some days . . .CallA1: . . . you’ve got homework to do. There was too much to learn in too short space of time.CallA2: Very intense. Very intense.CallA3: Yes. Very intense.CallA5: And . . . you’d also got assessments to do while you’re doing it [. . .]CMgr2: And then you’ve got exams for that, then you go home at night, you’ve got to revise, you’ve
got refresher questions, because you know you’ve got an exam the following day, so you’re not
getting home till six, seven o clock at night, you’re revising to start the following morning again, and
it’s too intense.
Focus group, site 4For some staff undergoing training there was a particular challenge when they had other part-time jobs
that they had to ﬁt around. It could be difﬁcult for them to attend standard training sessions and both
staff and their organisation had to be ﬂexible, with special bespoke courses delivered and workers
sometimes having to use holiday periods from other jobs to allow time for training.47
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Following the initial training period all call advisers spend up to 2 weeks observing call handling in practice
and then being observed and coached themselves by more experienced staff (either call advisers or clinical
advisers), often referred to as ‘coaches’ or ‘buddies’. Once call advisers are deemed by their coach to have
met the required competency levels they are given the green light to work alone. Coaching is an integral
part of training for newly qualiﬁed call advisers in all organisations and serves two key functions. First, it
provides call advisers with support, which is important for staff retention. For some call advisers ‘going
live’, taking real-life calls, was met with trepidation or fears about competency. Particular types of calls
worried new call advisers and required support. These included calls about seriously ill children and calls
from patients at risk of suicide.
Second, monitoring of call advisers ensures that they do not develop bad habits and that they are
performing ‘safe’ assessments. Call advisers were almost unanimous in their views about how they
beneﬁted from support from more experienced colleagues.NIHRThe senior manager is closely observing a new call handler – seated just behind her. The senior
manager tells me the new call handler has only been there a couple of days and ‘is doing really well’
and that supporting and observing newly qualified call handlers ‘stops us losing them’ [. . .] ‘Staff tend
to stay’.
Observation, call centre, site 2CallA4 is newly qualified . . . in her second week after her initial 4-week training. She explains that
she has to sit next to an experienced call handler because she’s new. This helps her feel much
more secure.
Observation, call centre, site 1Some of the mental health calls are particularly hard to deal with . . . A newer call adviser (CallA4)
says, ‘after training, every time I shadowed people, they had people with mental health problems and
that really panics you. It’s like your first ambulance or your first suicide’.
Observation, call centre, site 5Ongoing call adviser support, training updates and auditing
All call advisers were required to undertake training updates, for example when changes had been made
to NHS Pathways. There were also almost continual updates as a result of changes to practice, service
standards, targets or service provision. Often updates were delivered in the form of an e-mail or written
correspondence and call-handling staff often undertook ‘update’ training courses that could be single- or
several-day courses or online courses. In one site (site 3) we observed call advisers using a training NHS
Pathways computer in the call centre to test out their decision-making for a previous call. As we have seen
throughout this and the previous chapter, call advisers develop their skills by drawing on the knowledge
and support of their call-handling and/or clinical colleagues, and even experienced call advisers may seek
assistance from time to time. Informal coaching was intrinsic in all sites and supplemented more formal
audit activity.The call adviser explains to colleagues what she had asked [the patient] and how she used different
ways to ask the question – she was trying to rule out meningitis. A clinical adviser says that you are
not meant to mention meningitis, gently saying that she would put it as just rule out life-threatening
illness. She is correcting the call adviser’s practice in quite a gentle way – but also making sure the
other call advisers hear, as if it is a general observation about how to do the work not a direct
criticism of [the call adviser].
Observation, call centre, site 5Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SCallA6 takes a call from a 24-year-old male with a racing heart and breathing problems, following the
‘solvents/drugs’ pathway. It results in a ‘go to ED’ disposition. After the call CallA6 says that she
wasn’t sure whether to choose the ‘solvent/drug abuse’ or ‘palpitations’ pathway. She uses the NHS
Pathways training laptop to test what the outcome would be following different pathways. She tries
to match the triage to the outcome the call handler feels it should be.
Observation, call centre, site 3Some sites reinforced training messages and tips for practice, for example through posters (site 2) and
through digital technology or e-mail correspondence.A [television] screen is on a loop showing NHS Pathways hints and tips (e.g. which pathway to use for
different symptoms). The dispatcher explains, ‘this is things for call takers to be aware of. It was the
auditor’s idea in order to make call takers aware of things to remember, where there have been
problems or useful phrases’. One slide reminds callers to ‘use the term “clinician” or “clinical
colleague” rather than “paramedic or nurse” ’. In total there are 100 slides.
Observation, call centre, site 3We have described the auditing process in some detail in our earlier work18 but, brieﬂy, alongside the
CDSS there is an extensive audit procedure (imposed by the NHS Pathways developers as a condition of
use). Call advisers are subject to considerable appraisal, monitoring and surveillance of their work. The
process across sites is very similar. All calls are stored and call advisers have a minimum of ﬁve of their calls
analysed in detail each month. The calls are assessed and feedback provided to call advisers. Overall,
call advisers viewed auditing as a process that was generally heralded as a necessity for maintaining
standards. It also served to ward off complacency:CallA9 says that ‘calls are audited every week and we get feedback two to three times a month’.
He tells me about a ‘bad audit . . . I got 25% which is very low, because I’d become complacent . . . a
[patient] called with earache. I knew what the outcome would be so I didn’t ask all the questions.
It turns out she had a rash as well and I didn’t get that. It was good to have auditing; it gave me a
wake-up call. Now I get 100% or 95%’.
Observation, call centre, site 5Call advisers also spoke of the beneﬁts of listening to your own calls to improve performance:CallS2 explains that a selection of recent calls is audited and staff receive immediate feedback,
positive and negative. Call advisers and nurses do the auditing. Call advisers also listen to the call so
you can hear yourself, for example there was someone kept saying ‘yer’. When they heard themselves
they said ‘is that really me? From hearing herself on tape she could learn from it’.
Observation, call centre, site 5When call advisers were less positive about auditing there was a sense that they felt that it was unjust to
be assessed on a sample of calls:CallA17 says that the dispatchers and supervisors are also expected to take five calls per month and
be audited on these, but she doesn’t think that this is fair to be sampled on all five calls – no margin
here. Call advisers recognise that some calls they take will be better than others and there’s an
element of luck as to which ones will ‘get audited’.
Observation, call centre, site 3Graphs showing performance (in relation to anonymised colleagues’ performance) are available at all sites
to self-monitor performance.49
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50The survey ﬁndings showed that there was some variation between sites in whether staff agreed that the
monitoring and auditing of call-handling performance ensures safe call assessment (Table 12). Staff at
site 1 were less likely than staff at all other sites to agree that monitoring and auditing ensures safe call
assessment. Staff at site 5 were more likely than staff at sites 1, 3 and 4 to agree that it was necessary. In
all sites clinical staff were less likely than non-clinical staff to agree that monitoring and auditing were
necessary (signiﬁcant in all sites except sites 2 and 5).
Auditing and feedback are carried out by a combination of clinical advisers, call supervisors and
experienced call advisers. This role is pivotal in monitoring whether targets and standards are being met
and in monitoring how call advisers answer calls and whether this meets with NHS 111 and local
standards. Training and auditing are undertaken by different staff in each setting. At site 1 auditing was
primarily performed by non-clinical audit staff who also had responsibilities for the wider auditing of
ambulance provision. These staff were supported by the clinical supervisors in relation to auditing and
trainers (former call advisers) to develop NHS Pathways skills. At sites 2 and 3 this role was performed by a
non-clinical auditor. At site 5 there was a dedicated training role and the trainer was responsible for
delivering all call adviser and clinical adviser training. At sites 4 and 5 clinical advisers also played an
important role in auditing and monitoring – reviewing calls and feeding back results and explaining how to
improve practice. At site 5 these staff were also involved in reviewing and addressing calls that had led
to complaints from a front-line service provider.
Across our observations we also noted that the degree of conﬁdence amongst call advisers to perform
their work varied between sites. To some extent this is likely to be a consequence of how long the
organisation and the call adviser had been using NHS Pathways. However, we also suspect that some of
this conﬁdence may arise from who is delivering training and the extent to which trainers encourage call
advisers to take responsibility for dealing with a call. Although at all sites there was recognition that call
advisers should not go beyond what they felt able to do and risk an unsafe disposition, quite where this
boundary lay seemed to be different. At sites 1 and 5 our observations were that call advisers felt that they
had a high level of competence to deal with most calls themselves whereas at other sites we observed
much higher levels of referral to and/or consultation with clinical advisers and supervisors. These seemed to
be sites where there was lower trust in the system and/or the ability of non-clinical operators to handle
complex calls:NIHRA call from a 78-year-old man, short of breath, recently diagnosed with a collapsed lung. He has
awoken with pain this morning (when coughing/moving). He says, ‘I’m suffering like mad . . . I need
something to relive the pain’. The disposition is ‘see GP < 12 hours’. The call adviser asks the caller if
he would be able to come to the UCC. ‘No, it takes too much out of me’. The call is warm transferred
to a nurse. After the call, the call adviser says, ‘you don’t know what to do, do you?’ This particular
call adviser is very reluctant/unsure in completing a call without clinical involvement.
Observation, call centre, site 4Further training needs
Call-handling and clinical staff identiﬁed a number of training needs over and above those already being
met. Some clinicians were of the opinion that call advisers would beneﬁt from some basic training around
history taking to better prepare them for their role and to enable them to provide more useful information
for clinicians in the output from NHS Pathways. However, this request may have stemmed from
dissatisfaction with the NHS Pathways output rather than with the call advisers’ skill levels.I suggest that call handlers are not clinically qualified and perhaps that makes it difficult for them to
perform history taking. ECP2 disagrees. He feels that they could take ‘much more useful information’
with fairly minimal additional training. He says that it doesn’t necessarily need a clinical person to do
the job, but it does need a better trained call handler – one with some training around history taking.Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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NIHRECP5 says that it should be staffed either by nurses, or the call handlers need more training. He says,
‘anyone could do triage but they need the appropriate training’.
Observation, UCC, site 1Several call advisers also suggested that call advisers might beneﬁt from spending some time on
ambulances and considered that this might impact on the way that they asked questions in the future.
At some sites (site 1 and 2) some call advisers had had such an experience and appeared to value it for
supporting their understanding of the wider context of their role:CallA12 and CallS3 are chatting to me about their experiences of going out observing in an ambulance.
CallS3 says she saw ‘a stroke’ and CallA12 says ‘had a cardiac arrest that died’. He seemed a little
shocked by that. I ask CallA12 if going out in an ambulance is part of their training for Pathways or 111?
He tells me that’s it’s not, but that he arranged it himself as he thought it would be useful. He thinks it
would be useful for call handlers to do this: ‘it helps you know a bit more about when ambulances are
despatched; for example you might probe a bit deeper, or ask questions in a different way’.
Observation, call centre, site 2In addition to spending time on ambulances, better understanding of the wider range of NHS 111 front-line
services to which call advisers referred callers was also thought to offer value. To this end a number of staff
at one of our sites (site 5) had been on a tour of the NHS 111 front-line providers so that they could get to
know what was available: ‘I ask CallA2 about the Directory of Services options. He shows me a map on the
wall with lots of photos attached to it and tells me that the call advisers were taken on a tour of the
different service providers’ (observation, call centre, site 5).
Analysis suggested that there is potentially a need for additional training for clinical advisers and call
advisers around safeguarding children and adults. In one site we observed a challenging and emotional call
about a possible domestic violence case. The clinician dealing with the case identiﬁed the need for such
additional support. Gaps in support were identiﬁed in several sites and included a perceived lack of
support for call advisers following emotional work and particularly following difﬁcult calls with patients
with mental health problems:Clin8H puts the caller on hold: ‘I really don’t know what to do with this’. The call is from a 21-year-old
female with a 2-year history of abuse but the caller reports she and her child are not at risk tonight.
Her husband is present. The call handlers and clinician discuss whether this is a ‘vulnerable adult case
only’ or child too. Clin7H: ‘the child is potentially at risk too’. Clin8H: ‘She is clearly worried that if the
police are called that they can’t help her’. Clin8H questions if they should have selected the ‘vulnerable
adults’ Pathway. There’s a lot of uncertainty about what to do. Clin8H suggests the case should be
referred to the vulnerable adults team.
Observation, call centre, site 5ClinA3 tells me that she is particularly worried about whether call advisers have enough support
following mental health calls. She says that all call advisers will have had some training but that all the
clinical advisers are worried about debriefing ‘so we’re going to make clinical supervision available for
call advisers too. We should look after the staff . . . call advisers don’t get enough support and they
are making very important decisions’.
Observation, call centre, site 4Overall, our observations revealed variability amongst sites in a number of aspects of training and audit,
which may result in some inconsistency across sites and differences in the conﬁdence of call advisers. The
nature of NHS 111 work is that calls are variable and complex and it is very hard to be able to train for this
complexity and to assume that all calls can be handled by non-clinical staff simply following the system.
The impact of local variations in training and audit procedures on the standardisation of service delivery
warrants more detailed investigation.Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3SummaryAcross all sites, deploying NHS Pathways and piloting NHS 111 led to workforce expansion, with more
staff being employed and additional roles created. The ability to engage in effective teamwork is important
both to provide emotional support to colleagues and to provide advice in the case of difﬁcult calls. At all
sites a number of call advisers were promoted to a new role of call supervisor. Clinical advisers provided
home management advice but also had additional roles in managing and sanctioning dispositions and in
supporting, training and auditing call-handling activities.
Although formal roles exist in each organisation the boundaries between them are often blurred. Call
advisers lack clinical training but there is consistent evidence of them performing complex health-care work,
albeit supported by the technology. We observed that clinical knowledge gathered from the system and
from clinical staff becomes internalised in call advisers who then draw on this knowledge when handling
calls. Despite this there are clear beliefs amongst the workforce that input from clinical staff is essential for
supporting call advisers and to allow them to take clinical responsibility for more complex calls.
Participation in training can be challenging for call advisers. It requires considerable commitment in relation
to the amount of learning that is required for the role. Completing the required training programme also
places demands on their time, which is a particular problem for part-time and night-shift workers. Ongoing
formal and informal training was provided at all sites through coaching, support from call supervisors and
clinical staff and feedback from the audit process. There is considerable variation across sites in how these
activities are performed and by whom.53
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DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Chapter 5 Results: what is the technology?IntroductionIn looking at the technology used by the NHS 111 service we considered the CDSS, which is used by call
advisers to triage and manage calls to the service, and the wider network of technologies needed to
deliver the service. These other technologies included a range of digital ICTs – telephony, various software
and data storage systems including geographical information systems, patient record systems and
databases, and the computer hardware. This chapter describes the core technologies used by the NHS 111
service and looks at three particular issues that arose in our analysis: trust in technology, failures related to
technologies and integration of technologies.The technologies used to deliver NHS 111NHS 111 seeks to deliver telephone clinical assessment and provision of information, including direction to
the most appropriate service when necessary. The aim is that these tasks are completed within the ﬁrst call
(i.e. without the need for a call back). Clinical assessment and triage is supported by a single CDSS, and
callers can be given health information or self-care advice or can be directed to the most appropriate
service available at the time of the call using an up-to-date skills-based Directory of Services (DoS). Calls
assessed as requiring an ambulance can be immediately directed to ambulance dispatch without the need
for reassessment and, when necessary, calls can be transferred (‘warm transfer’) to a clinician or, if this is
not possible, placed in a call-back system. The integration of the CDSS and the DoS should allow callers to
be directed to appropriate local services without the need for re-triage, and, when possible, appointments
can be made at the relevant service. As well as recording information about the calls for audit and
monitoring within the NHS 111 service, the various technologies used also allow records to be shared
between health-care providers and services, for example a call summary created during the call can be
forwarded to the receiving service or to the patient’s GP.
The core technologies that we focus on here are the software and databases used to manage, record and
display information about the calls, the CDSS used to support triage and management of the caller and
the DoS used to identify and interface with local care services. The next four sections describe these
technologies to provide background information to situate our discussion of failures, trust and integration.Case/record management and booking systems
The NHS 111 services used different electronic case management and booking systems to record details
about calls. These computerised systems allowed real-time logging of caller details, including demographic
information, time of call and GP details, as well as recording advice given and outcomes (dispositions).
These systems also store or record these data for retrospective audit and monitoring of performance.
Four of the sites studied used the Adastra case management system and one used the Cleric case
management system [in conjunction with TPP SystmOne (Horsforth, Yorkshire, UK) to book appointments
at UCCs]. When watching the call handling for the NHS 111 service these systems are typically encountered
ﬁrst – the initial screens of information populated at the start of the call with basic demographic details are
part of these systems. The speciﬁc software used in NHS 111 settings is often one of a number of modules
or ‘solutions’ made by the software provider, and may be tailored to the urgent care setting or the NHS 111
service. The Adastra call management system is marketed by Advanced Health & Care and is currently
used in a variety of NHS settings, including both telephone services and face-to-face services in hospital,
emergency care and GP care. Cleric is marketed by Cleric Computer Services (Congleton, Cheshire, UK) and
offers similar functionality and has a history of use in the NHS, notably in ambulance and patient transport.55
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56One site used Adastra to manage urgent care calls but had also introduced software marketed by Valentia
Technologies (Dublin, Ireland) to manage 999 calls.
These systems are conﬁgured in slightly different ways but all allow the display of patient/call information
on a visual display unit (VDU) screen. Some items can be populated by free-text entry by the call adviser
whereas others may be populated from a drop-down menu of options or enable automated ‘look up’ of
information (such as an address or a patient care summary). These systems are used at the front end of
the call, before the call adviser accesses the CDSS to undertake assessment and triage.
Towards the close of the call the call adviser will, when indicated by the outcome of the call, use other
software to manage appointment bookings, view schedules and availability of appointments and send
electronic referrals or notiﬁcation of attendance to other services and, when necessary, to the patient’s GP.The computer decision support system
The CDSS software was developed by a team working within the NHS and it is currently licensed for use
by NHS ambulance services for the management of emergency (999) calls. It has previously been used for
urgent care services as part of a single point of access telephone service, for primary care out-of-hours
telephone services and for managing face-to-face interactions in an urgent care setting. Our previous
project examined the deployment of the CDSS in these different settings.
The CDSS is an expert system built on an extensive clinical evidence base subject to a continuous process
of evidence review and update. A series of logical algorithms (pathways) underpin questions that the
user/call adviser asks the caller/patient to determine the clinical skills required and the time frame in which
they must be accessed. The CDSS includes questions that the call adviser is required to asked as well as
prompts that are used to ‘probe’ or to gain more accurate and/or precise information, for example getting
callers to describe the nature of chest pain (as ‘crushing’, ‘shooting’, ‘aching’ and so on). The system is
used to arrive at a disposition, ranging from an 8-minute emergency ambulance to an appointment with
a GP to information on the self-monitoring or treatment of symptoms. For dispositions to primary care or
other community services the CDSS is able to identify the skill required to treat the patient and map this to
a record of clinical skills in local services using an integrated DoS. This directory, part of the Capacity
Management System (CMS), provides information on the location of services, opening times, response
times and clinical provision.
The CDSS comprises three modules, summarised in Table 13. Module 0 is designed to support immediate
identiﬁcation of life-threatening problems and the pathways here are typically short. It covers the vast
majority of 999 calls and provides needs assessment for the despatch of 8- and 19-minute ambulances.
Once immediately life-threatening situations have been ruled out, the call adviser moves into module 1,
which includes a larger number of pathways designed to assess a wide range of symptoms. At the start of
module 1 the call adviser is presented with a ‘body map’ (which is age and gender speciﬁc). The call
adviser clicks the computer mouse to select the body area affected and is presented with a menu of
pathways. The call adviser selects an appropriate pathway (based on the information provided by the caller
and the information presented on screen). The CDSS includes documentation of all clinical conditions.
A further module (module 2) is designed for use by a clinician (usually a nurse or paramedic) and involves a
longer set of algorithms for further assessment or for providing care advice.
The CDSS also includes a database of care advice for the call adviser to provide over the telephone
depending on the pathway. This includes:
l advice provided during the call [e.g. cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) instructions]
l ‘worsening advice’ in which the caller is advised to look out for signs of symptoms getting worse in the
period before primary care is accessedNIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
ABLE 13 Computer decision support system modules
Module Summary
0 Questions relate to immediate and imminent threat to life, e.g. chest pain, severe loss of blood/consciousness
or not breathing. There is some information ﬁltering, e.g. whether the problem is due to trauma (injury),
whether the call is from the patient or a third party, age and gender of the patient
1 Module 1 begins after life-threatening situations have been ruled out and includes a larger number of
pathways designed to assess a wide range of symptoms. The call handler is presented with a ‘body map’ and
selects the appropriate body system/area affected; this leads to a list of pathways relating to this area
2 Nurse/paramedic assessment module when there is no obvious emergency. The call is transferred to a nurse
for further assessment or provision of care advice. Typically used for more complex calls or when the call
handler has arrived at a home care disposition
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Tl interim advice for non-emergency dispositions and for managing symptoms in the period before an
ambulance or a primary care response (e.g. pain relief advice)
l home care advice for self-care dispositions in which detailed care advice is provided to support the
patient in looking after themselves.The Directory of Services
The DoS is a dynamic searchable database populated with information about local services including
UCCs, walk-in centres, primary care surgeries, pharmacists and EDs. The DoS contains information about
service operation including location and opening times but also information about the available skill set
and services offered by each provider. It also contains a set of guidelines or protocols to support the
referral process. This database is designed to operate as a ‘real-time’ system, detailing the services available
and open at a particular time of day but also reporting current activity (waiting times, number of
appointments free). The DoS automates the process of selecting the relevant service and the call adviser
should not need to manually search for the most appropriate service.Other software and systems
Call management systems and other software were also used in the NHS 111 services studied. These
included digital systems for routine operational information, for example recording who was on shift,
activity levels including the number of calls coming into and out of the service, staff engaged in taking
calls or on ‘rest’ periods and time taken to answer. These data were often summarised and displayed on a
large VDU/television screen in a central location in the call centre.
Most of the sites allowed call advisers to access other digital resources during and in between calls. This
included internal intranet facilities, notably e-mail and shared drives housing documentation, but also
external websites. The latter were used to access web pages, for example to conduct Google (Google Inc.,
Mountain View, CA) searches or to use mapping software to pinpoint a service location. Some sites also
gave call advisers access to instant messaging facilities to allow real-time information exchange with other
NHS staff and/or to monitor service demand.
Access to web browsers and external websites for call advisers was a key difference between these case
studies and our previous project;18 some sites in our previous project, for data protection and security
reasons, had not allowed such access, particularly while a call was in progress. Many of the NHS 111 sites
allowed some access to external websites although access to some sites and services, such as social media
sites, was blocked. Call advisers used the web to search for additional details about health-care providers
and to verify spellings of place names, and call advisers and clinical staff also used these technologies to
search for clinical information, ranging from looking up medical terms to researching details about
particular diseases or conditions. One call adviser reported that the use of the web was ‘probably frowned57
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58upon . . . especially during the day’ but proved invaluable for ﬁnding information to assist with call
management. Another clinician explained her use of the web during an observation session:NIHRClinA3 says there are a number of websites nurse advisers can access. For example, you can use an
online resource to calculate kg in to stones. She also regularly uses the British National Family
Pharmacy and GP notebook, which tells you about diseases. She is keen to talk about the resources
she links into, including NHS Choices for details ‘on health services near you . . . nurses also use
“TOXBASE” to search details about levels of toxicity in various substances’.
Observation, call centre, site 4Trust in the technologies for NHS 111Attitudes towards the CDSS were mixed. Some call advisers were positive about the CDSS and trusted the
dispositions made:CallA18 is incredibly positive about Pathways: ‘Pathways is very good’. She trusts the disposition is
correct: ‘Pathways tells me; it follows the symptoms not what the patient thinks is wrong with them;
it follows the exact symptom, so for example they might phone thinking it’s food poisoning, but
Pathways will pick it up that it’s not food poisoning if it doesn’t recognise it from the symptoms’.
Observation, call centre, site 1But others, on occasion, wanted greater ﬂexibility around the questions they asked as they felt that the
CDSS did not provide sufﬁcient information to direct the call ‘down’ the correct pathway. This was a
particular problem for callers who presented with multiple symptoms as these two quotes indicate:CallA6 is following the ‘cough’ pathway . . . CallA6 calls the clinical adviser and gives her a brief
summary of the call before putting the caller immediately and directly through. After the call I learn
the call was transferred because the [system] was saying it was a cough, but the child also had a fever
so it was difficult to know what pathway to follow.
Observation, call centre, site 1CallA20 chats to me about the ‘rectal bleeding call’, telling me she got very confused because
the caller was reporting ‘multiple symptoms’: pain in the back passage, rectal bleed and difficulty
passing urine; ‘so three symptoms, all potentially quite serious’. CallA20 is a little concerned about
this call . . . saying that getting someone to report a ‘main symptom’ is sometimes one of the hardest
parts of the job.
Observation, call centre, site 2Sometimes this distrust of the technology waned as experience increased:The call adviser says, ‘I was thinking, what Pathway do I use, because there is no Pathway for
pregnancy, but she did describe pressure down there. The more experience of Pathways you get, I
knew there would be a pregnancy question in the abdominal Pathway’.
Observation, call centre, site 5However, doubts about the veracity of the dispositions made with the CDSS might also be reinforced by
other knowledge or experience. Call advisers might look up clinical information to ‘check’ or validate the
pathways presented in the CDSS. In some cases the call advisers were able to use the CDSS itself to do this:[Clinical adviser] says that mostly NHS Pathways is good but there are a few things that don’t seem
right. She says that in a call she went down a particular route in the system for a baby and it came
out with a particular disposition (go to ED) but when she followed the same pathway for a toddler it
came out with a more urgent ambulance disposition. She says, ‘look, I’ll see if I can show you’. She
moves over to the laptops which have the training version of NHS Pathways on them.
Observation, call centre, site 3Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SClinA3 took this call and asked the patient ‘is it a numbing pain, like someone is ringing out a
sponge?’ The patient still refused an ambulance and ‘despite probing, it still came out as an
ambulance’. In relation to this case she says ‘Pathways doesn’t bend, its black and white’.
Observation, call centre, site 4Another example was when the call advisers did not agree with or ‘trust’ the disposition:I sense a disparity between what ClinA5 wants the system to do and what it actually does. She
explains this saying ‘I knew what I wanted to do with it, but I feel like sometimes it comes up with a
disposition that I don’t agree with’. She gives me an example from a call earlier today: ‘I had a young
baby with a rash today. The problem with Pathways is that it can only assess one symptom. The child
had a rash, was not communicating as usual and had sunken puffy eyes’.
Observation, call centre, site 2Interestingly, clinical staff working in the call centres reported that they found the CDSS to be too ‘risk
averse’, implying that, in their clinical judgement, the system was not offering the correct disposition. This
might be seen initially as a mark of distrust of the CDSS. However, they suggested that this feature was
positive, that it supplied a necessary ‘safety net’ allowing them to trust the technology when used by
non-clinical staff. Some were happy to follow the CDSS themselves because of this:The clinical adviser likes his job and using the system. He doesn’t find it restrictive despite his clinical
knowledge. Says ‘in the end you’ve got to be safe’, describing it as ‘safety netting’. I ask if it’s harder
not assessing face to face. He says sometimes because you can listen to breathing but not see if
they’ve got sweating or pallor as you would face to face. He thinks NHS Pathways is more cautious.
Observation, call centre, site 5One clinician suggested that the involvement of doctors in developing the CDSS was used to assert the
trustworthiness of the CDSS and she found this difﬁcult:ECP4 says ‘I can see call advisers just going down the wrong pathway’. ECP4 says that she queried
one of the algorithms at a ‘review meeting’ but was told ‘well it’s been designed by doctors [so it
must be correct]’.
Observation, UCC, site 1Others felt that, although the CDSS could be trusted to be sufﬁciently risk averse when used by
non-clinicians, this had to be actively managed by the clinical staff in the call centre:CallA6 has joined the shift . . . he used to be a paramedic on the ambulances. I ask him what he
thinks about 111 and Pathways. He says ‘it’s a very risk averse system . . . you need clinicians as it’s so
risk averse otherwise you’d end up with an ambulance for everything’.
Observation, call centre, site 3This view was also common to external stakeholders, notably GPs, who suggested that some dispositions
for UCC appointments and home visits were inappropriate:I ask GP1 about the types of patients he sees that have come through 111 and if the majority of
home visits are to elderly or housebound people: ‘the majority are elderly, but there are also
inappropriate visits, people with no transport, things like that. It’s OK if they are housebound,
whatever age they are, but for people with no transport; it’s wrong’.
Observation, UCC, site 559
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60The GPs felt that the technology could not be trusted to deal appropriately with some clinical presentations:NIHRGP2 says that ‘there are some conditions you can pigeon hole [as NHS Pathways does], such as chest
pain which are quite clear cut, need to err on the side of caution, but there are other symptoms that
are much more difficult for a non-clinician to assess’.
Observation, UCC, site 1One GP did echo the views of the clinicians in the call centre that the CDSS was necessarily risk averse
and that when there were failings this was not because of the technology per se but was the result of
human factors:The clinical lead talks to me about some of her early scepticism in relation to 111: ‘I was very sceptical
and tried to find errors, but it is safe and that was my biggest concern. In a lot of cases that don’t
work quite right, it’s not the software or the call adviser that has failed; it’s the fact that the patient
hasn’t given concise information’.
Observation, call centre, site 3In the excerpt below a call adviser explains why she has made an ‘untrustworthy’ or incorrect disposition
for a patient with (primarily) mental health concerns who also has an apparently more minor
physical symptom:CallA1 explained to me that sometimes in calls like these, where there is a mix of conditions (i.e.
blood loss and behavioural/mental health) Pathways is not so good. ‘You have to go down the blood
loss Pathway and send an ambulance’.
Observation, call centre, site 1Call advisers and clinicians alike noted that the pathways relating to mental health conditions were
more problematic:ClinA5 explains that ‘here mental health comes under the behaviour and mood disturbance Pathway’;
she seems to be making the point that everything comes under one Pathway as she tells me ‘in NHS
Direct we had different algorithms for say depression or anger; here, under 111, we cover everything
under one Pathway’.
Observation, call centre, site 4CallA2: I mean, I’m mental health trained anyway, so it doesn’t bother me, but I don’t think the
pathways accommodate mental illness at all.CallA1: Not enough paths to mental health on there . . . just one thing.CallA4: Yes, it is. It’s really poor on that, and that’s the other thing, as well, the mental health is . . .
really . . . I don’t know if poor is the right word, but it’s not adequate, it’s not sufficient.CallA2: It doesn’t cover mental health at all. I mean, I had a call on Sunday, and if I hadn’t have been
mental health trained, I’d have been totally lost, but . . . she couldn’t tell me what was the matter, but
I were asking her, you know, like, are you hallucinating . . . are you deluded, are you low, or . . .?
Whereas you know, sometimes with pathways . . . it’s not there.
Focus group, site 4Few GPs used the clinical information and triage details provided from the CDSS processes. Typically, they
initiated patient consultations – by telephone or face to face – by asking for symptom history and detailsJournals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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comments about the technology and the wider NHS 111 service.
Survey questions that measured trust in NHS Pathways supported these data. Trust was signiﬁcantly lower
amongst staff at site 1 (mean composite score of 3.06) than amongst staff at site 2 (mean score 3.64) and
site 5 (mean score 4.29) (F = 12.2; p < 0.001). This higher level of trust overall in site 5 is likely to reﬂect
the fact that the survey was not administered to UCC staff. Conversely, lower levels of trust in site 1 are
likely to reﬂect the negative views of the site 1 UCC staff (Table 14). In all sites trust in NHS Pathways was
higher amongst call centre staff than amongst UCC staff (see Table 14).ABLE 14 Staff agreement with statements about trust in NHS Pathways
Sitea Staff group n Mean (SD)b Range (min.–max.) 95% CI F-value; p-value
1 Call centre 32 3.82 (0.96) 1.00–5.00 3.48 to 4.17 F = 52.00; p < 0.001
UCC 21 1.88 (0.95) 1.00–4.43 1.45 to 2.32
2 Call centre 25 3.94 (0.49) 3.14–4.86 3.74 to 4.14 F = 9.83; p = 0.003
UCC 17 3.19 (1.04) 1.00–4.71 2.66 to 3.73
3 Call centre 32 3.74 (0.60) 2.71–5.00 3.52 to 3.95 F = 14.54; p < 0.001
UCC 27 3.10 (0.68) 2.00–4.57 2.83 to 3.37
4 Call centre 85 3.57 (0.77) 1.00–5.00 3.40 to 3.73 F = 23.61; p < 0.001
UCC 23 2.66 (0.87) 1.29–4.43 2.28 to 3.04
Total Call centre 174 3.81 (0.76) 1.00–5.00 3.71 to 3.91 F = 103.78; p < 0.001
UCC 88 2.74 (1.01) 1.00–4.71 2.52 to 2.95
CI, conﬁdence interval; max., maximum; min., minimum; SD, standard deviation.
a Survey was not administered at the UCC in site 5.
b Composite score of seven trust statements; higher mean agreement indicates higher levels of trust.TTechnological failures
All sites had contingency plans to cover failures in electrical supply or software malfunctioning. These
included having systems for rerouting calls to other sites and/or the use of paper-based back-up systems.© Que
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Park, S[The call adviser] shows me a paper version of the system used [when there is a system failure]. It
involves an input form and a manual with the opening questions from Pathways and then page
numbers to move onto dependent on whether there is a yes or no answer. He is very vague on
whether he has actually had to use this while he leafs through the pages but notes that on an early
page of the manual is a pathway for taking blood results. He follows this and notes it leads to the
same disposition as was eventually agreed by the staff.
Observation, call centre, site 5The sites used training and sometimes rehearsal/practice sessions to ensure that staff could cope with this
type of relatively large-scale technical failure affecting the service. We did not witness any lengthy
disruptions to services at any of the sites during our ﬁeldwork. However, we did hear accounts of and
witnessed ﬁrst-hand some examples of technology ‘failing’ temporarily and disrupting aspects of NHS 111
services. This included computer systems freezing and occasionally telephony problems. When telephony61
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62issues occurred this was mostly callers being cut off because they were using mobile technology or
occasional line interference:NIHRCallA11 takes a call but the line is just ‘crackling’. ClinA5 is watching: ‘what’s happening?’ The call
adviser comments ‘she’s just getting crackles, that’s it’. CallA11 comments that she will have to call the
caller back. There’s a bit of a discussion about what it could be and it is suggested it might be ‘static’.
Observation, call centre, site 3In one site we witnessed additional telephony problems when transferring calls to nurses at external
organisations and patients had to wait for a nurse to call back:CallA1 explains that ‘I’m going to pass you over to our nurse advisers’, but she is unable to transfer
the call immediately and tells the patient that a nurse will call back within 10 minutes. I recall that
earlier CallA1 mentioned that there has been some difficulty getting through to the nurses at NHS
Direct all night.
Observation, call centre, site 2Technical problems, such as freezing computer screens, sometimes resulted in callers being put on hold or
transferred to another call adviser, or call details having to be re-entered, and this could be stressful for
staff, but we observed how well managed such crises were:The supervisor . . . says that they have been having a ‘difficult’ day – Adastra has stopped working.
I later find out is must have stopped or at least been noticed around 1800 because they were trying
to book appointments and they were not going through. There is a bit of tension in the air but it feels
like a well-managed crisis.
Observation, call centre, site 5The ﬁndings from the survey suggest that staff feel that NHS 111 technology is reasonably reliable
(Table 15). Overall, staff at the call centres were more positive about the technology than UCC staff
(a ﬁnding that was statistically signiﬁcant in all sites).
There were particular problems associated with the technology for the DoS. Some call advisers were
frustrated that the DoS was not accurate or up to date. Sometimes it did not offer the information needed
and call advisers worked around this by using their own knowledge. In one site (site 3) there was almost
no use of the DoS, possibly because of the site’s geographically small/isolated location: ‘As she reads the
survey she reaches the question about whether the ‘DOS is up-to-date’ and comments, ‘well, that would
be a “no”; it’s rubbish’ (observation, call centre, site 3).
The ﬁndings from the survey with regard to staff views about the DoS broadly conﬁrmed the ethnographic
data, with staff across all sites tending to neither agree nor disagree that the DoS is accurate and up to date
(Table 16). Staff at site 5 were more likely to agree that the DoS was accurate than staff at all other sites.Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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The three core technologies – the call management systems, the CDSS and the DoS – need to be
integrated to deliver the NHS 111 service. There were some examples in our data of occasions when
particular technologies failed and this disrupted the integration of these systems:© Que
Health
provid
addres
Park, SThere seems to be some concern over Adastra and the fact that the disposition was ‘clinician call
back’ but that an ambulance had been sent by the ambulance dispatcher. The dispatcher says an
ambulance went anyway, but he appears a little frustrated.
Observation, call centre, site 3CallA11 still seems to be having some problems with the system and adds, ‘the demographics are
meant to be saved, it’s not working. I’ve lost all the demographics details’.
Observation, call centre, site 3Integrating with ambulance/999 services
At one site the technical links between the call centre and ambulance dispatch had failed on occasion so a
‘workaround’ had been devised to manage this – call advisers telephone 999 to check that the ambulance
service has received the disposition:The call handler says ‘you need a 999 ambulance . . . are you happy for this?’ An ambulance is
dispatched. The patient is put on hold whilst she phones the ambulance service to check that the
ambulance has actually been dispatched, then goes back to the patient to confirm this. After the call,
CallA1 explains that occasionally the information is not automatically passed to ambulance control.
There is a protocol now in place, so that after every 999 disposition, they telephone the ambulance
service to check the case has been received.
Observation, call centre, site 4One clinical member of staff felt that the integration of the urgent and emergency care systems could be
improved with the addition of a process that could immediately call an ambulance:He would like a ‘life-threat’ button – [he says] there is one but they can’t use it on their system. This
would allow them to immediately call an ambulance. He concedes this might be overcautious but
feels it would be justified for the few cases it caught.
Observation, call centre, site 5Integrating for primary care bookings
The integration of the technologies directed towards booking appointments at UCCs appeared to be a
straightforward and largely reliable process. When there was negative feedback it was typically around waiting
times so call advisers in some sites moderated the information that they gave to manage patient expectations:The disposition is to be seen by a GP practice in the next 6 hours, but CallA4 tells the patient that as
his GP surgery is closed she will book an appointment for him at his closest UCC. She seems to easily
book an appointment, flicking to the appointment bookings page, for an hour’s time.
Observation, call centre, site 1I ask CallA8 about the booking appointments system. She tells me that she thinks it works really well.
There were some problems at first, because call handlers would book people in and then they’d get
to the [UCC] and not be seen at the time they were booked in for and so would get upset about that.
CallA8: ‘Now we just say, I’ve booked you an appointment at whatever time it is, but you may not be
seen exactly then; this seems to work better’.
Observation, call centre, site 365
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66When there were problems they appeared to be about single failures in one or other of the technologies
used, as in this instance when the call adviser had to manually cancel an appointment:NIHRCallA1 tells me the ‘system is playing up’. It appears the case has gone to an ‘appointment booking’
and I observe CallA1 approach the supervisor (CallS1) for advice. I listen as CallA1 is advised to cancel
the out-of-hours appointment and note ‘the patient is happy to see their own GP’.
Observation, call centre, site 5Feedback from UCC staff suggested that they experienced some frustration about booking appointments.
This was primarily related to whether they agree with the dispositions or not, but there is also frustration
when call advisers book in ‘less urgent’ patients and ‘use up’ more urgent slots. Some UCCs found that it
was difﬁcult to manage the additional demand generated by NHS 111 and felt that call advisers were not
always aware of the full urgent care workload:CallA4 books an appointment for this afternoon. Afterwards she says, ‘you get your hands slapped if
you book the less urgent appointments in too early’.
Observation call centre, site 4The ECP says that the appointment slots are 15 minutes, but complex cases (e.g. requires minor
surgery) can take much longer. He recently had a case that took 1.5 hours to treat, resulting in
patients ‘backing up in the waiting room’. One issue [according to the ECP] is that call handlers do
not have access to the same information on screen as UCC staff. Call handlers can see if a slot is free
(to make a 111 booking), but cannot see other UCC appointments (e.g. appointments made by UCC
staff where patients walk in). ‘Slots are sometimes double, triple and quadruple booked’.
Observation UCC, site 1Integrating with other external organisations
Calls involving third-party external organisations in some aspect of the assessment frequently posed
problems as the transfer of technical information and the information and booking systems were not so
well integrated.CallA13 tells SMgr2 ‘[name] have completely mucked it [booking an appointment] up’. SMgr2 checks
whether there’s an appointment for the patient at the UCC. It appears the booking isn’t on the
screen/system for some reason.
Observation, call centre, site 2Integrating information
Several stakeholders expressed concern about the quality of call summary information received from the
CDSS. We have already noted that most of the GPs did not use the records generated by the CDSS (see
Chapter 3, Managing risk and upward referral of patients). This appeared to be because of the format and
layout of these summaries. GPs said that they would prefer not to have to search down the screen for vital
information and would like the call summary to provide a clearer indication of the main presenting
problem. They found the positive statements highlighted in blue helpful but negative statements
highlighted in black unhelpful:‘The triage is utter rubbish, it gives us nothing to use’. GP1 continues reading an example of the first
part of a call handler’s triage from the screen: ‘it’s not bleeding . . . NO . . . that’s because it’s a SORE
THROAT! No, I know why they ask, but seriously it’s utter rubbish’. GP1 shows me how the cases
appear on the screen and where it shows the main symptoms, e.g. a ‘sore throat’, pointing out that,Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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© Que
Health
provid
addres
Park, Sas you go down the triage, ‘it turns out it’s rectal bleeding . . . The doctors hate Pathways’. GP1
seems to be saying that they need to search down the information on Pathways before finding out
‘what’s really wrong’ and that the symptoms recorded by the call handler are not necessarily a good
prediction of the [medical] problem.
Observation, UCC, site 3[The clinical adviser] is annoyed that there is little free text allowed. He shows me his own notes in the
system, which are far more specific and individualised free-text summaries of individual patients.
Observation, call centre, site 4The survey results reﬂected the more negative views of clinicians about the call summary. Clinicians were
less likely than non-clinicians to agree that it was useful and this was signiﬁcant in sites 1, 3 and 4 (Table 17).
There were also information transfer problems associated with accessing the summary in vehicles
dispatched on home visits. In the two sites where we spent time in cars (sites 3 and 4), the full call
summary was visible in vehicles; however, in site 5, the GP told us that he had access only to the basic
patient demographics and the basic symptom information entered in the CMS. We have no way of
knowing whether the call summary information was not available or whether the GP simply did not know
how to navigate the system.
The DoS was pivotal to the NHS 111 service and needed to be an up-to-date database that integrated
information about local services. This was problematic because it required constant updating:CMgr2: The Directory of Services is not as I thought it would be. I don’t like that bit at all.CallA4: That’s the hardest bit for me.CMgr2: It’s not up to date, and it’s not easy to use.CallA4: No. That’s it, it’s not up to date . . . Well, it’s not up to date, and it’s not easy to use.CallA2: You avoid Directory of Services as much as you can, don’t you? You just say, oh, let’s click next.CallA4: But that’s what they want, though, isn’t it?CallA2: It’s either not going to be the right one . . . or . . . none of them are . . . are appropriate to . . .
where you want to send them. So a lot of the time, it does get ignored.
Focus group, site 4The DoS launches automatically, it’s all integrated so it should be seamless. You get to the disposition
and then it launches DoS. It’s intelligent, it knows for example [for someone with a broken leg] . . .
where to send someone, where there’s an X-ray machine. [The system] knows the patient’s age,
gender, location, symptoms and uses that to interrogate DoS, but it’s not perfect, in fact it’s
confusing. You need to use local knowledge and experience of using the system. The top option
should be the one that’s most appropriate and then the next one the next appropriate, but I find
often it doesn’t do that.
Call A7, observation, call centre, site 567
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DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3This was particularly difﬁcult for out-of-area calls and calls requiring dental services:© Que
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addres
Park, SA call adviser says, ‘If someone calls out of area, you have to go through the whole assessment and
then you get to the end and need to offer care and it doesn’t link to the DoS properly and you have
to tell them to recall’.
Observation, call centre, site 4The call adviser says, ‘One negative aspect of the DoS is related to dental calls where patients need a
dentist’s number’. He explains call advisers have to take all the caller’s details but then there is no
treatment available. All you can do is give the patient a telephone number . . . the DoS ‘just gives a
single emergency dental number and that’s no good [for most patients]’.
Observation, call centre, site 3There was some optimism that the wider implementation of NHS 111 may improve the DoS:Interviewer: So for you, then, when it does go national, will it make your lives easier?CallA2: It should do, if all the information is in the Directory of Services, yes, it should do. Hopefully.
At the minute, it’s not easy when you get an out-of-area call.CallA1: More out-of-area calls.CallA4: Yes, I was just going to say . . . that’s what I wondered. Eventually, I know it’s this area
that we’re taking on, but if the next county and the next county are taking it on . . . won’t it all
merge . . .? You know, because if they dial out of area, it might come to us anyway, you know,
that’s what I wondered.
Focus group, site 4Non-clinical staff were more likely than clinical staff in some sites (sites 1 and 4) to agree that NHS 111
technologies linked together well (Table 18).69
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RESULTS: WHAT IS THE TECHNOLOGY?
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NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3SummaryWe examined the core technologies implicated in the delivery of the NHS 111 services. These included the
CDSS used to assess and manage calls and the DoS used to locate appropriate services for onward referral
when indicated. We also observed the importance of what might be considered peripheral technologies
including call activity monitoring and display, internet features including web browsers and e-mail and
mapping systems.
Our analysis suggested three main themes of interest for the study, namely trust in technology, technology
failures and integration. Trust in the CDSS amongst call advisers is relatively high. There is some
appreciation that the system is risk averse and awareness of some areas in which the pathways are less
effective or useful (e.g. multiple symptoms). Turning to the theme of technology failures we noted that the
providers have established contingency plans for dealing with major faults, but we also noted that the staff
in the call centres work hard to make the technology work, often developing workarounds that enable
this. The survey suggests that they ﬁnd the system largely reliable although some problems with the DoS
were noted, especially the need to keep this up to date. The key area of integration necessary to deliver
NHS 111 was between the CDSS and the DoS, and this appeared to be an area in which there remained
some problems, such as dissatisfaction with case records and information about services.71
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DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Chapter 6 Results: organisational contexts
and relationships
In this chapter we move from the speciﬁc focus on work, workforce and technology, described in turn ineach of the previous three chapters, to examine how these are brought together within particular
organisational contexts and, more broadly still, how the delivery of NHS 111 is shaped by relationships
between the different organisations involved in its delivery.IntroductionThe aim of NHS 111 is to provide an integrated service for urgent and unscheduled care, rationalised and
standardised to achieve common clinical and bureaucratic outcomes across England. As we have shown
earlier, the introduction of NHS 111 has involved the emergence of new types of work, performed by a new
workforce, and the careful piecing together of heterogeneous technologies, not just the NHS Pathways
CDSS but also secure internet connections, telephone systems, the online DoS and so on. Although so far
we have considered this work, the workforce and the technologies involved independently, providing a
detailed description and analysis of each, the successful implementation of NHS 111 requires the
integration of these elements at the organisational level, in speciﬁc settings, and, furthermore, requires new
relationships across organisations within the wider health-care economy. In this chapter we explore how
this has been accomplished in each of our ﬁve case study organisations. The contracts to deliver NHS 111
have been awarded through a competitive process, in which a range of bidders have been active. Our case
studies were chosen to capture some of this diversity, allowing us to explore how organisational types,
histories and trajectories might impact on the motivation to become a NHS 111 provider and on the delivery
of a NHS 111 service in each case.
In this we draw on an understanding of work and organisations which recognises that innovation is not
accomplished ‘on the head of a pin’ – in policy documents, management strategies or organisational
charts – but is achieved in the everyday activities of individuals and teams with embedded values, practices
and relationships.29,30 It is well known that operational cultures vary across health-care services,31 that
professional cultures in health care are quite distinct32,33 and that relations between the different urgent
and emergency care services can be characterised by rivalry and a clash of cultures.34
In what follows we develop a comparative analysis across our case studies. We begin with a description of
each, asking:
l What is the nature of this organisation?
l Why did it become involved in NHS 111?
l What is the nature of its relationships with local partners in NHS 111?
Throughout, our concern is to explore if and how these factors shaped the organisation and delivery of the
NHS 111 service, with particular attention to how the work of NHS 111 was deﬁned, how the workforce
was constituted and how the technologies came into use. Through this discussion it becomes clear that
there is considerable variation in the organisation and delivery of NHS 111, shaped both by the nature of
contracted organisations themselves and by the nature of their relationships with other organisations.
However, our comparative case study approach also allows us to identify the cross-cutting themes that
have shaped the development of NHS 111 service delivery. Speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings draw attention to the
importance of the different service ethics associated with the emergency and out-of-hours providers,
respectively, the differentiated nature of interprofessional relations across our cases, and the impact of
competition for NHS 111 contracts between providers who are also expected to collaborate in the delivery
of the NHS 111 service based on interorganisational trust and knowledge sharing.73
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74Site 1The ambulance trust delivering NHS 111 at site 1 was established by the 2006 reforms, which consolidated
31 providers in England into 12 larger organisations.35 Site 1 now provides 999 services to over 2 million
people and handles over 300,000 999 calls each year, from the public, doctors, hospitals and the police
and ﬁre services, as well as dealing with ambulance transport requests from hospitals and GPs. It operates
two call centres including one at trust headquarters and one designed to mirror the ﬁrst centre as a
second, independent ‘back-up’ facility. The UCCs, operated by a different foundation trust, are located
some 20–30 miles from the call centre and can be accessed either by dialling 111 or by walking in.
Historically, the ambulance service in the UK was intended mainly as a call-handling and transportation
service and was characterised by a directive ‘command and control’ culture.7,36 There have been very clear
demarcations between job roles, with little interprofessional working within the service until recent times,
and management roles have been occupied by those with a paramedic background. Consequently, there
has in the past been relatively little integration between the ambulance service and other parts of the
health service, such as urgent care or routine general practice (beyond arranging patient transport). Over
recent years, the ambulance service has faced strong pressure to reduce, or at least contain, rising
ambulance demand, driven by the introduction of government-monitored performance targets. More
recently, policy related to the ambulance service has highlighted the potential for the ambulance service to
adopt a more central role in the delivery and performance of services across urgent and emergency
care,7,37 and the service itself has called for a move away from a command and control culture to a more
‘visionary, enthusiastic and motivating’ approach to leading the service.7,36 NHS 111 provides an
opportunity for the ambulance service to position itself in this central role.
In this wider national context, site 1 has undergone considerable modernisation and reorientation in recent
years. Managers describe this as a dynamic and outward-looking organisation, keen to embrace the move
towards greater integration of urgent and emergency care and to develop a range of services in addition
to 999. This spirit is evidenced by site 1’s recently successful application for foundation trust status, which,
in turn, affords a degree of autonomy and freedom in how services are provided locally and allows the
organisation to trade and make surpluses that can be reinvested in service development:NIHRWe were always . . . known across the country . . . as a forward thinking ambulance service trust . . . in
developing a lot of initiatives. A good example might be the introduction of a controlled drug across
the whole of the trust . . . not an easy thing to do, but we . . . took the bull by the horns and worked
through the policies and the procedures . . . and then took it nationally . . . presented it at a national
conference. A lot of other services picked up the work that we did and, introduced [it] into their
service. So we’re always seen as a high performer . . . a service that was looking to develop and
move forward.
SMgr2, interview, site 1 (data from previous project18)We’d been part of an exemplar project, looking at urgent care. And in there, the stuff that people are
talking about now at a strategic level, nationally, we’d already realised that five plus years ago: that
patient’s want healthcare brought to them, closer. The whole healthcare model’s becoming so
complicated it’s difficult to navigate your way through it; it’s not the patient’s fault that they don’t
know how to access and who to access.
SMgr1, interview, site 1 (data from previous project18)In 2006 the trust was one of the early sites to pilot NHS Pathways, the triaging software that underpins
NHS 111. NHS Pathways offered the potential to manage the rising demand for the ambulance service as
it enabled the service to offer alternative dispositions for less urgent calls. Senior managers had recognisedJournals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3that deploying this new technology resonated with their strategic aims and that its early adoption was also
a way of positioning the trust as a leading trust in the wider NHS:© Que
Health
provid
addres
Park, SThe main reason we moved over onto Pathways was because . . . as . . . a dynamic Trust, we thought,
if we get a hold of this tool, and we design the front end of it, you’ll get it designed for a United
Kingdom market, for somebody who knows what they’re doing, in other words us, and it should
work a hell of a lot better than the alternative.
SMgr1, interview, site 1 (data from previous project18)I could see the advantages almost immediately . . . even before Pathways had come along, I
recognised that . . . we were dealing with an ever, annual increase on the Ambulance Service in
demand . . . and we had no control over that. The only way . . . to have an influence on that is to
control the outcome, if you like. So even before Pathways, [I was] working with PCTs in developing
referral processes across to alternative pathways of care [. . .] I could see that [NHS Pathways] was just
an extension of that in the work that I was trying to develop locally.
SMgr2, interview, site 1 (data from previous project18)This piloting work of NHS Pathways was successful and allowed the technology to be licensed for wider
use. At the same time the process of early piloting allowed the trust to accumulate in-house expertise in
the work, workforce and technology that would later underpin NHS 111. Despite very early claims by the
CDSS developers that no clinicians were needed to run NHS Pathways, the pilot experience led site 1 to
introduce clinical advisers to support call advisers’ use of NHS Pathways. Site 1 also developed early
expertise in the monitoring and audit of call advisers. Shortly after NHS Pathways was licensed for use, in
2009 site 1 introduced a single point of access urgent care service. This was a new 24/7 single point of
access service for two PCT areas in the region (located in a different part of the region), effectively
replacing the existing out-of-hours service in these areas. NHS Pathways, along with the acquired expertise
in implementing this system, was transferred to this new service. Site 1 had nearly 3 years of experience in
recruiting and training staff to use the CDSS as well as monitoring and supporting them and so they were
conﬁdent that this was viable. The new service combined NHS Pathways with a new CMS allowing call
advisers to offer service information (e.g. opening hours of pharmacists) and to book out-of-hours
appointments. Building on this experience, in 2011 site 1 replaced the single point of access urgent care
service with NHS 111. Being one of the ﬁrst sites to pilot NHS 111 was a vindication of dynamic
diversiﬁcation and the expertise accumulated over a number of years:SMgr1 says that NHS 111 has ‘pretty much been my life for the last year or so’ . . . He says that he hopes
they are in a strong position (to win the 111 contract), with their previous experience, local knowledge
and collaboration with an equally strong partner (well-established out-of-hours organisation).
Observation, site 1NHS Pathways and the subsequent launches of the single point of access urgent care service and NHS 111
resulted in the diversiﬁcation of both the work and the workforce at site 1. Some of the existing 999 call
centre workforce, who mainly worked full-time, were trained to take NHS 111 calls and additional full-time
and part-time call advisers were recruited, which introduced a less homogeneous workforce (in terms of
age, qualiﬁcations and career aspirations).26 Additionally, both paramedics and nurses were recruited to
clinical adviser roles, offering different professional backgrounds and expertise and diversifying the clinical
expertise at site 1 by introducing signiﬁcant numbers of nurses to the organisation for the ﬁrst time.
This organisational history has shaped the distinctive constitution of NHS 111 at site 1. Managing down
demand continues to be a core organisational value and is reﬂected in call-handler training, which
emphasises (more so than in other cases) the need to enforce NHS Pathways dispositions and negotiate
ﬁrmly with patients (see Chapter 3).
In terms of relationships with partners in the wider health-care economy, tensions between the site 1 call
centre and the local UCC were notable. Historical separation of the ambulance service from other health-care
providers may have played a part here. Although the trust has had a number of years of experience working75
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76with PCTs and other organisations, UCC staff reported a lack of initial consultation over and engagement
with the implementation of NHS 111 as well as a lack of communication about ongoing NHS 111 operations:NIHRECP2 says there is some tension with [call centre organisation] about triaging and what the UCC
perceive as incorrect dispositions – they will ‘never admit they are wrong’.
Observation, UCC, site 1The GP lead says that ‘staff perceive’ 111 was imposed on them without sufficient prior consultation.
Observation, UCC, site 1For the most part the two services appear separate – both physically and in terms of communication.
Communication between UCCs and call centres is limited to NHS Pathways information transmitted
electronically and telephone communication to follow-up a patient or request additional information. There
is little sense that the workers at these organisations are working as part of the same NHS 111 service.Site 2The general practice out-of-hours organisation delivering NHS 111 at site 2 developed from a general
practice co-operative established in the early 1990s that provided out-of-hours call handling and GP-led
advice and consultation. This NHS 111 site is a smaller service than many of the others, serving a
population of a large town and the surrounding suburban area (approximately 140,000 people), but it is
part of a larger consortium with two other organisations that provides NHS 111 across a large region.
Based on its roots in general practice, the organisation is proud to offer to the local population what it
perceives as a quality service and it appears to have a strong patient-centric culture:CallA5: But even if [the patient is] not local and it’s further than local, then we will still attempt to
help that person.CallA3: No, I think a lot of us, we all do care what we’re doing. You know, we’re not just saying
‘oh well, sorry’. That’s us.
Focus group, site 2In this context, the short-term motivation for introducing NHS Pathways was to strengthen telephone
triaging as the paper-based system did not meet national guidelines for ‘deﬁnitive clinical assessment’
within 20 minutes of answering an urgent call:[Call-handling] staff couldn’t advise patients at that point – it still wasn’t recognised – even though
the PCTs were happy with the way we did things. So we knew we had to . . . do something.
SMgr1, interview, site 2 (data from previous project18)We were very happy with it; it worked very well [previous protocol system] . . . we won a national
award for it because it was so effective. The PCTs locally were very happy and they’ve audited it. And
we had a clinical governance system that reviews calls and the outcomes of the calls, and the
performance of the operators, the GPs, nurses.
GP1, interview, site 2 (data from previous project18)More widely, though, NHS 111 offered the organisation an opportunity to build on the experience of NHS
Pathways and push forward the move towards a more integrated model of urgent and emergency care
that had been underway for some time. For example, since 2010 the co-operative had been part of a new
local service in which an UCC combined an ED, an out-of-hours service, mental health services and primary
care. The out-of-hours service aimed to provide a single point of access for patients, who were encouraged
to telephone as the ﬁrst point of contact. Patients attending the UCC and requiring urgent care wereJournals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3managed at a reception desk, booked in electronically onto an integrated primary and secondary care
system (Adastra) and assessed using the CDSS to direct them to the appropriate service (ED or
out-of-hours care).
As a long-established out-of-hours provider in the locality, it is also likely that the organisation recognised
the potential threat to its out-of-hours business if it did not tender for the NHS 111 contract. In 2011 site 2
became a NHS 111 pilot as part of a consortium arrangement that included two other organisations.
Site 2 primarily took calls for patients in its own locality (i.e. its previous out-of-hours population) but also
took calls for other parts of the region when busy. Within the consortium arrangement call handling was
provided by site 2 and another consortium partner whereas clinical advice was provided by a third
consortium partner, whose staff are located in other areas. Similar to site 1, site 2 had considerable early
experience and expertise in using NHS Pathways that it brought to the implementation of the NHS 111 pilot
and used to assist its consortium partners:© Que
Health
provid
addres
Park, SI think it’s . . . highlighted by the fact that when [a partner organisation] went live, they asked us to
go down and help them do it our way . . . to do it the right way! [Laughter] [. . .] We were the ones
that were brought in to help them go live [. . .] We were up and running. We’d done our bit, but
because they were struggling to do it the way we did it, to the standard that we did it, they actually
asked us to go down and help them do it . . . For a big organisation to need us to go down, you
know, when we’re only a local firm at the end of the day, when [the other larger organisations] go
live with their services, it says a lot for what we do.
Trainer2, focus group, site 2Historically, the organisation employed a predominantly part-time call-handling workforce, many of whom
worked a few hours per month on ‘zero hours’ contracts. The introduction of a new technology and a
new service required the employment of more call advisers on more substantial contracts. More call
advisers were employed on a full-time basis and existing and new staff had to be trained to use the CDSS.
In addition, more staff were required to ﬁll a wider range of roles including additional training, auditing
and liaison roles. Because of the consortium arrangement (and because nurse advice was provided by a
separate organisation), site 2 remained a GP-dominated organisation. NHS 111 served to relocate some of
the work and decision-making from GPs to call advisers and to clinical advisers outside the organisation. It
is difﬁcult to determine whether a prevailing GP-led culture at site 2 had any bearing on the relationships
with the consortium partner that provided nurse advice services. Such blurring of professional and
organisational boundaries may potentially have resulted in some difﬁcult relationships. As we identiﬁed in
Chapter 4 (see Communication and relationships across NHS 111), for the most part call advisers and
clinical advisers worked as separate entities. Working relationships between call centre staff at site 2 and
clinical advisers were functional, evident in the minimal communication between these organisations. Call
centre staff were very aware of the poor communication between themselves and their clinical advisors,
based in a different organisation:CallA20 tells the caller: ‘rather than you wait for a call, I’m going to try and transfer you directly’.
When CallA20 gets through to the nurse adviser she says ‘it’s the 111 service with a warm transfer
for you’. She gives the case number and the caller’s name before transferring the call. There’s very
little else said.
Observation, call centre, site 2CMgr1: That’s just building the relationships, I think, with the other . . . services [. . .] But it’s their
understanding of what 111 is as well, you know. They’ve got to have that engagement.CallA2: We’ve learnt that communication at some companies doesn’t happen.CMgr1: But that’s what’s most important across the board – to communicate properly.
Focus group, site 277
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78There was no history of these organisations working together before the introduction of NHS 111. The
consortium model highlighted some of the difﬁculties encountered in requiring organisations that have no
embedded working relationships to work together. Staff at site 2 reported feeling a loss of control over
outcomes and care provided for ‘their patients’. For an organisation that is very oriented to the needs of
the local population, which emphasises that it is a local workforce with local knowledge, staff found this
arrangement difﬁcult. Staff at site 2 were concerned that consortium partners might not share their values
or have their local knowledge. Staff expressed concerns that, if they lost the NHS 111 contract, patients in
their local area would see a decline in service quality. Although staff at site 2 were not against change –
indeed site 2 was one of the early adopters of NHS Pathways and a NHS 111 pilot site – perhaps as an
organisation it could be argued to be quite inward looking with its focus on local services:NIHRCallA3: I think we’ve lost a bit of the control of ‘the whole’, you know. The control’s going out
of your hands at a certain point . . . Before, you could . . . watch the development and the process
[of the call] going through. Now sometimes. . . you’re in a situation where you don’t know what’s
happening [to the patient].
Focus group, site 2Trainer2: But . . . they’re not local [another call-handling organisation] . . . they don’t have the
knowledge that we have of the patients and the demographic and the services. . .CallA3: They’re just going to be another patient . . . just going to be another number in a queue . . .
It’s not going to be. . .Trainer1: A personal service [. . .] The fear for me is that if patients don’t get what they want, and are
being passed from one to another, that they will actually just start turning up in A&E departments
and walk-in centres, and bypassing.
Focus group, site 2The lack of a strong relationship between consortium partners was further compounded by the competitive
nature of NHS 111 procurement. The three organisations involved in the pilot consortium recognised the
potential temporariness of the arrangement in that they were required to retender for the contract from
2013. Competition between consortium organisations destabilised the arrangement for the provision of NHS
111. Site 2 formed a strategic alliance with one of the consortium organisations with another as a competitor
(with whom it had a better relationship) but ultimately it lost the contract to the third consortium partner
(to which, ironically, it had provided initial training in NHS Pathways). The consortium model, and lack of
working relationships historically, appeared to make this model of NHS 111 provision much more difﬁcult
than, say, a single organisation providing call handling, nurse advice and UCC provision (such as site 4).Site 3The ambulance service delivering NHS 111 at this site was established by the 2006 reforms and provides
999 services to about 140,000 patients. It is one of the smaller NHS 111 sites, covering a more isolated
geographical area, which makes it difﬁcult to integrate with a larger population or service. The call
handling is based in a smaller call centre located on a main hospital site. If patients require further
assessment or treatment they are referred to an integrated urgent and emergency care centre based at the
same hospital (which provides services for walk-in patients and ED attendances as well as for referrals via
NHS 111). Similar to site 1, there is pressure to manage demand for ambulance services and for the ED.
They key difference here is that, even before the launch of NHS 111, there has been a close working
relationship with other services in the locality, including primary care, the ED, out-of-hours services, mental
health services and community care. Indeed, the call centre has also taken out-of-hours calls alongsideJournals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SAnd the shared system with [walk-in centre/UCC] . . . we’ve carried over since 2006, we’d already got
that really close working relationship.
ClinA1, focus group, site 3We actually all talk to each other anyway . . . We don’t have the same bureaucracy, we have different
bureaucracy, but actually, I can phone up somebody in another department and go ‘can we just talk
about this a minute’? Whereas, it’s perhaps not easy when you go across organisations. It is nice that
we are . . . all using the same policies . . . We had a lot of it set up already.
SMgr1, focus group, site 3NHS Pathways was introduced at this site a few months before the introduction of NHS 111 in anticipation
of launching the service. The CDSS replaced the prioritisation system for 999 calls and separate protocols
for out-of-hours calls (for these calls call advisers recorded basic details about the call and passed them to
a GP for telephone triage). The technology introduced standardisation across urgent and emergency care
so that both 999 and 111 calls were assessed in the same way. The launch of NHS 111 required the site
to employ more call advisers and more call supervisors to manage staff and clinical advisers. Unlike some
of the other sites, the introduction of NHS 111 did not radically change working patterns for call advisers
(they typically worked 12-hour shifts taking both 999 and out-of-hours calls and therefore just replaced
out-of-hours calls with NHS 111 calls). The organisational nature of this ambulance service very likely
inﬂuenced its decision to employ paramedics rather than nurses in the clinical adviser role (there are only
a minority of nurses at this site). The site regards clinical decision-making highly, which is reﬂected in its
decision to have clinical advisers routinely check and sanction all 111 calls that result in a 999 disposition
(see Chapter 3, Sanctioning and moderating dispositions), suggesting that it more explicitly values human
clinical judgement over technological decision-making.
NHS 111, underpinned by NHS Pathways, was seen as an opportunity to build on existing integrated
services, to provide a model of health care that better achieved ‘the right care at the right time and in the
right place’ for patients: ‘That’s what 111 is. It’s about sending the most appropriate resource or
appropriate care of what the patient needs, rather than what we’ve done historically, one size ﬁts all,
because it doesn’t’ (SMgr1, focus group, site 3).
Past experiences of integrated working meant that NHS 111 provision was not such a huge leap in
thinking from what was already being provided:Prior to 111, we had a single number anyway . . . so in essence we were doing the 111 service already
in a certain guise . . . I’m not allowed to say it was just a number change for us, because it wasn’t,
there was a lot of other things that went with it, but in essence, we . . . did just change the number
that people were calling.
SMgr1, focus group, site 3Tendering for the NHS 111 contract early on allowed the organisation to be in charge of its own destiny,
warding off potential threats (such as being taken over by a larger neighbouring organisation). Site 3 was
also driven by the desire to continue to provide local services for local people:CallA2: We are run from here . . . [The patients] do like that . . . when you say, ‘oh, you’re a patient
with [name of practice] . . . which doctor’s it?’ClinA1: Yeah, [when we say] ‘do you know, it’s in the [walk-in centre/UCC]’. ‘Oh, yes, yes, we know
it’. And you say, ‘yeah, that’s it, yeah, go under the canopy’. ‘Oh, you’re on the island, are you?’ And
people do . . . like that.
Focus group, site 379
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NIHRWhilst you could . . . in theory, do it from a national call centre or . . . [another area] take over the
calls . . . but, actually, you lose so much more. Again, it’s this integrated working in [the call centre]
because you’ve got the local district nurse, you’ve got the local mental health crisis line. Sometimes
it’s not all about saving money. It’s about . . . this quality of service to the public.
SMgr1, focus group, site 3The organisation was motivated to provide an integrated NHS 111 service on a small scale. Indeed, its
history as a smaller-scale, integrated service appears to have established strong working relationships. The
organisation had a clear vision of co-locating services whenever possible to encourage joined-up working
and has fostered interprofessional working relationships by co-locating different types of professional roles
including call advisers, clinical advisers, ambulance dispatch workers and the district nursing team (with
imminent plans to integrate a mental health team). As we saw in Chapter 4, co-location of workers has
aided the sharing of knowledge within teams:ClinA1: Since NHS 111 . . . district nurses joined us . . . this is a huge advantage because we get
999 calls . . . for, ‘oh, my dressings have leaked’ [or] ‘my catheter’s blocked’, and we can sort it direct
with district nursing. Whereas . . . two years ago we’d be sending an emergency ambulance because
we were having no choice in the matter because of the triage systems that we used to use and we
hadn’t got such good links with the district nursing service.DN1: And some calls, they would sit in the queue . . . for a clinical adviser. Sometimes you can just see
that actually a district nurse is more appropriate, so we can just take that straightaway now.
Focus group, site 3We’re very much looking forward to the mental health teams joining in [. . .] it is going to be a vital
link, in the whole organisation of the room . . . If you have the people in their separate locations, you
have this silo working, whereas . . . within the room . . . it’s just a matter of, looking across the top of
your monitor. You can wave to somebody . . . and you can actually have this exchange of information.
We can make computer systems talk to each other . . . but . . . it’s easier to go across and talk across
the room, than it is to . . . pick up a telephone [or] send an email.
ClinA1, focus group, site 3One of the ‘sacriﬁces’ made when NHS 111 was launched was separating call handling from out-of-hours/
UCC provision. Before the launch of NHS 111, call-handling staff worked alongside out-of-hours GPs. Call
centre staff report that some information sharing has been lost. There has been some substitution of
clinical support so that call advisers are now supported by clinical advisers rather than GPs. Call advisers
now ‘control’ the work of the GPs (see Chapter 3, Loss of control over decision-making and workload) but
the physical separation of these groups of workers has resulted in less verbal communication:CallA2: It was a real break away when we’ve moved . . . we ran with the doctors down there . . . and
then we were sent up here and we were like ‘it’s never going to work . . . you’ve got to be with your
doctors’. And it’s taken 18 months before we think, ‘well, it’s not so important’ but it certainly still
would be easier if they were walking through.CallA1: But the difference is that we’ve got clinicians in the room now haven’t we? [. . .]SMgr1: . . . we’re looking at ways of how we can . . . Do we bring the doctors’ expertise up into this
room . . . it’s just tentative discussions [at the moment but] it may well become . . . more of a
necessity, a more viable way of working [. . .]UCC administrator: [. . .] We communicate a lot by phone now . . . on an administrative level, saying
can you . . . just look into this, I’m worried about such and such. So it would be a lot easier if we
were all in one giant room together [laughter].Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SSMgr1: We’re never going to get the whole building, are we [laughter] as much as I’ve tried.
Focus group, site 3Although it might be argued that this site is less ambitious than some of the other sites (e.g. site 1 or
site 5), and that NHS 111 has come about more as a way of building on its already integrated services,
site 3 does have ambitions to provide additional services in the future, pursuing opportunities to develop
telemedicine services that would move its services beyond urgent and emergency care to more
preventative/monitoring services:If we can have a desk where we can actually monitor [patients] . . . where we can send them home
with specific monitoring equipment and monitor them on an acute desk [from the call centre] . . .
[then] we can send an ambulance straightaway or we can send a district nurse round or the GP needs
to pop around. So technology is driving the NHS 111 service . . . and this is our next phase – assisted
technologies, telehealth, telecare, telemedicine. This is where it’s coming to its own, where we can
now send the most appropriate resource.
SMgr1, focus group, site 3Site 4In Site 4 NHS 111 is provided by a local social enterprise, established in 2007 from the merger of two
large, local GP co-operative organisations. As a social enterprise the organisation has a commitment to
reinvest any surpluses and is driven by a strong service ethic of patient care. As an out-of-hours
organisation, the social enterprise provided out-of-hours care to approximately 760,000 patients across a
diverse geographical area ranging from inner city to rural. The organisation currently runs two call centres
and 12 UCCs (four of which are also walk-in centres). Similar to sites 2 and 3, the values of the
organisation appear to be characterised by being proud of their locally based organisation that has
signiﬁcant experience and knowledge to meet the needs of the local population: ‘It was a complete . . .
whole service as it was, a continuation of the GP service. It was an out-of-hours GP provider service, and it
was in [county], run by [county] people, for [county]’ (NP1, focus group, site 4).
Historically, the organisation has had a diverse portfolio of services and, in addition to out-of-hours
services, offered forensic/police work, prison services and local community hospital services as well as
providing locum GP services during the daytime.
Unlike other providers the organisation has a long history of employing nurses in its services. This includes
nurses providing out-of-hours telephone triage and NPs who work alongside GPs in the UCCs. The
organisation appears to value the contribution of nursing competencies and certainly the nursing
workforce emphasised the career development opportunities within the organisation (see Chapter 4).
Before the introduction of NHS 111, call handlers answered calls and recorded demographic details before
passing the information to a team of nurse advisers for telephone triage. The nursing workforce view
themselves as contributing to offering more holistic care – an approach that appears to ﬁt with the
patient-centred ethos of the service (see Chapter 3, Emotion work).ClinA4: I raised issues [with the CDSS team] about . . . the scenario was a 21-year-old lad with
constipation. He was at uni. His granddad had bowel cancer, or something, and he was constipated.
The call handler went down the pathway and it was constipation. It was nothing, advice. And I went,
‘yes, but poor lad, he’s doing his exams . . .’ As a nurse, I would have said ‘what are you worried
about? Is it your granddad? Do you think you might have . . .?’ And [the CDSS team] said, ‘oh, well,
if you want to be pink and fluffy’. . .81
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NIHRSMgr2: But that is part of the caring, empathic service that they would have mainly got . . . before.NP2: . . . I’m not saying a pathway is not clinically safe, but it deals with a clinical situation . . . I
trained in the era where a patient wasn’t an appendix . . . it’s a person [. . .]ClinA1: I think the nurses’ roles have changed . . . are changing a lot, and . . . with the pathways . . .
we’re there to support the call handlers, and to do the auditing and supporting, and then do the calls
that need to be finished off . . . that are transferred over to us . . .NP2: And you can add the nursing element into that, but initially, Pathways is meant to deal with
symptoms and sort symptoms to the most appropriate [service].
Focus group, site 4At other sites the motivations for piloting 111 mainly centred around the desire to expand their business
(sites 1 and 5) or the desire to achieve greater integration of services locally (sites 2 and 3). At site 4 the
organisation recognised that NHS 111 was a potential threat to its out-of-hours business. It applied to pilot
NHS 111 primarily because it was concerned about the possibility of a separate organisation handling the
calls and referring patients to its out-of-hours service. The threat of this was used to garner local support
amongst local health-care professionals:We realised very quickly that if you weren’t doing NHS 111, you wouldn’t be able to front end an
out-of-hours service [. . .] So somebody else would have done our call-handling for the out-of-hours
service. So it was either, get into the pilot and do your best, or lose the opportunity to front end your
own service. So there wasn’t a lot of option.
SMgr1, focus group, site 4[The senior manager] explains two main factors motivated them to pilot NHS 111 . . . Firstly, the
potential threat to their out-of-hours service: ‘[they] recognised the importance of 111’. If they did
not bid for the 111 service they would lose the call-handling/triage aspect of their service – ‘worth’
approximately £1.2 million. Secondly, the ‘sell’ (or more of a threat) was that the alternative would be
[name of an alternative provider]. Support for [site 4] as the provider was garnered amongst local
service providers by ‘threatening’ that [name of alternative provider] would likely be the favoured
provider if [site 4] did not go for the contract. [The senior manager] explains that there has
traditionally been a degree of hostility from GPs towards [this alternative].
Observation, site 4In 2011 the organisation began its pilot of NHS 111 but was unprepared for the impact on its existing
out-of-hours business. Managers and clinicians described how it was a ‘bigger service’ than they had
anticipated. First, staff did not initially realise that NHS 111 would eventually replace NHS Direct. Second,
they had not anticipated the volume of NHS 111 calls (over and above the volume of out-of-hours calls).
As the organisation pointed out, there were few data about what the likely demand for NHS 111 would
be. This uncertainty placed considerable strain on the organisation – on existing staff and on the ﬁnances
of the organisation. The implementation of NHS 111 required rapid training of existing call handlers as
well as the recruitment and training of new call handlers:SMgr1: 111 is replacing NHS Direct, and we weren’t aware of that at the start. We weren’t aware of
the fact that, just by being a free number, that would also increase the workload, and attract a
different type of clientele than we’re used to [. . .]NP4: It was quicker than we expected [implementing NHS 111]. We thought we were going to do a
pilot, and it would be evaluated, and then there would be decisions made. We started this pilot, and
then next thing . . . they were going live . . . it did feel sudden.Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SClinA2: It very quickly leapt from being . . . a very short term thing to a very long term thing . . .
I have a deputy that works with me . . . and I was told she was going to be seconded for three
months. And 18 months later, she’s still here [laughter] [. . .]Interviewer: And what have been the effects of that, do you think?NP1: StressClinA2: Fear . . .NP1: At all levels I think. From . . . senior management, middle management and to the people on
the ground.ClinA1: Everybody’s wearing three or four different hats and doing extra work over and above what
they used to do [. . .]SMgr1: We couldn’t have done it, unless we’d got such a dedicated workforce. The staff have put up
with such a lot of change and alteration to what they were used to, that if they hadn’t have been so
good and flexible . . . so the goodwill of the staff has been a major part of this.
Focus group, site 4As a social enterprise, the values and mission of this organisation – driven to reinvest surplus for
patient-centred service – are congruent with the overall aim of NHS 111 but the ﬁnancial reality of this
has been challenging, particularly given the unanticipated scale and pace of growth:ClinA2: We’ve not got enough desks, we’ve not got enough space, we’ve not got enough
computers, we’ve not got enough phones . . .SMgr1: . . . and you have to provide additional resources because the service is growing . . . you can
imagine the cost of the training . . . even if you’ve got a part-time person, you still have to give them
the full-time training. And the impact of that, because when you’ve got a coach that’s with a trainee,
the coach is not taking calls, the trainee’s not taking calls. Well, it’s just so costly to the service. And
we’re a not-for-profit social enterprise, so we haven’t got an awful lot of money . . . to absorb such a
massive hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of cost [. . .]SMgr3: The idea of [social enterprise] originally was, it would give the commissioners some
reassurance . . . because you could obviously . . . rightly . . . any excess we make . . . we plough back
into it. And we all felt that . . . as it was public money that was being given to us, that’s . . . how it
should be. But . . . it means it’s very difficult for us to raise any funding because . . . we have got a
track record not making money and it’s kind of not what we do. But actually . . . I think the sense of
altruism that you get from being a social enterprise does . . . does give far more than it takes away.NP2: You know that . . . corners are not being cut for profit. If we are struggling, and sometimes we
do struggle, we know it’s . . . not because . . . they’re trying to cut down so that you can make a
profit. Staff know that . . . we’ve got to be a bit tight, we’ve got to do this, it’s because it’s for
the patients.
Focus group, site 4Site 4 recruited more call-handling staff but the introduction of NHS Pathways meant that fewer nurses
were required than in the previous model of care. Site 4 was reluctant to make nurses redundant and
managed its workforce through the natural attrition of nurses and by reorganising rotas (to match the
change from out-of-hours to 24/7 work) and extending the role of nurse advisers to take on additional83
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84tasks including training and audit functions. Although the nature of the everyday work of nurse advisers
has changed with the launch of NHS 111, they are valued as an integral part of this organisation:NIHREven though we don’t have the need for as many nurse advisers in the system overall, everybody that
we’d got has still got a job . . . The ratio of nurses that you require, say, on a Saturday morning, has
lessened, but you would then use those from a Saturday during the week. We have avoided
redundancies by being quite sharp with what we’ve done with the staff involved.
SMgr1, focus group, site 4The organisation still very much positions itself as an out-of-hours organisation rather than a 24/7 urgent
care organisation. It perceives that one of its greatest strengths in offering NHS 111 services is its history of
integrated call handling and local out-of-hours provision:You have to remember is that while this is going on 111, our ordinary business that we’ve always
done . . . we’re still an out-of-hours service. We’ve still got commissioners’ requirements, CQC [Care
Quality Commission] has come in, we’re working on that. We’ve still got our other, everyday business
going on, at the same time as 111.
NP2, focus group, site 4I think we’re in a better position than some of the others that have got a separate 111 service, and a
separate out-of-hours. Because I understand that causes an awful lot of conflict, because of . . . systems
not flowing properly, patient problems, whose fault was that, and they’re both pointing at each other.
We know if we’ve caused a problem in our system, and therefore, we can fix it . . . we don’t realise
how good we are at that until you go to other areas, and you see it separate, and you think, ‘my God,
how do they possibly work with that? That’s ridiculous’. So we undersell ourselves a lot of the time.
SMgr1, focus group, site 4The organisation has occupied a dominant position locally in the provision of out-of-hours care and it
recognises how changes in policy and commissioning have changed the landscape in which it is operating.
The organisation faces a degree of uncertainty in needing to tender for future NHS 111 contracts and
has highlighted the nature of competition and its adverse effect on the potential for collaboration and
sharing of good practice. Organisations are in the position of needing to protect their existing business:There is a strong sense [from senior manager] that their organisation is very nervous about the future
[their current 111 contract was due to end in 2013 and they were in the procurement process
at this time]. He has a ‘horrible feeling’ about the direction in which health care is travelling and is
concerned that the contract may go to a commercial provider. . . the general direction is to
‘commoditise health care’.
Observation, call centre, site 4SMgr1: We’ve found ourselves in a very, very competitive market where everybody wants a piece of
our business, hence what I was meaning about the political environment when people decide to ruin
your reputation by saying, ‘ooh, you’re sending everybody here, or you’re sending everybody there’.SMgr2: Yes, it’s because they want the business.Interviewer: And do you feel some of that has been calculated to achieve . . .?SMgr2: Yes, definitely. They say it at key meetings, to key people.Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, SSMgr3: . . . everybody is now trying to protect their little bit of the NHS cake, and then we’re trying to
provide a clinical service that overarches over all the providers, and it doesn’t work, because
whoever’s got the contract obviously has to shift the work to other people. I think that’s going to be
an ongoing issue [. . .]SMgr2: Once all this tendering, competitive process has died down a bit, then maybe people will
encourage more cross visits to other sites, to see what they’re doing, and learning from each other,
because at the moment . . .SMgr1: We’ve put some off [organisations] we don’t want to come through the doors until after the
competitive tendering is over, because we know that they’re going to be up to no good.
Focus group, site 4Site 5Site 5 is a large commercial organisation located on an industrial estate in the suburbs of a major UK city,
providing the NHS 111 service to approximately 250,000 patients. The call-handling organisation is well
established in delivering out-of-hours care across England. It was originally a GP-led co-operative but over
the last 15 years or so the organisation has expanded its business across England, capitalising on 2004
health service reform that allowed GPs to opt out of out-of-hours care. The organisation was successful
in securing contracts to provide the service, with its strength being the large network of GPs. The
organisation also has a history of nurse-led triage and offering call-handling services to a range of
out-of-hours providers.
NHS 111 was a new 24/7 service in this area providing call handling for two PCT areas. Before the launch of
NHS 111 in one of the areas the organisation had provided call-handling services for a local out-of-hours
service and in the other area it replaced call handling that was previously provided by a GP co-operative.
The organisation also provides a range of other services including out-of-hours services, offender
health-care services, GP-led health centres and UCCs.
This is an ambitious and expansionist organisation, actively seeking new NHS 111 business as well as
looking for other opportunities in other health-care sectors. The motivation for applying for NHS 111 in
this area was primarily about the organisation looking for opportunities to continually expand its business
across England. The NHS 111 procurement process has offered new business opportunities and the
organisation has been very successful in securing new contracts:[The senior manager] tells me that [their organisation] has won [the 111 contract] and will go live
with 111 in September. They have also won [another area] going live in October, [and another] in
December. This will give them coverage of 2.5 million people by December. They have very ambitious
plans for 10 million by next April and she tells me they are well on the way.
Observation, call centre, site 5Although NHS Pathways was a new way of operating call handling, the organisation was well established in
providing these services. The organisation appears to have drawn on this experience to recruit, train, monitor
and support staff during the implementation of NHS 111. Although the organisation had previously
provided call-handling services in this area, NHS 111 essentially was a new service for site 5. There were
some existing staff from the previous out-of-hours service but many new call advisers (most of whom had
little experience in health care before they started) and clinical advisers were recruited. The implementation
of NHS Pathways required all staff to undergo CDSS and NHS 111 training. Staff appeared to be excited at
the prospect of starting something new but were very aware that the service was, to some extent, untried85
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86and untested. Being a new organisation meant that it was able to think in advance about the type of staff it
wanted to recruit for this new service rather than training existing staff, as was the case at many other sites:NIHRWell, it was quite exciting wasn’t it, because it was a new service and we were the newbies . . ., but
I think being the new ones I suppose, we was like the guinea pigs, but we did have good trainers in
all fairness.
CallS2, focus group, site 5In recruitment . . . we’ve been very careful to look at the gender mix, the skill mix and the age mix of
the staff . . . I was the only man in a team of all women [previously] . . . I think that actually from the
point of view of the patient . . . certainly you will often have a situation where a male patient will
want to talk to a male adviser or clinician, but I think that also helps with the sort of dynamic within
the group [. . .] And I think . . . paramedics see things very differently, very much a here and now [. . .]
So it’s a good mix of skill mix when you assessing a patient’s needs on the phone.
Trainer2, focus group, site 5The organisation has a strong ethos of supporting and valuing its staff, with an emphasis on continued
learning and opportunities. Staff at this organisation suggested that NHS 111 and NHS Pathways have
introduced a greater range of career development opportunities, which appears to ﬁt well with the
organisational ethos of opportunities and staff development:The [senior manager] says, ‘we are all equal here. No one is better to anyone else in terms of clinical
compared to non-clinical people – we just have different skills’.
Observation, call centre, site 5[The] telephone triage is basically the same [as NHS Direct] but we deal with the more complex call
. . . it’s quite nice really to be dealing with more complex calls and . . . there’s been opportunities like
auditing calls and even interviewing, short-listing. So there’s a variety so we’re not just sitting on the
phones. There’s opportunities . . . getting involved and [a] management role as well, doing extra
things. And we now have our study sessions every week. One clinician will do a teaching session and
so we keep the education system going . . . training and learning and development.
ClinA1, focus group, site 5If someone becomes proficient in the system then we put an advert out . . . for anyone interested in
coaching to encourage an informal interview, and then they’ll attend a one day course here and then
. . . get supported being a new coach [. . .] There’s far more developmental opportunities within 111
to actually move within the service.
Trainer2, focus group, site 5The call-handling organisation has a dominant position in the provision of out-of-hours and urgent care
services and has been able to capitalise on opportunities presented by the procurement and commissioning
of NHS 111 services. The competitive nature of tendering for NHS 111 contracts has created tensions
between partner organisations in this area, however. One of the partner organisations that had previously
provided out-of-hours services (including call handling) for the area also tendered for the NHS 111 contract
in this area. Although it lost the NHS 111 contract to site 5 in terms of providing call handling, it is still
responsible for providing UCC services in the area. Former competitors are therefore now obliged to work
together offering different parts of the service, creating a somewhat difﬁcult working relationship:[The senior manager] talks about how the key relationship between [the organisation providing UCCs]
and [the call centre] doesn’t seem to work as it should. She says this is a real shame as they all want
the best for the patient. We discuss if it is competition that’s the problem. She thinks it is. [The other
organisation] lost out and feels they are undermining what [we] are doing. [The senior manager] isJournals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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Park, Sreally upset about this. She says they work so hard and have few complaints from anyone else. She
worries about the effects this negative information will have on people’s views of the service.
Observation, call centre, site 5SummaryThere is considerable variation in the organisation and delivery of NHS 111 services, shaped by the
organisational history, dominant service ethic and professional culture of the varied contracted
organisations. Our comparative case study approach suggests that there are some keys factors that have
shaped the development of NHS 111 service delivery.
There is an inherent tension in the NHS 111 service – there is a push for rationalisation and standardisation
while at the same time there is the pull of local service providers wishing to continue to provide services
that will deliver quality care that is aligned with their service ethic and their views about what is needed
locally. Organisations were motivated by different reasons to want to pilot NHS 111. Broadly speaking they
included more entrepreneurial, business-orientated ambitions about expanding the business of the
organisation as well as looking for opportunities to grow new business (sites 1 and 5). The commercial
organisation (site 5) and ambulance-led providers (sites 1 and 3) were particularly driven by rationing and
systemising – by pursuing the NHS 111 vision of ‘right care, right place, right time’. NHS 111, underpinned
by NHS Pathways, was a means of rationing, but it also achieves the goals of developing a more
integrated service, which may relieve the pressure on ambulance services (sites 1 and 3).
Sites 2 and 4 were driven by different factors. Both were well-established and respected out-of-hours
organisations that stood to lose a signiﬁcant part of their business – the call centre business – if they did
not bid for the NHS 111 contract. Both of these patient-centred organisations were strongly motivated to
protect their current out-of-hours business. Sites 2 and 4 also feared the ‘threat’ that an alternative
provider might offer a poorer service to their local patient population.
The organisational history has, to some extent, shaped how each organisation has handled these tensions
and affects the way in which the everyday work of NHS 111 is carried out. For example, sites with a
stronger push towards rationalisation (notably sites 1 and 5) demonstrate a more ‘hard-line’ approach to
making dispositions (e.g. the call advisers are trained to provide dispositions) than sites with a strong
patient-centred ethos (sites 2 and 4), where there is more negotiation and an expectation that patients
‘should be seen or speak to’ a health professional.
Co-location of services and a shared history has signiﬁcantly enhanced the co-ordination of work and
relationships and interorganisational trust and knowledge sharing between organisations. This was
particularly strong in out-of-hours organisations that have historically provided call centre activity and UCC
services (sites 2 and 4) and organisations that have a history of integrated working (site 3). A lack of
previous engagement or joint working with partner organisations or a lack of shared historical
relationships appears to be detrimental to relationships between NHS 111 partners. We see this particularly
in sites 1, 2 and 5, and in sites 2 and 5 this poor relationship has been exacerbated by the competitive
tendering process.
Sites 2 and 4 in particular were both in a position of needing to tender for the NHS 111 contract to
protect their current out-of-hours business and workforce. Contracts were initially awarded as ‘pilots’ so
organisations were then required to retender to provide the service from 2013 onwards, introducing
considerable stress, uncertainty and a huge amount of work for organisations. The competitive process has
resulted in organisations being less open, protecting themselves against the potential loss of their business.
The opportunity for sharing early best practice has been hampered as sites have been less willing to ‘open
their doors’ to potential competitors for fear of giving away their competitive edge.87
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study with the ﬁndings from the Policy Research
Programme-funded evaluation of NHS 111 pilot sites
While this study was in progress another project looking at NHS 111 was being completed by aresearch team at the University of Shefﬁeld.15 The Shefﬁeld study, funded by the PRP, was a
mixed-methods evaluation of the ﬁrst four NHS 111 pilot sites that ran from October 2010 to June 2012,
overlapping slightly with our project.
Our study was carefully designed with input from the Shefﬁeld team so that our methods and analyses
would augment the Shefﬁeld research. Both teams liaised and corresponded regularly by e-mail during the
course of the research to ensure that we did not duplicate effort. We supported information sharing
between the two projects by having a member of each research team on the other project’s steering/
advisory group and circulating interim ﬁndings.
Towards the end of our study we held an integrative research workshop in London to bring together
members of both research teams to discuss our respective ﬁndings. At this stage the Shefﬁeld study was
complete and the team had submitted a ﬁnal draft project report to the PRP and our project was in the
closing phase of data collection and analysis. The workshop provided an opportunity for members of the
Southampton and Shefﬁeld teams to discuss how the ﬁndings of each project might be integrated.
From the Southampton team Joanne Turnbull, Ali Rowsell, Susan Halford, Catherine Pope, Jane Prichard
and Jeremy Jones attended. From the Shefﬁeld team Alicia O’Cathain, Janette Turner and Jonathan
Tosh attended.Summary of the Shefﬁeld studyDetails of the Shefﬁeld study are published elsewhere15 but a short summary is provided here to situate
the discussion in this chapter. The Shefﬁeld study evaluated four NHS 111 pilot sites, three of which were
led by NHS Direct and one by an ambulance trust. The evaluation was designed to assess processes,
outcomes and costs and used a controlled before-and-after design to measure the impact of NHS 111,
comparing changes over time in the four pilot sites and three control sites that did not establish NHS 111.
The evaluation comprised:
l descriptive analyses of service use, referral patterns and quality standards in the ﬁrst year of operation
of NHS 111 in the four sites
l two postal surveys of user experiences and satisfaction
l a controlled before-and-after telephone survey of the general population and recent users of
emergency and urgent care to assess satisfaction with emergency and urgent care services and
awareness of NHS 111
l an expert panel review of cases
l interviews with stakeholders exploring implementation
l a cost analysis of providing NHS 111 within an emergency and urgent care system and the potential
impact of wider implementation.
The Shefﬁeld evaluation showed that NHS 111 had been successfully implemented, albeit slightly
differently, in all four sites and that these services were meeting national service quality standards. Caller
satisfaction with the NHS 111 service was, in the main, quite high and stakeholders were enthusiastic
about the new service, but also concerned about the challenges for wider implementation. Awareness of89
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90the service was higher in two of the sites. The NHS 111 service did not appear to have a statistically
signiﬁcant impact on emergency ambulance calls but a drop in NHS Direct calls and an increase in
emergency ambulance incidents were detected. The expert panel concluded that the calls that it reviewed
received the right clinical disposition and achieved the objective of ‘right place, ﬁrst time’. The cost analysis
showed that there was a low likelihood of cost saving across the four pilot sites but that national
implementation, assuming a reduction in NHS Direct costs achieved by disconnecting the 0845 number,
could potentially save the NHS £2.5M per month.The workshop discussionRather than simply reviewing the ﬁndings of the two studies, the workshop discussion was structured
around three core areas of overlapping interest, namely the impact on the wider health system of
introducing NHS 111, the organisational implications of introducing NHS 111 and caller experiences of the
NHS 111 service.Impact on the wider health system
Ambulance service
The Shefﬁeld evaluation did not demonstrate any statistically signiﬁcant change in number of 999 calls but
did show a statistically signiﬁcant increase in ambulance incidents overall. Drawing on the Southampton
ethnography we noted that some NHS 111 services appeared to be responding to rising emergency
ambulance service demand with call management processes designed to validate or reduce 999
dispositions. This included weekly monitoring of 999 dispositions to identify patterns that could be
addressed by additional call adviser training or by transferring these cases to clinical staff before sending
the call to 999. The ethnographic work suggested that call advisers and other stakeholders accepted that
the CDSS was ‘risk averse’ but that this was a necessary feature for non-clinical call handling. Analysis of
one of the Shefﬁeld sites showed no change in the number of ambulance incidents. We discussed possible
reasons for this and noted that there was no direct electronic link to ambulance dispatch (warm transfer)
so call advisers had to consciously telephone the ambulance service whereas other sites had click-through
access by telephone. In addition, this particular site had put considerable additional effort into populating
the DoS and this may have enabled a better match between patient need and the appropriate service.General practice
The Southampton team discussed their data which suggested that ‘gaming’ the system was occurring,
with receptionists in some general practice surgeries asking patients who called in the afternoon to redial
NHS 111 as they had no further appointments available. We discussed why patients were not being routed
to other daytime services by general practices (e.g. walk-in centres) as this appeared to occur when
patients called NHS 111 during ‘in-hours’ periods. In looking at the dispositions that directed patients to
general practice (as a recommendation for a next-day or 3-day appointment) the Southampton team had
found that some of the informal organisational call-handling practices bypassed dispositions offered by the
CDSS, for example some call advisers used discretion with calls near the weekend that resulted in a
non-urgent GP (within 3 days) disposition and would tend to book UCC visits on the same day.Walk-in and urgent care centres
The Shefﬁeld team found one site with a statistically signiﬁcant reduction in walk-in centre/UCC/
out-of-hours service use but noted that it had not been possible to disaggregate data about the use of
different services. The Southampton team noted a perception among staff and stakeholders that
‘everything is increasing’ and a tendency to attribute this to the introduction of NHS 111, but we felt that
this needed further investigation as there had been similar perceptions surrounding the introduction of
NHS Direct.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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The Southampton study did not sample sites where NHS 111 services were provided by NHS Direct.
We noted that NHS Direct currently supports both health information calls as well as health advice but that
the marketing of NHS 111 has focused on ‘urgent care’. Nonetheless, the Southampton study presented
data showing some examples of calls for non-urgent advice (e.g. asking where services were, asking about
opening hours or wanting self-care advice). Many health advice calls and some information-seeking calls
(e.g. identifying appropriate services for a patient with long-term but non-urgent cardiac care needs) were
transferred to NHS 111 clinical staff as call advisers did not have the knowledge required to deal with
these. Occasionally, answering these calls involved team work and several staff would be marshalled to
help provide an answer. This raises some questions about where non-urgent callers will go once the
0845 number for NHS Direct is disconnected. There appears to be an assumption that the NHS Direct
website will provide health information of this kind but we noted that people would need to have access
to the internet.Organisational implications of NHS 111
Implementation
All of the Shefﬁeld and Southampton sites studied had launched the NHS 111 service. However, both
studies suggested that it has taken considerable organisational effort to introduce the service. The
Southampton team argued that this effort would be needed in the longer term to keep the service
functioning. The introduction of the NHS 111 service in each setting required the resolution of a number
of tensions and challenges and often these were unique to the history and location of the service. This
included agreeing the boundaries between NHS 111 and emergency services (which might be different
from those previously negotiated, say, between ambulance and out-of-hours services], resolving conﬂicts
and creating new working relationships and ways of working for staff (e.g. establishing ‘trust’ between
staff in different services), managing workﬂow in new ways (e.g. UCC appointment systems) and working
around limitations in service provision (e.g. to meet an increased need for mental health services out of
hours). Some NHS 111 services struggled with the pace of implementation and reported feeling that
implementation of NHS 111 ‘happens despite everything’. Both teams noted that it has not been possible
to accurately cost the resources required to launch the service in each site and felt that this was an
important gap in knowledge for future service roll-out. The Southampton study noted that some sites had
encountered difﬁculties in workforce planning because of uncertainties about local patterns of demand.Different organisational models
Research visits and ﬁeldwork at each of the sites had allowed each team to build up a good understanding
of the organisational models, cultures and histories at each site and this revealed intersite variation. The
sites studied included a highly integrated service model in which NHS 111 call handling was co-located
with out-of-hours services and on the same site as A&E services. Other NHS 111 services were not
physically integrated with care providers; these might be ‘stand-alone’ call centres or NHS 111 services
co-located with 999 ambulance call-handling services. Both teams felt that co-location with care providers
could be a key differentiator of the levels of service integration achieved. Proximity and contact between
staff enabled better understanding of the range of services provided, which led to smoother working
relationships and the build-up of trust and communication networks, which enabled stronger integration.
The Southampton team noted that internal organisational structures and cultures evolved as the NHS 111
services developed over time, but also reﬂected ‘parent’ organisations; thus, for example, the NHS 111
services provided by ambulance trusts tended to mimic the formal organisational structures of these
well-established organisations whereas the new private and third-sector providers had slightly ﬂatter
hierarchies and a different organisational ethos. The Shefﬁeld team felt that although their study began
with four different NHS 111 sites there were two contrasting organisational models: NHS Direct or the
ambulance service. The three NHS Direct 111 sites were organised with NHS 111 as an additional call91
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92centre activity in the context of a national organisation with an established history providing a nurse-led
telephone service. The ambulance trust-led service was situated in a more regionally focused organisation
with a history of emergency call handling and emergency care provision. The Southampton team noted
differences across the sites in such things as organisational reporting and management lines through to
the use (or not) of uniforms. The research teams noted that local histories and key players appeared to
have an impact on how the services were organised – for example in one of the sites studied by the
Southampton team a strong not-for-proﬁt ethos in a service provided by a third-sector organisation was
supported by statements made by senior management, by formal organisational structures and by pay and
reward systems. It appeared that some standardisation of organisational models might occur if subsequent
commissioning rounds favoured a few larger established providers.
Although the ‘front end’ of the NHS 111 service was delivered by non-clinical call advisers using the CDSS,
each of the organisations also had clinical staff involved in service delivery. The Southampton study had
the opportunity to examine the workforce in more detail and suggested that these clinicians tended to be
paramedics or nursing staff, although some sites also had access to GPs. These staff typically worked
alongside the non-clinical call advisers, creating an apparently ﬂat hierarchy. However, these clinical staff
were increasingly implicated in the extensive training, audit and monitoring functions necessary for the
efﬁcient and safe running of the NHS 111 service. As each service grew the amount of this audit work
increased, as did the visibility of this distinct group of clinical staff, creating a clearly deﬁned tier of staff in
each organisation.Caller experience of the NHS 111 service
Experiences of using the service
The Shefﬁeld study conducted two cross-sectional postal surveys of NHS 111 users at 3 and between 9 and
11 months after the start of the service in each site. The average response rate for the surveys was 41%.
The survey analysis showed some demographic differences in who called the service and differences in how
the calls were routed to the service (directly via the NHS 111 number or via call rerouting). One-third of
respondents said that they had been given a primary care appointment and two-thirds of respondents
found the advice received ‘very helpful’. The Southampton study did not directly examine caller views of the
NHS 111 service but we were able to report our analysis of the call advisers’ conversations with patients.
This qualitative analysis supported the Shefﬁeld survey ﬁnding that patients were largely satisﬁed with their
experience of the NHS 111 service. We noted that callers sometimes expressed surprise that the service was
available 24 hours a day and that they were able to get appointments to see a doctor or speak directly to a
clinician. Both studies did, however, note the considerable frustrations experienced by some callers at the
number of questions the call advisers asked them – particularly when these did not seem relevant to the
reason for the call (e.g. callers wanted a GP appointment for a prescription that had run out but the call
adviser had to ask questions to rule out emergency conditions as per the CDSS script). Another issue
identiﬁed by the Shefﬁeld study expert panel review were the problems faced by patients receiving palliative
care who were told to phone NHS 111 to request district nurse home visits but then had to endure a set of
apparently ‘irrelevant’ questions from the CDSS.Caller expectations
There was some evidence in both studies that caller expectations shaped satisfaction. The Shefﬁeld survey
noted some differences in the routes by which callers accessed the NHS 111 service, with those auto-routed
from another service reporting lower satisfaction. The Southampton team discussed the strong differences
in the call adviser perceptions of some populations, notably from a set of data from one site in which the
NHS 111 service covered two geographical areas that had previously had very different arrangements for
out-of-hours care. The call advisers at this site felt that callers from one area were more demanding and
‘just wanted a GP appointment’ and were less willing to go through the CDSS questions. It seemed clearNIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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were important and would need to be carefully managed when the service was rolled out nationally. Both
teams agreed that the call advisers undertook a considerable amount of work managing caller expectations
to achieve a positive outcome to the calls.Economic analysis
The ﬁnal part of the workshop looked at the economic analysis carried out by the Shefﬁeld team. We
explored how the qualitative analysis from the Southampton study could inform the Shefﬁeld costing
analysis and how the two studies could be integrated to inform future economic analysis of NHS 111.
We explored possible ways of integrating the ﬁndings using formal methods (e.g. Bayesian analysis) but
rejected these on the advice of the economist members of the team with it being agreed that the data
would not sustain such analyses. We focused therefore on bringing together the economic analysis with
the narratives offered by the qualitative and survey work from both studies.
We revisited our discussion about the signiﬁcant organisational effort and resources marshalled to
introduce the NHS 111 service in each site. We acknowledged the lack of robust resource use and costing
data surrounding this activity and the difﬁculties in accurately costing the implementation of NHS 111.
One of the key ﬁndings from both studies was that the provision of NHS 111 services had implications for
a wide range of resources and stakeholders in addition to the apparently immediate costs of the CDSS
software and the new call-handling staff. We noted that the use of existing infrastructure and estate had
been essential to the delivery of the service at each site – in terms of both call centre accommodation and
telephony, computing and training facilities and human resource management capability. Although the
Shefﬁeld team had been able to estimate costs per call and undertake a cost analysis, the lack of data on
measurable health beneﬁts, problems disaggregating some activity data (e.g. walk-in centre/UCC/
out-of-hours) and lack of data on other key costs (e.g. in-hours general practice dedicated to urgent care)
meant that the team had not been able to undertake a cost–beneﬁt analysis. We noted that the increasing
involvement of private sector providers and competitive contracting processes meant that commercial
sensitivity might prevent full economic costing of these services in the future.
The Shefﬁeld study costings had indicated that there was a likelihood of signiﬁcant cost savings if the
NHS 111 service replaced the telephone component of NHS Direct (i.e. the 0845 telephone number was
disconnected) and the GP component of out-of-hours call handling. We discussed the evidence from both
studies regarding the appropriateness of calls and the public understanding of the term ‘urgent care’. The
newness of the NHS 111 service and the current pattern of call routing – some via the NHS 111 number,
some via auto-rerouting of calls from out-of-hours general practice and others via answerphone messaging
– meant that not all callers understood what the service offered or that they had used NHS 111. This
meant that call advisers had to deal with different expectations and needs. We noted that in the current
system NHS Direct continued to pick up much of the demand for non-urgent health advice and service
signposting. The Southampton study, which focused on NHS 111 services that were not provided by
NHS Direct, noted the incidence of calls for non-urgent advice and support. We felt that there was an
assumption that much of this non-urgent demand would increasingly be met by alternative services, such
as NHS Direct online. Our analysis of call interactions and understanding of service user expectations
suggested that this might be more problematic, that there might continue to be high levels of demand for
telephone-based non-urgent advice services. Both research teams felt that this might have implications for
service costs in the longer term.
Both study teams agreed that a more detailed economic analysis of the NHS 111 service would be helpful
to inform future policy and service development. This would require more detailed costs for inputs, activity
and outcomes. Given our ﬁndings about implementation processes and the effort required to keep the
service functioning, future analyses would need to include initiation, staff and non-staff resources, training
and audit and long-term running costs.93
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94Conclusions from the workshopWe concluded that the two studies were indeed complementary. This section of the report has highlighted
some important issues to be considered for future commissioning and policy as well as articulating some
remaining gaps in our knowledge about this new service. Both studies revealed different organisational
models for service delivery and highlighted the considerable organisational effort required to introduce a
service and again this may provide valuable lessons for the future roll-out of the NHS 111 service. The
Shefﬁeld study provided survey evidence of high levels of satisfaction with the new service but both studies
urged caution over the need to understand and manage user expectations and future demands. Finally,
the workshop discussion of the economic analysis highlighted the need for further, more detailed work on
the costs and beneﬁts of this new service model.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusionsAnswering the questions in our proposalIn our proposal we highlighted that the NHS 111 service would fundamentally change the way in which
urgent care is organised and delivered, most notably in the use of digital technologies and the greater use
of non-clinical staff to undertake clinical assessment. The introduction of this new service, deploying a
technology that we had previously studied, provided a timely opportunity to empirically investigate four
core features of health-care innovation and change around which our four research questions were
framed: the way in which work and workforce is organised for this new service and how the technology
and organisational context shape the way in which services are delivered. We proposed to undertake a
detailed comparative case analysis of three NHS 111 services (in fact we have undertaken this in ﬁve sites)
to understand the impact of these inter-related aspects on the organisation and delivery of urgent care
services and inform workforce planning.
In this chapter we draw together our conclusions for each research question before discussing the
implications of our ﬁndings and how this work has built on our previous NIHR Service Delivery and
Organisation programme project18 and complements the evaluation of NHS 111 undertaken by the
Shefﬁeld team.15 Finally, we set out our research recommendations and consider the strengths and
limitations of the study.What is the work of NHS 111?
We examined the everyday work tasks and activities involved in delivering the services and integrating care
provision. NHS 111, underpinned by NHS Pathways, has facilitated the management of urgent care calls
but it is notable that the NHS 111 service receives calls about a broad range of physical and mental health
problems as well as social issues. Some staff suggest that implementation of the NHS 111 service may
have increased the number of ‘non-urgent calls’ (compared with out-of-hours services), including those
from people seeking medical advice and reassurance. In addition, our ﬁndings suggest that some callers
may access urgent care via NHS 111 rather than by contacting their own GP when they believe that it can
help them to access care more quickly and more conveniently. GPs may also direct callers to NHS 111
when the GP surgery is busy or there are no more appointments available that day.
Building on our previous study18,27 we have shown that NHS 111 call-handling work is complex and
intensive, involving high levels of communication and ‘emotion’ work. The ways in which the work ‘gets
done’ play out differently at each site but all call advisers demonstrate a considerable level of skill in
negotiation, communication and translation to mediate the assessment process that enables the CDSS to
work most effectively. Call advisers engage in a range of everyday work activities that extend beyond
being simple users of a CDSS to assess calls.
The everyday work of clinical advisers varied across sites. At all sites (except site 2 where clinical advisers
were based at a separate organisation) these staff provided support and reassurance. In particular, they
played an important role in managing and sanctioning dispositions, notably emergency ambulance
dispositions. Variations in how support for call advisers was delivered appeared to be inﬂuenced by levels of
trust at an organisational level, so that some organisations (notably sites 1, 2 and 5) appeared to engender
a greater degree of autonomy in its call advisers through their approach to training and ongoing support.
Clinicians at UCCs provide further assessment and a consultation, either on the telephone or face to face
(at an UCC or at home) and their work is shaped by call advisers, clinical advisers and call supervisors
working at the call centre, who determine how many patients are seen, who is seen and how quickly
patients are seen by clinicians. Upward referrals are also made to UCC clinicians for decision-making.95
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96Clinicians can assess and manage risk in ways that non-clinicians using a sensitive CDSS cannot. Although
we identiﬁed that some UCC clinicians had concerns about non-clinical workers assessing calls, these
typically (although not entirely) related to issues of speciﬁcity rather than sensitivity.Who is the NHS 111 workforce?
We examined the experience and skill sets of this new workforce, identifying education and training
needs of workers and how this workforce might be developed and maintained. We also examined role
differentiation, the division of labour (e.g. how tasks are divided formally and informally between staff),
professional boundaries and relationships across NHS 111. Across all sites the piloting of NHS 111 involved
providers expanding their workforce, employing or reorganising to ﬁll additional roles. At all sites there
were opportunities for call advisers to be promoted to a new role of call supervisor, who provided support
for day-to-day call-handling activities. Clinical advisers primarily brought their clinical skills to NHS 111
work and were important in not only responding to dispositions but also managing the workload
(e.g. sanctioning or ‘managing down’ dispositions safely). The role also required a range of additional
management skills for supporting, training and auditing call adviser activities.
Across NHS 111 there is a blurring of boundaries between different clinical professions and non-clinical
staff groups. Call advisers and clinical advisers triage calls, make decisions and assess clinical risk,
supported by NHS Pathways, thereby stepping into the domain of medical doctors who have traditionally
undertaken triage in out-of-hours services. There is a history of nurse telephone triage within the NHS38,39
but only more recently has technology enabled non-clinical staff to perform complex health-care work.
Almost inevitably this is a source of tension amongst some UCC clinicians, with frustrations about
perceived ‘inappropriate’ dispositions and tensions around professional boundaries. Clinicians held clear
beliefs that input from clinical staff is essential not only for supporting call advisers but also to enable
clinical staff to take clinical responsibility for more complex calls. Within UCCs, when ECPs or NPs worked
alongside GPs, typically these staff undertook similar roles, dealing with face-to-face appointments and
home visits.What is the NHS 111 technology?
We examined the core technologies implicated in the delivery of the NHS 111 service. These included the
CDSS used to assess and manage calls and the DoS used to locate appropriate services for onward referral
when indicated. The CDSS was the focus of our previous research project18 but we have provided
additional detail here of how it is used in the NHS 111 context. The DoS is key to the delivery of NHS 111
as it provides the call advisers with information about services, including location, opening hours and
remit. However, the delivery of the services required a set of interlinked technologies, including case record
and case management systems, booking systems and a range of what might be considered peripheral ICTs
(call activity monitoring and display, internet features including web browsers and e-mail and mapping
systems). The different settings do not use the same case record/management systems and we noted
that Adastra, Cleric and Valentia are currently used. As these systems are used elsewhere within the
organisations providing the NHS 111 service it seems unlikely that it will be possible to standardise this
technology, which means that the interface between case record/management systems and the CDSS will
vary slightly across different sites.
Trust in NHS Pathways amongst call-handler staff was relatively high and the call advisers in particular are
positive about this technology. There is some appreciation that the system is risk averse and awareness of
some areas in which the pathways are less effective or useful (e.g. multiple symptoms). There is some site
variation in terms of trust but this may reﬂect the poorer response from UCC and external stakeholders;
however, GPs and other external stakeholders are less positive about the CDSS than those who use it
every day. Staff at call centres understood why NHS Pathways reached particular dispositions – primarily
because the system has to be, above all things, safe. However, UCC staff were sometimes confused as to
why particular patients were referred to them. Lack of trust and negative views about NHS 111 were likely
to be inﬂuenced by perceptions of the ‘appropriateness’ of NHS 111 assessments and outcomes.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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that the staff in the call centres work hard to make the technology work, often developing workarounds
that enable this. The survey suggests that they ﬁnd the system largely reliable, although some problems with
the DoS were noted, especially the need to keep this up to date. The key area of integration necessary to
deliver NHS 111 was between the CDSS and the DoS, and this appeared to be an area in which there
remained some problems, such as dissatisfaction with case records and information about services. Again,
it was notable that staff worked hard to overcome the barriers to integration and that non-clinical staff
tended to have a more positive view of the level of integration between technologies overall.What is the organisational context of NHS 111?
There is considerable variation in the organisation and delivery of NHS 111 shaped by the organisational
history, dominant service ethic and professional culture of the varied contracted organisations.
Call-handling organisations were motivated by different reasons for bidding for the NHS 111 contract,
including entrepreneurial drivers (such as expanding the size of the business or growing new business) as
well as protective drivers [to defend against threats to existing (out-of-hours) business and the desire to
keep call handling ‘in-house’].
In all sites the spatial location of the work facilitated communication and the sharing of knowledge, with
co-location facilitating supportive relationships and knowledge sharing. The ability to work in and manage
teams is essential for the successful implementation of NHS 111. Relationships between some UCCs and
call centres were poor. In addition to concerns about non-clinical staff undertaking clinical assessment,
proximity (co-location) and history appear to have inﬂuenced the working relationships between call
centres and UCCs. In sites 1, 3 and 5, call centres and UCCs were separate services and the relationship
between these was a ‘faceless’ one; communication between the two was typically limited to NHS
Pathways information transmitted electronically, supplemented with some telephone communication
(discussed further in Implications for integrating health services).
Inherent tensions exist within the NHS 111 service. On the one hand there is a push towards rationalisation
and standardisation but on the other hand local service providers are strongly pulled towards designing
services that are aligned with their service ethic and with their views about what is needed locally. Broadly,
the commercial organisation (site 5) and ambulance service providers (sites 1 and 3) were more driven by
rationing and systemising – by pursuing the NHS 111 vision of ‘right care, right place, right time’ – whereas
out-of-hours services were heavily driven by an ethos of providing a service that is more in line with what
they provided as out-of-hours organisations. Co-location of services and a shared history have signiﬁcantly
enhanced the co-ordination of work and relationships and interorganisational trust and knowledge sharing
between organisations but the competitive nature of NHS 111 contracts has resulted in organisations being
less open and protecting themselves against the potential loss of their business. The opportunity for sharing
early best practice has been hampered as sites have been less willing to ‘open their doors’ to potential
competitors for fear of giving away their competitive edge.Implications of our ﬁndings for workforce planning
and organisation
Implications for the roles, training and education of call advisers
Building on our earlier ﬁndings27 we suggest that NHS 111 call handling is a complex task combining high
levels of communication, cognitive skills and emotion work. The extent to which call handling is high- or
low-skilled work is debated in the wider call centre literature.40 It is often presented as low skilled
(characterised by repetition and high levels of monitoring)41,42 although higher-level skills (e.g. emotion and
articulation work) are also recognised.43 Training and audit activities reinforce the idea that ﬂexibility and
experiential expertise are not required when using the CDSS, but we have shown that accommodating
these features plays an important role in enabling call advisers to make a disposition. Our work suggests
that call advisers are not passive users of computer software. They develop and draw on experiential97
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98knowledge and lay clinical knowledge (e.g. in over-riding call dispositions and translating information
provided by the caller).26 However, staff recognised the ﬁne line between ‘probing using the supporting
information’ and ‘following the system.’ We suggest that the work carried out by NHS 111 call advisers
has more in common with clinical health-care work than with other generic call centre work that it
superﬁcially resembles. Working in health-care settings is attractive to call advisers; they are highly
motivated and often very committed to delivering high-quality services. At all sites there were
opportunities for progression into training, auditing or supervisory roles. We identiﬁed some requests from
call centre staff for a ‘professional’ qualiﬁcation for NHS 111 call advisers, one that recognises and
formalises this distinct role and level of training. Offering opportunities for career development and
recognising the range of skills that call advisers demonstrate are a vital part of recruiting and retaining
skilled call advisers and are essential to technologies such as the CDSS delivering on their promise of
managing demand whilst providing quality health services.
Ongoing formal and informal coaching was provided at all of our sites through buddying systems,
support from call supervisors and clinical staff and feedback from the audit process. However, there was
considerable variation across sites in how these activities were performed and by whom. There was also
considerable variation in the levels of conﬁdence that call advisers demonstrated in performing their role.
This lack of standardisation of training could have implications for the skills acquired by call advisers and
the degree of conﬁdence that they have to complete calls effectively. Greater consideration of how
training is delivered may inﬂuence the conﬁdence and/or autonomy of these workers.Implications for NHS 111 as a standardised service
NHS 111 is predicated on the use of a CDSS built on abstracted clinical evidence that is designed to ensure
consistency and safety by standardising, controlling and monitoring the clinical knowledge in play for both
call advisers and clinical advisers. In practice, the everyday work of using NHS Pathways to deliver NHS 111
is somewhat more ‘messy’ and our ﬁndings suggest that standardisation across NHS 111 may be difﬁcult
for a number of reasons.
NHS 111 call centre workers manage a vast range of contingencies in using the CDSS, using signiﬁcant
human input and clinical expertise. Clinical and non-clinical staff merge their expertise and experiential
knowledge (albeit in different ways) to deliver an individualised, rather than a standardised service. Call
advisers use considerable skill to identify the exact nature of a patient’s symptoms (‘probing’ to sift out
relevant information to be able to select and assess a single symptom), adapt to a caller’s levels of
knowledge about symptoms (e.g. translation work, rephrasing), assess the caller’s circumstances, drawing
on their knowledge and expertise, and make tacit judgements (e.g. whether the caller is correctly depicting
the symptoms, whether the disposition seems appropriate). In most sites call advisers are also heavily
supported by a clinical workforce and draw on the professional expertise of a range of clinical colleagues
(nurse advisers, paramedics and primary care doctors). Clinical advisers play a key role in delivering NHS
111 by supporting callers, providing an additional assessment of complex calls and sometimes managing
dispositions by using their experience and expertise. This merging of lay expertise (call advisers) and
professional expertise (clinical advisers) with the CDSS expertise is reﬂected in the wider literature. For
example, our ﬁndings are similar to those of Greatbatch et al.44 who found that nurses used a CDSS in a
range of ways, incorporating and valuing their own expertise, to ‘deliver an individualised service’ (p. 802).
Berg45 suggests that it is often necessary to adapt the formal rules (algorithms) of CDSS to accommodate
the complex, multifaceted issues that arise in clinical decision-making, reﬂected in the literature about
nurses using CDSS.44,46
Flexible, non-standardised use of the system is a means of mediating the (real or perceived) ‘oversensitivity’
of the CDSS (or ‘risk averseness’ as sometimes described by staff). Previous research suggests that the CDSS
is often oversensitive (it does not miss sick patients and therefore it is safe) but that it tends to ‘over-triage’
(it identiﬁes ‘too many’ false positives because it is not speciﬁc enough).47,48 Such studies acknowledge that
it is difﬁcult to devise a CDSS that has both high sensitivity and high speciﬁcity, and in a CDSS that has been
designed for use by non-clinicians it is necessary – and somewhat inevitable – that NHS Pathways has highNIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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however, more work is required to clearly understand this. What is clear from our study is that call advisers
and clinicians use their expertise and experience to mediate (real or perceived) ‘oversensitivity’.
All call centres faced similar issues in working with the CDSS but different sites approached making
dispositions in different ways. In some sites, for example, all emergency dispositions were sanctioned by a
clinical adviser before an ambulance was dispatched. There were variations in the extent to which call
advisers requested support from a clinical adviser or referred ‘difﬁcult’ or ‘complex’ cases to a clinical
adviser. It is likely that this variation in how the CDSS is managed is inﬂuenced by the organisational
history and culture, practices, professional culture and dominant service ethic of the varied contracted
organisations. NHS 111 tries to impose an abstracted standardised system on the urgent and emergency
health-care system but our ﬁndings suggest that ‘place’ affects the way in which this standardised system
becomes embedded in practice.
This difﬁculty in achieving standardisation raises important issues for the development and use of expert
systems, not only in NHS 111 but also in the organisation of health care more widely. A lack of
standardisation could have implications for safety and efﬁciency but evaluating this lies beyond the remit
of our study. There is a potential concern that ﬂexibility in call advisers using the CDSS may lead to
overconﬁdence and the exercising of inappropriate levels of discretion. However, the high levels of clinical
support and monitoring that we have observed (e.g. audit, ongoing training) helps to temper this. This
lack of standardisation may also help explain why there are differences in disposition rates between
NHS 111 sites.15,27Implications for workforce reconfiguration
Underpinning a new telephone service with non-clinical workers offers signiﬁcant opportunities for
workforce reconﬁguration. However, our ﬁndings suggest that there is not a simple substitution of labour
(i.e. non-clinical staff replacing clinical staff). The introduction of NHS 111 has resulted in workforce
expansion in each site – of both clinical and non-clinical staff. It should be noted that this is likely to be
both because of changes to work practices (e.g. the introduction of NHS Pathways) and because NHS 111
has generated more calls on a wider range of health issues (compared with previous calls to out-of-hours
providers) and the new service may be attracting calls that might have previously gone to NHS Direct.
What is clear from this study is that there is a signiﬁcant organisational structure in place that is necessary
to support and ‘keep in place’ both the CDSS itself and the non-clinical workers who use the CDSS. This
inevitably has implications for the organisation, delivery and ﬁnancing of NHS 111. Although cost saving is
not an explicit aim of NHS 111,12,49 it should not be assumed that employing a ‘cheaper’ non-clinical
workforce to assess calls will reduce urgent care costs. The apparent advantage of a non-clinical workforce
has to be set against the resources and structures needed to support these types of staff. This includes the
need for auditing, training and ongoing clinical supervision and support, as well as the necessity to refer
many calls upwards to nurses and doctors. Considerable additional work is required to support these
workers and efﬁciencies in service provision may not always be achieved. This should be borne in mind
when introducing NHS 111.Implications for integrating health services
NHS 111 seeks to integrate a range of urgent care services in the context of an increasingly complex
landscape of health services and signiﬁcant increases in demand for urgent and non-urgent services.
Curry and Ham50 distinguished between ‘real’ integration, in which organisations merge their services,
and virtual integration, in which organisations work together through networks and alliances. NHS 111 is
primarily founded on virtual integration so that a network of different organisations provides different
aspects of the service (e.g. call centre, UCC). This network is primarily enabled through technological
integration (e.g. communication, information sharing). We have seen that technological integration is key
to delivering NHS 111, most notably in NHS Pathways being able to assess the ‘right time and right place’
for the patient and in the DoS containing accurate information about the most appropriate service99
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100available locally. Technological integration has been achieved in NHS 111, albeit with staff effort in
developing workarounds to ‘make the technology work’.
However, successful integration requires understanding and trusting relationships between different
providers. Our study revealed that relationships between different providers in the NHS 111 network at
some sites were very poor and that mistrust (of technology and of partner organisations) was high.
Ham et al.51 suggest that integrated care is more likely to succeed if there is good team working (so that
barriers are broken down between clinicians); responsibility for deﬁned populations that enables
relationships to develop over time; and partnerships between health professionals and managers in leading
improvement. Our study suggested that organisations sometimes felt that service change was imposed on
them with little consultation. Even when the call centre and UCC had worked in partnership for several
years (site 1), hostility and mistrust persisted. We identiﬁed that much of the communication between
different NHS 111 providers was electronic, with little personal contact between providers at some sites.
We suggest that technological integration alone is not enough to sustain an integrated service.
Relationships were more harmonious in sites that were co-located and/or that had a history of working
together. Time and effort are crucial in promoting shared communication and a more harmonious
relationship between partner organisations.
Wider health service reforms also have implications for greater integration in urgent care. Opening up NHS
111 contracts to any willing provider has meant that organisations that have had no previous working
relationships have been required to form partnerships to provide NHS 111. Additionally, competition may
exacerbate difﬁculties so that integration across organisational boundaries is difﬁcult.52 Our study revealed
that in some instances organisations that had previously competed against each other for the NHS 111
contract (e.g. at site 5) were now required to work alongside each other. In another case (site 2),
organisations that were competing against each other for future NHS 111 contracts were required to work
in partnership. Sites were reluctant to share ‘best practice’ with other organisations for fear of losing their
competitive advantage, and this could produce fragmentation rather than integration.
Finally, the policy around NHS 111 has highlighted the need to integrate urgent and emergency care
services. However, the wider system, most notably general practice, needs to be more securely aligned to
this process. Our study suggested that there was a sense from some call centres that NHS 111 was
diverting patients with primary care needs into urgent care. Some staff suggested that NHS 111 had the
potential to be a ‘victim of its own success’, providing a convenient, highly accessible alternative service to
general practice. The implications of these ﬁndings are that NHS 111 could expand beyond its urgent care
remit, demanding considerable resources for health complaints that might be more appropriately met by
other services. Thus, to be a fully integrated service, there is a need to consider how urgent care and
NHS 111 might best integrate with routine general practice.
Historically, local services have developed in an ad hoc way and this has inevitably made integration
problematic. There is also some tension between policies intended to promote integration and those
designed to increase patient choice.53 The NHS 111 service seeks to simplify access and overcome the
fragmentation of urgent and emergency care services. The ‘success’ of NHS 111 is thus dependent on an
effective and cohesive network of urgent care, emergency care and general practice services.Research recommendationsThe conclusions reached in this study raise questions for future research. First, our analysis suggests that
NHS 111 is not a standardised service across the UK. Organisational history and culture and the way in
which the workforce uses the CDSS mean that the deployment of this technology plays out in different
ways in different sites. For example, we have noted that there is variation in how clinical advisers advise
on, or sanction, ambulance dispositions. We have argued that this interpretive ﬂexibility has been
important to the successful roll-out of services. What is not clear is whether this variation matters.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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example of ambulance dispositions we know from the Shefﬁeld evaluation15 that there has been an
increase in ambulance incidents. A detailed assessment of ambulance dispositions is needed as it is unclear
to what extent the technology or the call centre workforce is making decisions. UCC staff reported that
the implementation of NHS 111 had resulted in an increase in their face-to-face workload (also reﬂected
by call centre managers at some sites) although ﬁndings from the Shefﬁeld evaluation did not seem to
reﬂect this. The effects of variations in the way that NHS 111 is provided on its longer-term impact on
urgent and emergency services warrants further investigation.
We have identiﬁed that there is a complex infrastructure that supports NHS Pathways and its use by
non-clinical workers. As highlighted in Chapter 7 there is a lack of robust resource use and costing data
surrounding NHS 111 and there are difﬁculties in accurately costing its implementation. A more detailed
economic analysis of NHS 111 is needed to inform future policy and service development and this
must include analyses of detailed costs for inputs, activity and outcomes. However, this relies on
there being robust data available. There are also commercial sensitivities around ﬁnancial data from
NHS 111 organisations.
We have suggested that lack of integration of NHS 111 services with routine general practice warrants
further investigation. Beyond this, a whole-systems approach to considering integration across a wider
network of partners is key to understanding the complex relationships between demand, access and the
provision of health care.Strengths and limitationsThis follow-on study has built on the extensive work of our previous project,18 which examined a single
CDSS used in different emergency and urgent health-care service settings. Through ﬁve detailed
comparative case studies drawing on ethnographic and survey methods, we have explored the inter-related
aspects of work, workforce, technology and organisation of NHS 111, to inform the organisation and
delivery of modern health services.
The study was predominantly qualitative with a signiﬁcant ethnographic component and a smaller survey
component. This level of detail across a range of case studies is one of its strengths. We chose ﬁve case
studies to capture some of the diversity in organisational models and professional cultures and to examine
a wide range of different NHS 111 services. One of the limitations is that we were not able to include a
NHS Direct model of NHS 111 provision and during the course of our research NHS Direct became a
signiﬁcant provider of NHS 111. The Shefﬁeld evaluation15 included three NHS Direct-led pilot sites, which
allows some insights into possible differences and similarities but also makes the synthesis of ﬁndings
between the two studies more difﬁcult. We studied organisations at different points in their NHS 111
trajectory (some were more experienced in using NHS Pathways and/or had piloted NHS 111 earlier than
others). The length of experience and stage of implementation will invariably affect the way in which the
everyday work of NHS 111 is undertaken (e.g. how dispositions are reached). However, studying
organisations at different stages of NHS 111 has also illuminated the different challenges faced by sites at
different points along the trajectory.
The timescale of the project (15 months) meant that it was necessary to limit our investigation to call
centre and UCC providers. There is, of course, a wider network of health services involved in the provision
of urgent care that we were not able to explore in detail. We aimed to include a wide range of
stakeholders in the focus groups but securing agreement to participate from stakeholders proved difﬁcult.
Additionally, inclusion of stakeholders required multiple research and development (R&D) applications
across a large number of trusts, which was difﬁcult to achieve within a 15-month project.101
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102The survey work was limited by both the potential number of respondents available in the ﬁve sites and by
the moderate response rates we received at some sites (and from UCC organisations). Because of the
constraints imposed by ethics and governance requirements, and the limited time available for the project,
we do not have information about the non-responders and possible bias.What does this study add?This study has focused on the work, workforce, technology and organisation required to deliver the NHS
111 service, building on earlier work (a study of a CDSS in different urgent and emergency care settings18)
and complementing work undertaken by Shefﬁeld university (an evaluation of the activity of NHS 111 and
its impact on other urgent and emergency care services, costs and patient satisfaction15). A summary of
what our study of NHS 111 adds to earlier work is summarised in Table 19. We have revealed that,
although call advisers are extremely skilled in assessing callers using a CDSS, the work requires signiﬁcant
support and monitoring. Some poor working relationships were observed between UCCs and call centre
organisations, with UCC staff in particular having low levels of trust in NHS Pathways and in NHS 111.
Although there was evidence of technological integration, this alone is not enough to sustain an
integrated service. Organisational history, the dominant service ethic and the professional culture of
contracted organisations all shape the way in which services are organised and delivered.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
ABLE 19 What does this study add?
Study What is already known?
Southampton study
of a CDSS in different
settings (2008–10)18
The CDSS changes call-handling work and creates a new worker identity (health-care call
handler). Call-handling work is skilled. These workers are not simple ‘users of a system’. Call
handlers also use individual experiential knowledge, embodied expertise and team sharing of
knowledge. The work of bringing the CDSS into use and maintaining its everyday use required
signiﬁcant effort, buy-in and ongoing appraisal and adjustment. Continued effort is required
to keep the CDSS in everyday use. Although a single technology (CDSS) can be made to work
in different settings, this takes more effort than simply slotting a technology into place
Shefﬁeld evaluation
of NHS 111 (2010–12)15
Some integration between services was achieved (particularly technological, e.g. NHS 111 call
advisers could dispatch an ambulance without further triage). One year after launch, the pilots
did not deliver the expected beneﬁts of improving satisfaction with urgent care or improving
efﬁciency by directing patients to urgent rather than emergency care services. There was
evidence of a reduction in calls to NHS Direct but an increase in emergency ambulance
incidents. A ‘simplistic analysis’ of the national implementation of NHS 111, with the service
replacing the NHS Direct 0845 service and handling all GP out-of-hours calls, showed that NHS
111 may result in cost savings to the NHS. However, this is based on considerable assumptions
and limited cost data. There was no clear evidence of the superiority of one type of model
What does this study add?
Southampton study
of NHS 111 (2011–12)
Work
Clinical and non-clinical staff work together closely to mediate the CDSS in clinical assessment
in most sites. The work of UCC clinicians is shaped by call advisers and clinical advisers
Workforce
Signiﬁcant organisational structure is required to support non-clinical staff using NHS Pathways
(clinical support and monitoring, auditing). Non-clinical workers are not simply substituted for
clinical workers
Technology
There was a low level of trust in NHS 111 and NHS Pathways amongst UCC staff. This
contributed to poor working relationships between some NHS 111 partner organisations.
There was evidence of technological integration, although staff sometimes developed
workarounds to ‘make the technology work’
Organisational context and implications
There is considerable variation in the organisation and delivery of NHS 111 across sites. This is
shaped by organisational history, the dominant service ethic and the professional culture of
contracted organisations. Integration of NHS 111 organisations is primarily ‘virtual’ and it is
enabled primarily by technological links. Co-location and a history of working together
enhanced relationships between organisational partners. There is a need to consider
integration with a wider network of health care, including general practice
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The work, workforce, technology and organisational implications of the ‘111’ single point of
access telephone number for urgent (non-emergency) care
Chief investigator Dr Joanne Turnbull
Sponsor University of Southampton
Funder NIHR SDO programme
NIHR Portfolio number 10885
ISRCTN registration number (if applicable) Nota applicable1. Aims/ObjectivesThe study is designed to examine the work required to deliver the 111 urgent care service, the types of
workforce and skill mix required, the interlinked technologies that will be brought into use, and the wider
organisational implications of the introduction of this new service. This represents a large scale and
fundamental change to the delivery of urgent care. The research questions will be addressed by using a
comparative mixed methods case study approach to understand the implications of the following
interrelated aspects of the new service to inform the organisation and delivery of modern health services.RESEARCH QUESTIONS1. WHAT IS THE WORK OF 111? Describing the everyday work tasks and activities to understand the work
involved in delivering the services and the integration of multiple providers implicated in 111; exploring
information sharing and knowledge across the full range of services integrated by 111 to examine how
trust and knowledge transfer varies;
2. WHAT IS THE 111 WORKFORCE? Looking in detail at the workers to examine the experience and skill
sets of this new workforce, identifying education and training needs and how this workforce might be
developed and maintained, describing role differentiation and division of labour (e.g. how tasks are
divided formally and informally between staff);
3. WHAT IS THE TECHNOLOGY FOR 111? Exploring the technologies underpinning the service to
understand the complex socio-technical interaction required to bring them into use, looking at
conﬁguration, anticipated and actual use of these technologies (both computer decision support
systems and wider implicated information and communication technologies).
4. WHAT IS THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF 111? To situate questions 1–3 we will examine the
organisational effort and environment, to compare and describe structures, practices and service
integration within the wider political, sectoral and organisational settings (within 111 sites and the
wider network of providers).111
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1122. BackgroundThe English NHS provides a wide range of services including GP out-of-hours services, minor injuries units,
NHS Walk in centres and NHS Direct. The Next Stage Review (Department of Health 2008) proposed the
development of a 3 digit telephone number (111) to provide a single point of access to urgent care
services to reduce public confusion about where to seek help, to coordinate and integrate services and
improve access. The need to integrate urgent care services has long been recognised (Department of
Health 2000; 2008). In 2009 the Department of Health (DH) announced a 1 year pilot of a 111 service as
a precursor to a national single point of access service which would provide a central hub to integrate and
co-ordinate care. The White paper ‘Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS’, in 2010, suggested a
continued commitment to developing an integrated 24/7 urgent care service incorporating GP out-of-
hours services across England. The potential roll out of 111 services nationally would represent a signiﬁcant
change to service provision that requires long term commitment and substantial ﬁnancial investment at a
time when there is pressure on public funding. The DH commissioned a Policy Research Programme (PRP)
funded evaluation of four pilot 111 pilots (University of Shefﬁeld, 01/03/2010–30/11/2011) to examine
activity (implementation, service use, call and referral patterns and impact on local health economy) and
patients’ perspectives (satisfaction, experience and demand). Our project is deliberately designed to
complement this work by answering key questions about the work and workforce, and the technological
and organisational context underpinning the new 111 service.
The use of new technologies like Computer Decision Support Systems (CDSS) to support new services is
consistent with the NHS mission to use appropriate technology to beneﬁt patient care and improve service
delivery, but the history of the implementation of new technologies in health care demonstrates that the
deployment is not always successful. Previous research shows the importance of attending not only to
technological feasibility but also to the complex, dynamic processes through which technologies come into
use or, more often, fail to do so (Berg 2001; May et al. 2005; Heeks 2006; Haux 2006). By focussing on
work, workforce, technologies and organisation our study will capture these important processes.
The CDSS NHS Pathways has been identiﬁed as an underpinning technology to support the 111 service.
This CDSS was the focus of our previous NIHR SDO study (08/1819/217, completed August 2010) and has
shed light on the ‘work’ and effort required to bring a CDSS into successful use in a similar service setting.
We have demonstrated the complex relationship of expertise and experience required for using CDSS on a
day to day basis. This project aims to examine the work required to deliver 111 nationally, the different
types of workforce implicated (clinical and non-clinical), the deployment of computer technologies to
support this service and the particular organisational settings and conﬁgurations surrounding it.3. NeedHEALTH NEED: By informing the evaluation of the new service and ﬁlling the research gaps by explaining
the work, workforce, organisation and technology of 111 we will enable a more holistic understanding of
this new way of delivering and accessing urgent care and see how it contributes to health care. This
project will inform the work, organisation and delivery of urgent care services to the whole population,
and will also speak to the wider issues surrounding the implementation and use of technologies like CDSS
to meet health needs.
SUSTAINED INTEREST AND INTENT: The roll out of 111 services nationally represents a signiﬁcant change
to service provision that requires long term commitment and substantial ﬁnancial investment at a time
when there is pressure on public funding. The use of CDSS to support new services is consistent with the
NHS mission to use appropriate technology to beneﬁt patient care and improve service delivery. However
the history of the implementation of new technologies in health care demonstrates that the deployment is
not always successful. It is therefore imperative that such technologies are thoroughly understood.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3GENERATING NEW KNOWLEDGE: We do not know enough about the work and organisation of this kind
of service at national scale nor do we fully understand how new workforce and new technologies are
brought into use and sustained. Our current project has shed light on the ‘work’ and effort required to
bring a CDSS into successful use in a similar service setting, showing the potential for CDSS to intensify
the work of call-handling, and demonstrating the complex relationship of expertise and experience
required for using CDSS on a day to day basis. No research has been commissioned to examine the work
required to deliver 111, the different types of workforce implicated in this service, the particular
organisational settings and conﬁgurations surrounding it or the deployment of computer technologies to
support this new service. It is essential to ﬁll these knowledge gaps to ensure effective and efﬁcient roll out
of this particular service, and to inform wider debates about service development and technologies in use.4. Methods
a. Setting
Four initial pilot sites were commissioned by the Department of Health and the 111 service was launched
in the pilot sites in 2010. In addition, several ‘second wave’ sites are due to ‘go live’ later in 2011.
Five sites will be chosen from on the basis of including a range of different organisational models, service
providers and geographical areas.b. Design and data collection
We will use both quantitative and qualitative methods that include: 1) Rapid ethnographic observation and
2) Focus groups. 3) A survey of staff. 4) Integrative multidisciplinary workshop.Ethnographic case study
Rapid ethnographic (observational and informal interview) case studies will provide a detailed description
of the work, workforce, organisational context and the technologies used and will address all four research
questions. Our previous research will inform this part of the study and we will use a similar approach to
undertaking observation in this study. An orientation visit by two or more research team members will be
undertaken at the outset of the study to outline the project and talk with key management personnel, and
to make initial contact with local service managers in order to negotiate access to the study sites and the
staff. Observation of call handling and the wider integration of services will be undertaken (e.g. call
centres, urgent care centres) to look at interactions between staff, technologies in use, and the settings,
including networks and relationships, routines, everyday processes, and workload and content.
Observation at each site will be designed to capture activity at different times of day/days of the week,
including day shifts, evenings, nights and weekends, conducted by the research fellow and the named
investigators. The total number of observation hours at each site will vary depending on the complexity of
local organisation and work practices. A maximum of two researchers will undertake observation at any
one time but typically only one researcher will be present.
The observation will consist of two main components. Firstly, the researchers will closely observe what staff
do in their everyday work, and how they interact with each other and the technology. The researcher, with
permission, will typically focus on one member of staff (sometimes this is called shadowing) or will watch a
team (e.g. discussing a problem with the software) working. The researcher may discuss their work
informally or join in conversation. In our previous study, typically the researcher sat alongside 3–4 different
staff (a period of two hours per staff member) on a given shift to observe what they do – and during
quieter shifts engaged the call-handler about their work, if it was appropriate to do so (e.g. if the call
handler was not busy; if the call-handler wanted to talk). The research team are mindful that on busy shifts
there is not always the opportunity to engage staff in conversation. Care will be taken to ensure that the
researcher does not disrupt the productivity and work patterns of staff in any way. Secondly, because
there is typically some opportunity to talk informally with staff at quieter periods, these informal
conservations will augment and help to understand what is being observed. The purpose of these113
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114conversations are i) to enable the researcher to check with, and clarify with staff that they have accurately
understood/interpret what they have observed ii) to understand the nature of the everyday 111 work – this
will be particularly focused on their use of NHS Pathways.
Observation will be performed without audio or video recording. Detailed notes will be taken during the
observation period and transcribed soon afterwards. Fieldnotes will describe the everyday work of the staff
involved in delivering 111, as well as opinions about 111, and any other relevant background information.
Notes will for the most part, be taken overtly in the setting, forming an outline from which more detailed
notes will be written up later.Focus groups
Up to 8 focus groups (1–2 per site) will be undertaken with staff and key stakeholders from across the
111 service network. Focus groups will particularly address research questions 2 and 3, examining how
work is distributed across the integrated service (division of labour), the role of technology, barriers and
facilitators of 111 for work, workforce and organisation. Focus group interviews explicitly use group
interactions as part of the data collection process; we would expect the group to consist of about
8 individuals. The precise focus of the focus groups will be further informed by the observational work.
A topic guide has been prepared for facilitating the focus groups but will be ﬂexible to allow exploration
of issues that might arise from the participants. Potential participants (staff and key stakeholders) will be
identiﬁed after undertaking some periods of observation at the sites. They will reﬂect a range of staff in
different job roles and from different parts of the integrated care network, to fully understand work and
organisation across the urgent care system. We would expect each focus group to last approximately
two hours. Two members of the research team will conduct the focus group (one as moderator/facilitator,
one as an observer/assistant).Survey
A questionnaire about information sharing and knowledge, particularly addressing research questions 1
and 4, will be administered across the multiple services and range of staff implicated in 111, to understand
trust and knowledge transfer in integrated services. This work will build on questionnaire development and
analyses conducted for the previous SDO project, which was designed to capture two key aspects relating
to staff; (i) the skills, experience and training of call handlers using NHS Pathways and (ii) call handlers trust
in NHS Pathways and the work system in which it is embedded. This project will aim to develop these
questionnaires to examine communication, knowledge-sharing and decision-making across the services
integrated in 111. The questionnaire will consist of on-line questionnaires if possible, although our
previous research has indicated that there may be practical difﬁculties in administering in this way (for
example, some staff may not be allowed or not be able to access the internet whilst they are at work). In
the event that on-line questionnaires are not feasible, a paper based questionnaire will be used instead.Integrative multidisciplinary workshop
An integrative multidisciplinary workshop meeting will be undertaken towards the end of the study to
bring together the ﬁndings from our work with the activity and economic costing analysis undertaken in
the parallel study by the PRP funded team to extend what we know about the use of 111. This synthesis
will particularly focus on how much the service is used, how much it costs – and what the implications
might be for the work and workforce.
Relevant service, research and policy stakeholders will be invited to the workshop to so that the ﬁndings
are directly conveyed to these communities. This workshop will bring together all aspects of work,
workforce, organisational context and technology with the ﬁndings from the PRP research team. The focus
of the workshop will develop with the emergent ﬁndings of our research. We anticipate that this aspect of
the study will require qualitative synthesis methods, economic and/or statistical approaches (e.g. Bayesian
statistical approaches) to interrogate and integrate ﬁndings as appropriate. The health economist on the
team will support this work.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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For analysis of the qualitative data from the observation and focus groups, we will use our established data
clinic approach to share and interpret data collectively, building from emergent themes to narrative and
interpretive summaries (ethnographic and focus group data). Team members will initially read and open
code a sample of ﬁeldnotes and focus group transcripts. Regular data clinics will be used to ensure
collective input and discussion of emerging codes, themes of interest and attention paid to contradictory
cases. Data analysis will extend techniques used in the previous project, linking data to the research
questions and to the Normalisation Process Theory (NPT), generalizing patterns across cases, as well as
drawing upon other sociological concepts and social theory. The analysis will include a mixture of
traditional comparative analytical approaches, looking at themes, and matrix techniques using a grid
informed by NPT as a broad framework for the analysis to facilitate comparison. To support the process of
analysis, focus group transcripts and observational notes will be imported into a qualitative analysis
software package, Atlas.Ti 6.1 which will be primarily used to code data and facilitate data management
and data retrieval.
Survey analysis will concentrate on descriptive outputs, and will use statistics package PASW, (following
double data entry using Excel).
Qualitative synthesis methods, economic models and/or statistical approaches will be used to integrate
ﬁndings as appropriate in advance of the integrative workshop. We anticipate this aspect of the study will
require economic and Bayesian statistical approaches.
Methods will be integrated primarily in two ways. First developmentally – the ﬁndings from one method
will inform the design and analysis of subsequent components (e.g. ethnography informing the focus
groups and vice versa; both of these will inform the survey development). Secondly, the analysis of the
results will be integrated by exploring convergence and contradiction in the results derived from different
methods – a process of ‘crystallisation’ to provide a more comprehensive account than offered by a single
method (O’Cathain and Thomas 2006).5. Plan of InvestigationThe team will undertake some initial work before the study fully commences in August 2011, including
initial meetings and/or contact with case study sites; ethical approval: and research governance
applications; invite and brief advisory group members. The chart below sets out a monthly timetable:
l Months 1–3: liaison with sites, initial visits; ﬁnalize ethical approval and governance; literature review;
ethnography (site 1); initial survey design; initial team meeting
l Months 4–6: Team and advisory meetings; ethnography (sites 1–4), data clinics/analysis; brief progress
report for SDO; focus group design/preparation
l Months 7–9: Ethnography (sites 1–4) data clinics/analysis, survey preparation; focus groups data
collection, team meeting
l Months 10–12: Survey administration, team/advisory meetings; update of literature review;
ethnography (sites 2–4), survey analysis, ethnographic data analysis; brief progress report for SDO;
l Months 13–15: Update of literature review; advisory and team meetings; integrative workshop with
PRP funded study researchers; ﬁnal report writing and paper writing115
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DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 36. Project ManagementThe team combines disciplinary expertise in sociology and psychology and considerable experience of
health services research. Turnbull will lead and supervise the project, manage the researcher, oversee
ethics, governance and ﬁeldwork/surveys, and lead the analysis and reporting. Pope and Halford will
contribute to the ethnography and take lead roles in analysis and reporting. Prichard will supervise the
surveys and take a key role in analysis and dissemination. Jones will provide expertise in economic
modelling, statistical approaches and evidence review, for the integration of our ﬁndings with the parallel
PRP funded project. May will contribute theoretical expertise, advise on the ethnography and analysis and
will make a major contribution to dissemination of ﬁndings. Lattimer will support stakeholder liaison/site
access, advise on the surveys and analysis of workforce planning implications.7. Dissemination and user engagementResearch will be disseminated summatively through reports and journal articles and formatively to current
and future user groups, to maximise the impact of our ﬁndings to the future planning and development of
the workforce. Outputs will include ﬁnal reports, and papers for relevant journals to inform the research
and policy community in the range of disciplinary and practice ﬁelds implicated in this research (e.g. J Hth
Serv Res & Policy; Soc Sci Med; Sociology; Work Employment & Society; BMJ; Lancet; Health Informatics J).
Building on work underway as part of our previous project we will seek to use emerging web technologies
(the semantic web) to enable effective dissemination via the web to allow wider engagement. We will seek
to disseminate to the health research and provider communities, as well as liaising with SDO network by
presenting at service services research conferences (e.g. HSRN SDO Network annual conference,
Organisational Behaviour in Health Care), in addition to other appropriate urgent/emergency care and
sociology conferences. We will work closely with SDO and our advisory group to prepare ﬁndings that can
be readily disseminated to target audiences of urgent care service providers, workforce planners,
healthcare managers, policy-makers and users of new technologies. We would look to disseminate
ﬁndings via the NHS Forum.
Relevant stakeholders were consulted (at the Department of Health and urgent care providers) to secure
their involvement in developing the proposal. As this new service has potential to impact on the whole
population our deﬁnition of ‘user’ is broad and includes patient/lay users of services, staff and
organisations using CDSS, and key local and national stakeholders (e.g. CDSS developers, strategic
planning/policy, clinical, and IT managers). We will include representatives of these in our advisory group
and dissemination plans. The advisory group will meet 3 times during the project. In addition we plan to
link the user engagement aspects of our project with the activities of the PRP project by holding at least
two joint meetings where the user representatives from both projects meet to discuss the issues and
ﬁndings from both strands of work.
We will also have links to, and support, of the Work Futures Research Centre at the University of
Southampton via the newly formed special interest network on the health and social care workforce. This
give us access to an interdisciplinary network of researchers, healthcare policy-makers and NHS managers
concerned with innovation in working and organisational practices across health care in the 21st century.
We hope to organise a joint workshop/seminar with WFRC to present and discuss our ongoing analyses to
facilitate a broad exchange of knowledge and ideas surrounding the study.
In the research sites we will build on successful engagement mechanisms developed in our previous
research linking to local R&D and strategic committees to facilitate and disseminate the research. We will
also make effective use of regular electronic bulletins and feedback to ensure that staff and stakeholders
are kept up to date with the project progress and ﬁndings.117
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Shelley Noble (Senior Clinical Nurse Manager, Solent NHS Trust)
Alicia O’Cathain (joint principal investigator of the PRP-funded NHS 111 service evaluation,
University of Shefﬁeld)
Francine O’Malley (Senior Nurse in Unscheduled Care and Lecturer, University of Southampton)
Stephen Peckham (Professor of Health Policy, University of Kent and the London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine)
Nicholas Reeves (Department of Health advisor)
Arjan Shahani (lay advisor)
Ann Short (lay advisor)
Helen Smith (Professor of Primary Care, University of Brighton)
Janette Turner (joint principal investigator of the PRP-funded NHS 111 service evaluation,
University of Shefﬁeld)Purpose and activitiesThe advisory group assisted the project by providing external research and theoretical input and by
informing us about relevant practice and policy issues. The group members were invited because of their
experience and interest in issues related to the use of technologies in health-care settings and they are
drawn from academic, policy-making and health-care arenas. The group also included public/lay
representatives with the aim of helping to keep our research relevant and accessible to a wide range of
audiences and users.
The group played an important role in helping us think about the implications and dissemination of our
ﬁndings. We held two meetings over the course of the project in January 2012 and September 2012.
The main focus of each meeting was as follows:
l January 2012: introduction to the research, choosing the case study settings and discussion of urgent
and emergency care policy.
l September 2012: feedback on the main ﬁndings and structure of the ﬁnal report.119
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observation and focus groups
Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 11/NE/0198111 URGENT CARE STUDY: WORK, WORKFORCE, TECHNOLOGY
AND ORGANISATIONFurther information for staff and stakeholders at participating
sites about the observation and focus groups
The study
We are studying the work, workforce, technology and the organisational factors that are required to
deliver ‘111’ urgent care services. We are using a case study approach which means that we will look at
the four 111 pilot sites in detail, including your workplace. The study will include managers, policy makers,
health professionals, technical and support staff who have contact with or responsibility for this site. We
will conduct focus groups with staff and stakeholders about their experiences of providing or working for
the 111 service, observe staff undertaking their everyday work, and use questionnaires to collect
information for this study.
This information sheet tells you about the observation and focus group part of the studyAbout the observation
For this part of the study one to two researchers will come to your workplace to watch how staff work
and how NHS Pathways and other technologies are used. The purpose of the research is not to assess or
audit staff performance. No information about individuals will be reported back to managers at your
organisation. We will display posters to inform you when the observation is taking place and if the
researcher is observing an area where you work they will ask you for verbal consent before they begin
observing. The researcher will sit or stand somewhere out of the way so that they do not interfere with
your work and they will watch and take notes. If you have any questions or concerns before or during the
observation period you can ask the researcher. If you want them to stop observing or move to another
location you can ask them to do so at any time. If you do not want to take part in this part of the study
you can tell the researcher before or during the observation and they will not include you. The researcher
will be happy to answer any questions you have about the observation or the study – please do not
hesitate to ask.About the focus groups
We plan to conduct focus groups (a group discussion with approximately eight to 10 people) with some
(but not all) of the staff here about the 111 urgent care service. We will choose staff with different jobs/
roles to tell us about their experiences of providing the 111 urgent service and look at the technologies
used (e.g. NHS Pathways, appointment booking systems). If we want to invite you to participate in a focus121
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122group, a member of the research team will approach you, and if you want to take part they will ﬁx a time
that is convenient for you and the other focus group participants.
The focus group will take approximately 1–2 hours and will take place in a meeting room. Before the
focus group starts the researcher will explain the study to you and go through a consent form with you to
make sure you are happy to take part. The focus group will be a group discussion facilitated by one of the
researchers. We will ask the group about their experiences of working in the 111 services, and their use of
technology in providing the service. We will not be asking anything about individual patients or patient
records. With your permission we will record the focus group. You can ask questions before and during
the focus group and the researcher will be happy to tell you more about the study. You can decide not to
take part in the focus group and can tell the researcher (or withdraw from the focus group) if you decide
during the focus group that you do not want to participate in the group discussion. Direct quotes from
focus group participants may be used when writing up the project (e.g. ﬁnal report, journal publications),
but all quotes will anonymised (we will not refer to you by name), or use information that could identify
you (e.g. very speciﬁc job titles).Do I have to take part?
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Declining to take part in the study will not affect
your current or future job role in any way.Confidentiality
All of the data we collect will be kept strictly conﬁdential. Focus group recordings and typed up transcripts
of the focus groups and observation notes will only be accessed by the study team and will be kept in
password-protected computer ﬁles and/or a locked cabinet. All personal details and information that can
identify individuals will be removed from the data when it is being analysed and reported. The study will
be carried out in full compliance with all relevant guidance from the NHS ethics committee, NHS research
governance and Data Protection legislation.What are the possible problems and disadvantages of taking part?
We do not anticipate any problems arising from participation in this study. We will not ask you to change
anything about the way you work and you do not have to take part if you do not want to.What are the possible benefits of taking part?
There are unlikely to be direct personal beneﬁts to you from this study. Some people enjoy participating in
this kind of research and welcome the opportunity to talk about their work. We will feed back our
ﬁndings to you and keep you regularly updated about the study.Who is funding and organising the research?
The research is a collaboration between the Universities of Southampton and East Anglia. It is funded by
the National Institute of Health Research Service Delivery and Organisation programme but the research
team is independent – we do not work for the trust you work for.What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of this study will be written up for a report to the funders and for the ethics committee and for
publications that will be read by health professionals and health service managers and other researchers.
We will be happy to send you a free copy of the research report if you tell us you would like one.Who has reviewed the study?
The study has been reviewed by the National Institute for Health Research, the [name of] Research Ethics
Committee and your local trust in accordance with the research governance framework.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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You can contact the project leader, Joanne Turnbull (details below), if you have any concerns about
this study or a complaint. If you would prefer to contact someone independent from the research team
you can contact: Research Governance, Corporate Services, Building 37, Level 4, Room 4001, University
of Southampton, Highﬁeld Campus, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, tel. 023 8059 5058 or email
rgoinfo@soton.ac.uk.Contact details:
If you have any questions about the study please contact the project leader, Joanne Turnbull, on 023 8059
7940 or jct@soton.ac.uk, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Southampton, Highﬁeld Campus,
Southampton, SO17 1BJ.123
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Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 11/NE/0198111 URGENT CARE STUDY: WORK, WORKFORCE, TECHNOLOGY
AND ORGANISATIONFocus group topic guide for staff and stakeholders
Outlining the aims of the study and focus groupl This study is being carried out by the University of Southampton and University of East Anglia. The
study is being funded by the National Institute for Health Research Service Delivery and Organisation
programme, but the research is independent – we do not work for the NHS or the trust that you
work for.
l Whilst research has been commissioned to examine activity and patient perspectives surrounding 111,
it is important to also examine the work required to deliver the service, the types of workforce and skill
mix required, the interlinked technologies that will be brought into use, and the wider organisational
implications of the introduction of this new service, which represents a large-scale and fundamental
change in the way urgent care is delivered.
l In this group discussion we will ask you about your day-to-day work and 111 service provision, as well
as discuss the impact of 111 service provision on the urgent care workforce, the technologies that you
use and how they work, and about some of the wider organisational factors that affect the 111 service.
l The purpose of this research is not to assess or audit staff performance.
l This is one of several group discussions being carried out with a range of staff and stakeholders that
are involved in providing the 111 service. Focus groups are being held in each of the 111 pilot sites.Instructions/format of the discussionsl Check participants have received and read project information. Recap, answer questions as necessary.
l This is an opportunity to discuss your experiences of working within the 111 service.
l The focus group is a discussion not a question-and-answer session and we anticipate that it should last
between an hour and a half to two hours.
l We would like to tape record it to make sure we get an accurate record of what is said. Then it will be
transcribed and analysed for our project report back, but everything you say will remain anonymous
throughout the research – all names will be removed and no comments will be attributable to any
identiﬁable individual.
l We would also ask you to respect each other’s conﬁdentiality about any personal details shared today.
l Talk through consent form and gain permission to tape record. Ask participants to sign the
consent form.
l Any questions before we start? (NB Check everyone has signed consent forms)125
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126Backgroundl Let’s start by introducing ourselves. We will go round the table to introduce everyone.
l If you could include your name and brieﬂy the nature of your job role.
l The 111 pilots have changed the way that urgent care services link together and how care is provided.
I would imagine that some of you might be new to the 111 service and some will have experiences of
working within urgent care before 111 was introduced. I’d like to start by asking each of you to
describe BRIEFLY your background, for example how long you have worked in both your current post
and how long you have worked for the NHS.
PROMPT – Length of service in NHS; previous roles; previous urgent or emergency care experience; main
day-to-day tasks associated with their jobChanges in work, roles and responsibilities with the introduction of 111l Has their job changed in type/nature of work since 111 introduction?
PROMPT – Reasons for and nature of changes in the context of the wider changes within the NHS and
urgent and emergency care provision; reasons for and nature of impact
l Impact on everyday work – nature and scope of work/responsibilities
PROMPT – Has the work changed – overall and day-to-day; impact on nature and scope of work/
responsibilities, job/workload/management of work – complexity? Intensity?
l Team working and sharing knowledge about provision of 111
PROMPT – Contact between 111 organisations – has the work changedStaff development, skills and trainingl Has the 111 service necessitated learning new (or updating) skills for staff?
PROMPT – Necessity or choice? Nature and reasons for updating; qualifications – professional/academic
l Explore any training gaps
PROMPT – Training received; internal/external? What sort of training do you think is needed? What would
help? Formal mechanisms for identifying skills shortages/gaps? Informal mechanisms?
l Has the 111 service seen the creation of new staff roles?
PROMPT – Explore any new or extended roles; were they anticipated prior to the introduction of 111
l Monitoring/auditing of staff/feedback on performanceTechnologiesl History of working with NHS Pathways and other technologies
PROMPT – Were these new technologies with 111 introduction or previous history. Have they worked
with other CDSS prior to 111 – comparison; any problems/workarounds? What do they like/dislike about
this CDSS?
l Explore conﬁdence and trust in NHS Pathways and other technologiesNIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02030 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 3Organisational contextl Facilitators and barriers to implementation of 111
l NHS policy and 111
l How did the pilot come about
l What do you see the beneﬁts/challenges of 111
l Resources needed – and why
PROMPT – Financial; staff; space; technical support; equipment
l Resources lacking – and why?The future of the 111 servicel Is it working? Has it delivered what you wanted or expected it to deliver?
l Where do you see it heading?
l Longer-term implicationsRounding upl Thank participants for their time
l Make sure they have researchers contact details127
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the survey
Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: 11/NE/0198111 URGENT CARE STUDY: WORK, WORKFORCE, TECHNOLOGY
AND ORGANISATIONFurther information for staff and stakeholders at
participating sites
About the survey
Invitation to participate
We would like to invite you to take part in this research study by completing a survey. Before you decide
whether or not to take part, please take time to read the following information which explains why this
research is being done and what you involvement would consist of. Talk to others if you wish, and please
feel free to ask questions if there is anything that you are unsure of. Thank you for reading this.The study
We are studying the work, workforce, technology and the organisational factors that are required to deliver
‘111’ urgent care services. We are using a case study approach which means that we will look at the four
111 pilot sites in detail, including your workplace. The study will include managers, policy makers, health
professionals, technical and support staff who have contact with or responsibility for this site. We will
conduct focus groups with staff and stakeholders about their experiences of providing or working for the
111 service, observe staff undertaking their everyday work, and use questionnaires to collect information
for this study.
This information sheet tells you about the survey part of the studyWhy have I been chosen to take part?
We are asking all staff at your workplace to take part because you work in an organisation that has
agreed to participate in the study.Do I have to take part?
No, taking part in this study is voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. You are not
obliged to take part in the research just because your organisation is participating.What will happen to me if I take part?
For this part of the research, we would like you to complete a survey which asks you about your work
which should take you about 15 minutes to complete. We would like to know about your views and137
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138experiences of you working in the 111 urgent care service. This will enable us to understand how the 111
service works and how it might be successfully implemented at other locations in the future.How do I take part?
There are two ways to complete the questionnaire. Firstly you can complete the enclosed paper
questionnaire and return the completed questionnaire in the Freepost addressed envelopes that we have
supplied. This can either be put in the locked box located at your organisation or it can be posted directly
to Alison Rowsell, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Southampton, [Freepost ID/address], Highﬁeld,
Southampton, SO17 1BJ.
Secondly, you can complete the questionnaire online at [web address].Confidentiality
All of the data we collect will be kept strictly conﬁdential. All data will be handled in accordance with the
Data Protection Act 1998. Your surveys will be kept in a secure cabinet in the university. Your organisation
will not have access to your completed questionnaire. The information you give us in the survey will be
entered into an anonymised database which will not contain any personal details about you. The study will
be carried out in full compliance with all relevant guidance from the NHS ethics committee, NHS research
governance and Data Protection legislation.What are the possible problems and disadvantages of taking part?
We do not anticipate any problems arising from participation in this study.What are the possible benefits of taking part?
There are unlikely to be direct personal beneﬁts to you from this study. Some people enjoy participating in
this kind of research and welcome the opportunity to give their views about their work. We will feed back
our ﬁndings to you and keep you regularly updated about the study and we hope that you will ﬁnd
this interesting.Who is funding and organising the research?
The research is a collaboration between the Universities of Southampton and East Anglia. It is funded by
the National Institute for Health Research Service Delivery and Organisation programme but the research
team is independent – we do not work for the trust or NHS organisation that you work for.What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of this study will be written up for a report to the funders and for the ethics committee and for
publications that will be read by health professionals and health service managers and other researchers.
We will be happy to send you a free copy of the research report if you tell us you would like one.Who has reviewed the study?
The study has been reviewed by the Department of Health, the [name of] Research Ethics Committee and
your local trust in accordance with the research governance framework.Who can I contact if I have a concern or complaint about this study?
You can contact the project leader, Joanne Turnbull (details below), if you have any concerns about
this study or a complaint. If you would prefer to contact someone independent from the research
team you can contact: Research Governance, Corporate Services, Building 37, Level 4, Room 4055,
University of Southampton, Highﬁeld Campus, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, tel. 023 8059 5058 or email
rgoinfo@soton.ac.uk.NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
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If you have any questions about the study please contact the project leader, Joanne Turnbull, on 023 8059
7940 or jct@soton.ac.uk, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Southampton, Highﬁeld Campus,
Southampton, SO17 1BJ.139
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